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769 
ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 
GORDON BUTLER∗ 
A good man leaves an inheritance for his children’s children.1 
ABSTRACT 
The next forty years of economic life will be dominated by one underlying 
theme: dealing with the retirement income security of a growing, aging and longer-
lived global population. This is a “can’t run, can’t hide” problem that will affect the 
lives of almost every human being on the planet . . . Whether you are light in your 
pension account, whether you have more money than Croesus, whether you live in 
the well-funded Netherlands, or whether you are a put-upon unambitious young male 
in Japan who sees no future for himself, you cannot escape this problem.2 
Before you read very far you will realize that looming Baby-Boomer retirements 
are a ticking time bomb that threatens even those who have saved prudently for most 
of their lives. This is because many millions of others will enter retirement with 
virtually no private savings. The second group, which is far larger than the first, will 
face unmet needs that governments will find politically impossible to ignore. And to 
meet those needs, we will need lots of additional tax revenue, which can only come 
from those in a position to provide it. As Willie Sutton replied when asked why he 
robbed banks, “that’s where the money is.”3 
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 1 Proverbs 13:22. 
 2  RICHARD A. MARIN, GLOBAL PENSION CRISIS: UNFUNDED LIABILITIES AND HOW WE 
CAN FILL THE GAP 43 (2013). The abstract of a recent article about the pension system in 
Australia begins: “Dealing with the fiscal impacts of Australia’s ageing population is 
potentially the most important issue for the next 30 years. The majority of the countries in the 
developed world are facing an ageing population due to sustained low fertility and increased 
life expectancy.” Rhys Cormick & John McLaren, The current retirement system in Australia 
needs to be more attuned to a mobile international workforce: A case for reform, 29 
AUSTRALIAN TAX F. 493 (2014).  
 3  Robert H. Frank, Foreword to MARIN, supra note 2, at ix. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
770 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:769 
 
  C.  Federal Government’s Long-Term Fiscal Problems ..................... 784 
  1.  Intergenerational Inequality ................................................... 788 
  2.  Standard Solutions to Social Security Financing ................... 789 
  3.  The Easy Solution—Not So Easy .......................................... 798 
II.  JUSTIFYING SOCIAL SECURITY .................................................................. 799 
  A.  Stay the Course with the Present Social Security Structure ........... 799 
  B.  Arguments for Forced Savings ....................................................... 804 
  C.  Arguments Favoring Investor Participation .................................. 805 
  D.  Acknowledged Faults ...................................................................... 809 
III.  ABANDONING LEG TWO: DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS ................................ 810 
  A.  The Municipal Bankruptcy: Detroit ............................................... 810 
  1.  Urban Flight and the Anemic Tax Base ................................. 811 
  2.  Adverse Demographic Shifts ................................................. 811 
  3.  Inaccurate Projections of Financial Returns .......................... 812 
  4.  The Approved Workout Plan ................................................. 813 
  B.  The States: New Jersey, California, Illinois ................................... 816 
  1.  New Jersey ............................................................................. 818 
  2.  Illinois .................................................................................... 819 
  3.  California ............................................................................... 823 
  4.  Future of State Pensions ........................................................ 828 
  5.  Impact of the Employer Retirement Income  
   Security Act (“ERISA”) ......................................................... 830 
  C.  Demographic Problems Worldwide Strain Pension Funding ........ 832 
  D.  Protesting Plan Changes and Constitutional Litigation ................ 838 
  E.  Private Employer Pensions: Problems with General Motors ........ 840 
  1.  GM’s Pension Troubles ......................................................... 846 
  2.  What to Do Now? .................................................................. 848 
IV.  LEG THREE: PRIVATE SAVINGS PLANS .................................................... 850 
  A.  The Rise of the 401(k) Plan ............................................................ 850 
  B.  Guaranteed Retirement Account .................................................... 855 
  C.  President Bush’s Plan for Private Accounts .................................. 855 
  D.  Chile’s Private Pension System ...................................................... 858 
  1.  An Overview of Chile’s Private Pension System .................. 859 
  2.  Obtaining Benefits ................................................................. 861 
  3.  The Transition Financing Pensions and Pension Options ..... 862 
  4.  Criticism of the Chilean Model ............................................. 863 
  E.  Australia’s Model ........................................................................... 864 
  F.  Canadian Savings Account ............................................................. 867 
  1.  Key Features .......................................................................... 868 
  G.  Social Security Works All Generations Plan .................................. 869 
  H.  The Better Base Case ...................................................................... 871 
V.  ONE FUND SOLUTION ................................................................................ 875 
  A.  Integrating Social Security with the Total Retirement Scheme ...... 877 
  B.  The True Cost of Retirement ........................................................... 879 
  C.  Market Failure ................................................................................ 882 
  D.  Annuities ......................................................................................... 887 
  E.  Put No Confidence In princes . . . or Their Economists ................. 890 
  F.  Markets Not as Free as People Think ............................................ 892 
  G.  The Great Recession and Lost Wealth ............................................ 896 
  H.  Social Security: A Different Kind of Defined Benefit Plan ............ 898 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 771 
 
  I.  Alleviating the Problem and Facilitating a Transition .................. 901 
  1.  Expand the Workforce ........................................................... 902 
  2.  Return to the Fiscal Constitution ........................................... 902 
  3.  Breaking the Logjam of Tax Expenditures ............................ 904 
  4.  Excessive Tax Expenditures and Retirement 
   Tax Complexity ..................................................................... 906 
  5.  Technological Breakthrough .................................................. 910 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 911 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eve of President George W. Bush’s inauguration in January 2001 the 
world was at peace and the federal deficit was predicted to produce a $5.6 trillion 
surplus over the next ten years. Indeed, Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Federal 
Reserve Board was fretting about the problems that would be caused if the national 
debt were paid off.4 At that time, total federal debt was $5.6 trillion, and debt held by 
the public was $3.4 trillion. In 2009, President Obama found the federal debt nearly 
doubled at $10.0 trillion and debt held by the public at $5.8 trillion. In 2017, when 
the next President takes office, the federal debt is projected at $20.3 trillion with debt 
held by the public at $14.9 trillion. Overall federal debt will have grown by $14.7 
trillion, and the debt held by the public will have grown by $11.5 trillion in the first 
sixteen years of the twenty-first century.5 
The next President’s most optimistic observation may be that the United States 
has survived sixteen years of fiscally irresponsible and excessive spending, wasteful 
and interminable wars, failed projects, and the inability to take modest steps to solve 
the nation’s long-term deficit problem handicapping the nation with $17 trillion of 
debt. However, the next President may find solace from an unexpected source. The 
discovery of energy resources could tip the balance toward national solvency and 
reduce the cost of manufacturing in the United States provided government 
regulations do not hinder its development or use the new wealth for new programs, 
more wars, and/or for maintaining the wasteful and inefficient programs.6 A further 
reason to be optimistic is the reassertion of the United States’ historic abhorrence of 
debt.7 
Retirement security is viewed as a three-legged stool in which the first leg is 
Social Security, the second, employer-sponsored pensions, and the third is personal 
savings.8 Medicare is sometimes viewed as a fourth leg, and a “bridge job” is 
                                                            
 4  C. EUGENE STEUERLE, DEAD MEN RULING: HOW TO RESTORE FISCAL FREEDOM AND 
RESCUE OUR FUTURE 63 (2014). 
 5  Historical Tables: Federal Debt at the End of Year 1940-2017, OFFICE MGMT. & 
BUDGET, at tbl.7.1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Apr. 24, 
2016) (If the projections are correct, the average annual deficit over sixteen years was slightly 
over $700 billion per year.). 
 6  See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Inventives to Promote Sustainable 
Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More Stable Land 
Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 736-37 (2008). 
 7  It has been a part of the American dream that our children would have a better world 
than we inherited. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 8  NANCY J. ALTMAN & ERIC R. KINGSON, SOCIAL SECURITY WORKS!: WHY SOCIAL 
SECURITY ISN’T GOING BROKE AND HOW EXPANDING IT WILL HELP US ALL 58-59 (2015). 
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sometimes referred to as a fifth leg.9 Although a three-legged stool is inherently 
unstable, when any one of the legs are weakened the entire stool is in danger of 
collapsing. As a nation we find ourselves in an unstable situation due to our 
unwillingness to change the system. To use a children’s fairy tale, everyone has 
become immune to the warnings of fiscal demise by modern day “Chicken Littles.” 
Providing for the pension and health care obligations, needs, and expectations of 
the elderly is threatening the economies of cities, states, and nations, as well as 
private businesses and individuals. Governments have not only been unable to 
adequately address these growing obligations, but have created new ones that expand 
government in such a way that all major life decisions are dominated by 
governmental bureaucracy and economic growth necessary to accommodate these 
obligations has been stunted. 
America needs forward-thinking leaders who see into the second half of the 
twenty-first century and move the United States into a position of financial strength 
and solvency with personal responsibility and independence. Sylvester J. Schieber 
has noted the dilemma young people face: 
It looks like most of our children can just forget about a monthly 
employer pension. Many of the private pensions still standing are closed 
to new entrants, and the phenomenon has even spread to public pensions. 
Policy mavens in Washington are now suggesting that we need to raise 
the payroll tax cap and cut Social Security benefits. At the state and local 
level, public pension costs are edging out funding for educating our 
children and replacing crumbling infrastructure, in some cases inflicting 
near paralysis on other normal governmental functions . . . .10 
This Article is a continuation of two previously published articles proposing a 
one-fund account to simplify retirement planning for individuals.11 First, this Article 
outlines the parameters of the fiscal problem America faces and how its major 
entitlement program, Social Security, fits into that problem. This Article then 
focuses on the justifications given for taking twelve percent of an individual’s 
lifetime earnings and eliminating their investment choices. The next section 
examines the failure of cities, states, and countries, as well as companies, in 
fulfilling their defined benefit pension funding obligations. Then Social Security and 
its faults are discussed followed by some possible solutions and alternative ways to 
provide benefits that incorporate decisions made by the taxpayer whose funds are 
being taken. The final section discusses how the One Fund Solution meets many, if 
not all, of the parameters for a successful retirement plan. 
In reviewing the state of retirement security, Sylvester J. Schieber’s comments 
that the “so-called” golden age of retirement in the 1970s may not have been so 
golden after all but merely reflected a desire that should be kept in mind: 
                                                            
 9  SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER, THE PREDICTABLE SURPRISE: THE UNRAVELING OF THE U.S. 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM 4 (2012). 
 10  Id. at 6-7. 
 11  See Gordon T. Butler, American Paternalism and the One Fund Solution, 9 WYO. L. 
REV. 485 (2009) [hereinafter Butler, American Paternalism]; Gordon T. Butler, The One Fund 
Solution: “It’s My Money and I Need It Now!,” 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 262 (2011) 
[hereinafter Butler, It’s My Money]. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 773 
 
I do not believe that we should abandon the goal of a comfortable 
retirement supported by the combined efforts of government, employers, 
and ourselves. Retirement and our various retirement programs arose in 
response to economic and business necessities, as well as to a personal 
desire for a well-deserved rest after a lifetime of labor. None of those has 
gone away. We just have to figure out how to make our programs serve 
our interests instead of becoming slaves to them.12 
Finally, a tradition needing no authority for its support is the great American 
tradition that tells us we should leave the next generation a world that is better off 
than the one we inherited.13 
I. RETIREMENT’S THREE-LEGGED STOOL—SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WEAKENED FIRST 
LEG 
Social Security stands for a simple proposition: no matter how life works out, 
whether prosperity or ruin, no one will be left penniless in old age or because of 
disability or being orphaned.14 
Social Security is by far the most popular federal government program, the best 
funded federal program, and the strongest remaining piece of our badly frayed 
system of social benefits. It is also under relentless attack by those who would kill 
it.15 
A. Social Security Benefits 
Social Security retirement benefits are received in the form of a lifetime annuity 
that begins at full retirement age that is sixty-five for those born before 1938 and 
gradually increases to sixty-seven for those born after 1960. Workers qualify for 
Social Security benefits when they have forty full quarters of covered work in the 
system,16 and have the option of taking a reduced benefit at age sixty-two or an 
enhanced benefit by delaying the start of benefits beyond normal retirement age up 
to age seventy, at which time benefits must start.17 A beneficiary taking benefits 
prior to normal retirement age and earning more than a prescribed amount will have 
his or her benefit reduced by a percentage of earned income above that prescribed 
amount.  
                                                            
 12  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at xvii-xviii. 
 13  Id. at xviii. 
 14  David Cay Johnson, Foreword to ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xiii. 
 15  Id. The authors describe Social Security as the largest children’s program and largest 
disability program providing income security for millions of families. Id. at 16. 
 16  On this “quarter system” one credit is received for each quarter worked if the person 
earned $1,200 (in 2014) during the quarter. Survivors Planner: Planning for Survivors, SOC. 
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2016) [hereinafter Planning for Survivors]. Survivor and disability benefits for younger 
workers and their families can be paid if he earned a minimum of six credits in the three years 
prior to his death. Id. 
 17  The adjustment made to the benefit based on when the individual retires is “intended to 
be actually fair, so that a person’s total lifetime benefits will have an approximately equal 
value regardless of the age at which he or she begins collecting them.” ALTMAN & KINGSON, 
supra note 8, at 3. 
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The initial Social Security retirement benefit uses the worker’s “average indexed 
monthly earnings” (AIME) over a thirty-five-year period,18 and the “primary 
insurance amount” (PIA) to calculate the initial benefit by applying percentages to 
defined increments of the AIME.19 The first increment (currently up to $816) is 
multiplied by 90%, the amount in the next increment ($816 up to $4,917) is 
multiplied by 32%, and the final increment up to the maximum AIME ($4,917 up to 
$8,890) is multiplied by 15%.20 The result is a progressive formula providing a 
greater overall percentage of AIME to lower income workers than higher income 
workers.  
The retirement benefit is perhaps the most important benefit because it provides 
insurance against “bad labor market outcomes” that carry over into retirement.21 It 
contains a redistribution scheme by providing low-wage workers with an “adequate 
income” even when their working careers are unsuccessful.22 The retirement benefit 
provides a retirement for those who are too short-sighted to provide for their own 
retirement thereby providing an acceptable mandatory minimum standard living for 
the elderly.23  
The lifetime annuity also protects against the risk of outliving your retirement 
income.24 In addition, it is unique in that once the initial benefit is determined it will 
annually be adjusted based on increases in the cost-of-living index (COLA) to keep 
pace with consumer prices and protect the retiree’s purchasing power.25  
                                                            
 18  The Congressional Budget Office describes the impact of the initial benefit as follows: 
For the purpose of calculating average earnings to determine the initial benefit, the 
amounts earned in earlier years are converted to current-year earnings in the economy 
as a whole. Because average national earnings are projected to grow faster than 
inflation that indexation will cause average initial benefits to grow in real (inflation-
adjusted) terms and will keep the average replacement rate stable. (In later decades, 
the replacement rate will be slightly lower for workers with average earnings who 
claim benefits at age 65, mainly because of the scheduled increase in the full 
retirement age.) 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 2010, at 3 (2010). In other words, 
“the procedure converts a worker’s past earnings to approximately average-wage-indexed 
equivalent values near the time of his or her benefit eligibility.” THE BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. 
OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 
109 (2014) [hereinafter THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT]. 
 19  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
 20  Id. at 9. 
 21  See generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2015) (strongly supporting the function of government in 
providing social insurance against such adverse effects). 
 22  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 120-21. This protection against a failure to provide sufficient 
income outside Social Security may be due to causes outside an individual’s control but could 
just as likely represent poor choices in spending patterns.  
 23  Id. at 121. 
 24  Id. at 122. 
 25  Id. at 121-22. 
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Another critical element of the retirement benefit is that the spouse of a 
beneficiary is entitled to a benefit at least equal to one-half the benefit of the primary 
wage earner.26 The spouse is entitled to his or her own benefit if that benefit is 
greater than one-half of the primary beneficiary’s benefit.27 When the primary wage 
earner dies the surviving spouse takes the deceased spouses benefit if it is larger than 
their own benefit.28 
1. Disability and Survivor Benefits Under Social Security 
In addition to retirement benefits, Social Security provides survivor and disability 
benefits.29 Survivor insurance is built into the current Social Security system and is 
funded by the Social Security taxes paid by the individual. Upon a beneficiary’s 
death, benefits are paid to the surviving spouse, and in some cases a former spouse;30 
children under age eighteen,31 and other dependents.32  
The amount of any benefit is based on the decedent’s “insured status,”33 lifetime 
earnings, disability status (if applicable), and the maximum amount of benefits he 
                                                            
 26  Id. at 120. 
 27  Id. at 120-21. 
 28  As noted later in this Article, the non-working spouse’s receipt of a 50% benefit creates 
a much larger return for those family units who are often higher income individuals. Some 
people think of the spousal benefit as a means of offsetting effects of the progressive objective 
of the benefit formula. Id. at 120-21. 
 29  M. L. Reig, The Unspoken Poor: Single Elderly Women Surviving in Rural America, 9 
ELDER L.J. 257, 260 (2001). 
 30  Divorced widows or widowers may also be eligible. See Social Security Survivor 
Benefits, NAT’L CAREGIVERS LIBR., http://www.caregiverslibrary.org/caregivers-
resources/grp-money-matters/hsgrp-social-security/social-security-survivor-benefits-
article.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2016); LEXIS TAX ADVISOR–FEDERAL TOPICAL § 6A:5.06 
(discussing the applicability of state law to determine whether there was a state marriage, 
common law marriage, or a deemed marriage). Furthermore, being a child of the deceased 
worker does not automatically make the individual a qualified child. 
 31  Social Security is provided only to children under eighteen years old. ALTMAN & 
KINGSON, supra note 8, at 120-121 and 214; Amy Foster, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY GUIDE 
FOR BEGINNERS, 41 (2016). But see Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (2012) (stating 
children conceived after a parent’s death are not entitled to survivor benefits if state law 
forbids it); LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30 (“[A]n individual may be eligible for child’s 
benefits if the individual is . . . (2) under age 19 and a full-time elementary or secondary 
student; (3) 16 years or older but became disabled prior to reaching age 22.”). 
 32  See 22 C.F.R. § 19.11–1 (2106). The beneficiary’s age (spouse, child, or dependent) 
also affects the benefits a person can receive. For example, a spouse under the age of 
retirement will have their monthly benefit reduced based on a specified formula. “The formula 
for spousal benefits, based on the number of months entitlement before full retirement age, is: 
25/36 of 1% for each month of the 36 months reduction; and 5/12 of 1% of each month of 
reduction in excess of 36 months.” LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30, at § 6A:5.06[b]. In the 
case of a qualified divorced spouse, the formula is very similar, but it has three additional 
requirements. Id. at § 6A:5.06[c]. 
 33  An individual can be “currently insured, fully insured, insured for disability, or 
transitionally insured.” LEXIS TAX ADVISOR, supra note 30, at § 1N:8.06. A “currently 
insured” person must have “quarter coverage,” by having a minimum level of earnings for six 
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would have received if he were still living.34 Normally a beneficiary cannot receive 
more benefits than the deceased would have during his life, but the maximum family 
benefit is between 150 and 180% of the deceased’s full retirement age benefit.35 
Survivor benefits, in the case of a wage earner’s premature death, rarely occurs (less 
than .025%) and the progressive benefit structure has the effect of redistributing 
wealth.36 
Social Security also provides disability insurance that extends earnings protection 
to people unable to support themselves by working.37 While the definition of 
disability is stringent, people who qualify for disability often stay on disability until 
they qualify for early retirement benefits under Social Security.38 Recently, there has 
been criticism of the disability benefit in that many people used disability as a means 
of extending their unemployment insurance. Although in need of considerable 
revision, disability insurance protects against a moderate risk of 2%.39  
Beyond the benefit for the individual at retirement, the spousal, dependent, and 
disability benefits look like a game with innumerable twists and turns with various 
                                                            
calendar quarters out of the last thirteen quarters of his life. Meeting this requirement qualifies 
for coverage but does not affect the benefit amount, which is limited. See Survivors Planner: 
How Much Would Your Survivors Receive?, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown5.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 
Survivors Receive]; Quarter of Coverage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/QC.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter 
Quarter of Coverage]. A person with “fully insured” status receives “virtually all of 
retirement and death benefits of the deceased.” Reig, supra note 29. To be fully insured the 
decedent must have one quarter of coverage for each year which has elapsed since “1950 (or, 
after the year in which he or she became 21 if after 1950) and before the year he or she died or 
(if earlier) the year in which she or he attained age 62.” Short-range Projects for the Social 
Security Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as115/as115_VI_H.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
 34  Survivors Receive, supra note 33 (showing the amount a survivor may obtain based on 
the relevant factors, and explaining the maximum benefits a qualified beneficiary may receive 
cannot be greater than the amount the decedent would have received while he was living); see 
also Survivors Planner: Survivors Benefits For Your Widow or Widower, SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/onyourown2.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2015) 
[hereinafter Widow or Widower] (explaining the amount a spouse may obtain based on the 
stated factors). 
 35  Planning for Survivors, supra note 16; see also 21 KIPLINGER’S RETIREMENT REPORT, 
YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED: FAMILY MAXIMUM SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 14 (2014). 
 36  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 119. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 119-20. 
 39  Calculations similar to those for survivor benefits provide a progressive benefit 
structure for disabled workers. The benefit for disabled workers is based on their wage-
indexed average earnings through the time of disability. Id. The disability benefit paid is 
progressive such that the replacement rate (the ratio of benefits received to a worker’s past 
earnings) is higher for people with lower average earnings that for people with higher 
earnings. Id. 
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winners and losers.40 For example, a sixty-two-year-old man with three children 
under eighteen can take an early-reduced retirement benefit and his three children 
can claim dependent benefits of an additional $1,800 per month.41 A married couple 
could face up to 625 options for claiming benefits; divorced spouses also have 
numerous options for claiming benefits based on a former spouse’s status.42 
Notwithstanding numerous criticisms, Social Security is a valuable part of 
retirement planning. One study found Social Security comprised one-third of the 
assets of people between the ages of sixty three to sixty-seven in 2000; the remaining 
two thirds were equally divided between employer pensions and retirement 
savings.43  
B. Social Security’s Long-Term Financial Problems 
Social Security is the largest single federal program and is often referred to as the 
most successful federal program.44 It provides benefits to retired workers, their 
survivors and dependents, through Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), and to 
people with disabilities, through Disability Insurance (DI).45 For people over the age 
of sixty-five, the benefits are a major source of income, 50% or more of total income 
for 67% of those families, and 90% or more of total income for almost a third of 
such families.46 
Social Security is funded through two primary sources of dedicated tax revenues: 
payroll taxes and taxes on benefits. Approximately 97% of the revenues are from a 
payroll tax of 12.4% levied on earnings and split evenly by workers and their 
                                                            
 40  Social Security pitfalls and windfalls: Playing the game right can add more to your 
monthly check, CONSUMER REP. (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:00 PM) 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/02/7-social-security-pitfalls-and-
windfalls/index.htm. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id.  
 43  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 125 (noting that the top and bottom 10% of wage earners 
provided unique situations and were not included in the study and concluding, “[a]nyone who 
contends that it is not a retirement program, albeit one with a number of unique features, is 
ignoring the facts”). 
 44  STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 138. Marin, suggests that the Social Security program had 
its origin, not in the great depression of the 1930s but “in the English Poor Laws enacted in 
mother England in 1601 and brought over on the Mayflower in 1620 as part of the Puritan 
Ethic and Anglo history of caring for the poor, aged, and indigent. MARIN, supra note 2, at 58. 
This fervent sense of self-determination and independence that came with the Puritan Ethics 
made this the exception in social policy, not the norm.” Id.  
 45  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 1. 
 46 Id. at 2. The report notes that OASI accounts for 82% of the benefits and DI for 18%. 
Id. AARP identifies the percentage of the population over sixty-five in each state that depends 
on Social Security for at least 90% of their income. News From Your State, AARP BULL., 
June 2014, at 36(C). The range is between 14.5% (Alaska) and 32.7% (Tennessee). Id. Eleven 
states in the Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, and WV) have between 
27.2% and 32.7%, while nine states are below 20% (AK, CA, CT, HI, MD, NE, OR, WA, and 
WY). Id.  
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employers at 6.2% each.47 The tax applies to taxable earnings up to a maximum of 
$117,000 in 2014, and up to $118,500 in 2015 pursuant to annual adjustments.48 
Social Security taxable wages constitute approximately 83% of covered earnings 
(i.e. wages and self-employment income).49 Approximately 3% of the revenues come 
from taxes on Social Security benefits received by high-income beneficiaries.50 The 
current 12.4% rate presents a stark contrast to the original 2% rate in the Social 
Security Act in 1935.51 
Two trust funds have been created to receive tax payments and distribute 
payments to beneficiaries. One is for the OASI program, and the other one is for the 
DI program, although they have often been described collectively as the “OASDI 
trust funds.”52 Whenever tax revenues exceed expenditures, creating a surplus, the 
excess funds are loaned to the federal government to fund general operations and are 
considered a loan from the trust fund to the government, which will eventually be 
repaid with interest credited to the trust fund on a regular basis.53 
In 2013, payments into the OASDI trust funds, exclusive of interest, totaled 
$752.8 billion while expenditures, benefits, railroad retirement financial exchange, 
and administrative expense, totaled $822.9 billion.54 The $70.7 billion deficit was 
covered by the $102.8 billion in interest credited to the trust fund so that the trust 
fund grew by $32.1 billion to $2,764.4 billion.55  
                                                            
 47  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 36. Noting that during the formative states in the 
development of Social Security: 
Everyone was convinced that a national program that did not include contributions 
from workers and their employers would almost certainly have to include means 
testing. Virtually all students of social insurance found means test demeaning and 
beneficiaries of traditional welfare programs that included such testing were 
commonly considered to be personal failure by the broad cross-section of society. 
Id. The contributory nature of the system gave the beneficiaries a “right” to their benefit so 
that they could say, “I have paid for my benefits.” Id. at 37. The failure to provide for one’s 
retirement was viewed not as a personal failure, but as a failure of the industrial system. 
 48  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18. 
 49  Id. 
 50  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 36. 
 51  The final provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act provided for a 1% tax on the first 
$3,000 of income on both the employee and the employer. That Act scheduled 0.5% increases 
in the payroll tax every three years until the rate reached 3% on each the employee and the 
employer in 1949. Id. at 40. In subsequent debates leading the 1939 Amendments over 
whether the system should be pre-funded or simply pay-as-you-go, the date of the scheduled 
increase was gradually pushed back until 1950 while benefit increases were incorporated into 
the system. Id. 56-57. These changes pushed the system toward pay-as-you-go and left it for 
future generations to worry about the funding and left some people concerned over leaving the 
public unawares of the ever-growing debt in excess of the acknowledged debt of the United 
States. Id. 
 52  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 136. 
 53  For 2013, the trust funds effective annual rate of interest was 3.8%. Id. at 7. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. at 22. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 779 
 
Since 2010, tax revenues into the trust fund have been insufficient to fund 
benefits so that payments into the fund from general tax revenues in the form of 
interest on the trust fund assets were needed to make up the shortfall.56 These 
payments, although built into the system, reversed the dynamic in the federal budget 
in which excess Social Security revenues were used to decrease the deficit. The first 
decrease in the trust fund occurred unexpectedly in 2015.57 Now repayment of those 
revenues will increase the deficit. The amount needed to repay trust funds will grow 
annually so that by 2033 the trust fund will be exhausted. 
By 2035, the number of people over age sixty-five will have grown by 90% 
while those between twenty and sixty-four will have grown by only 10%.58 In 
addition, the life expectancy of the older generation is increasing. Reflecting these 
changes, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) dedicated to paying benefits will grow from 4.8% in 
2010 to 6.2% in 2035, as the Baby-Boomer generation moves through retirement, 
and then decline over the next fifteen years to 5.95% in 2050.59 
When making projections, the Trustees of the OASDI trust funds make certain 
assumptions regarding demographic, economic, and programmatic criteria. 
Recognizing that such assumptions are critical to any projection, the Trustees make 
projections using a “low-cost,” “intermediate-cost,” and “high-cost” scenario.60 
Unless otherwise indicated, the intermediate-cost scenario is presented because it 
represents the Trustees’ best estimates of future experience.  
The Trustees use several tests to evaluate the status of the system. One such test, 
the Short-Range Actuarial Estimate, seeks to measure financial adequacy by looking 
at the trust fund ratio over a ten-year period (e.g. 2014 through 2023).61 The trust 
fund ratio is the projected trust fund reserves at the beginning of each period to the 
projected program cost for that year. Maintaining a ratio of 100% is a good 
                                                            
 56  Id. (Trust fund revenues, exclusive of interest, have been insufficient to pay benefits 
since 2010.). 
 57  Jed Graham, Social Security Trust Fund Fell, First Time Since 1983, INV. BUS. DAILY 
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.investors.com/politics/capital-hill/social-security-trust-fund-ends-
32-year-streak/. 
 58  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4. 
 59  Id. After 2050, it is anticipated that the trajectory will resume its upward climb 
reaching 6.3% in 2080. Id. Another common measure is the ratio of workers to beneficiary, 
which fell below 3:1 in 2010 and will decline to 2.1:1 by 2035. THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, 
supra note 18, at 113-14 (indicating that the ratio was stable at 3.2 to 3.4 to 1 from 1974 until 
2008 when this measure began to decline due to the economic recession and the beginning of 
the demographic shift caused by the baby boomers). 
 60  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 8 tbl.II.C1 (showing long-range values 
of key assumptions for the 75-year projection period). Factors affecting the low-cost, 
intermediate cost, and high-cost assumptions include, among others, fertility rates (children 
per woman) are 2.3, 2.0, and 1.7, respectively; net immigration (in thousands) are 1,430, 
1,125, and 830, respectively; average wage in covered employment from 2025 to 2088 are 
5.16, 3.83, and 2.52, respectively; and Consumer Price Index (for 2020 and later) are 3.40, 
2.70, and 2.0, respectively. Id. 
 61  Id. at 9. 
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indication that the program can meet its obligations over the succeeding year.62 
Based on these criteria, the asset reserves of the OASI trust fund and the combined 
OASI and DI trust funds exceed the 100 % criteria over the ten-year period.  
The DI trust fund individually has a ratio of 0.62% and, as of 2014, was 
projected to be depleted in 2016.63 Thus, a challenge to the political powers to patch 
or resolve the disability program will occur in the context of the 2016 presidential 
election year.64 In anticipation of the disability trust fund’s depletion, the Obama 
Administration initially proposed transferring $350 billion in Social Security 
revenues into the DI trust fund over five years so it will be solvent until 2033, 
thereby delaying reform for a generation. However, in the 2015 budget deal, a 
Republican controlled Congress and a Democratic President temporarily avoided the 
crisis by reallocating 0.57 percentage points of the Social Security tax to the DI Trust 
from 2016-2018 without raising the total payroll tax.65 The current crisis is a result 
of the expansion of the criteria in 1984, which ultimately doubled the percentage of 
the working age population on disability. Once on disability, few people ever return 
to active full-time work since qualifying entitles one up to $15,000 in cash and 
$9,000 in Medicare benefits with the option to earn more than $13,000 without 
losing benefits.66  
                                                            
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. at 9. The DI trust fund is expected to be exhausted in 2016 and the OASI trust fund 
in 2034. After the DI reserves are exhausted, the income would only support expenditures at a 
level of 81% declining to 80% by 2088. In 1994, when the DI trust fund was nearly exhausted, 
funds were redirected from the OASI trust fund to make up the difference. Id. at 23. Such 
action, it is suggested, would likely delay much needed reforms to the DI program. Id.; see 
also Lanhee J. Chen, A Capsizing Disability-Insurance Program, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lanhee-j-chen-a-capsizing-disability-insurance-program-
1421802230 (predicting that Congress will take a short-term view in 2016 to shore-up the 
system and suggesting ways to tighten up the criteria for disability and eliminate barriers for 
workers to leave disability and return to work). 
 64  See Disabling a Budget Con, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/disabling-a-budget-con-1421367558 (noting that disability 
income used to be a last-resort insurance and is now a “middle-age retirement”). In 1990, one 
dollar in ten social security dollars went to disability but now it is one in five. Disability roles 
doubled between 1990 and 2008 and spiked an additional twenty-one by 2012. A recent rule 
change in Congress would prohibit moving money from one trust fund to the next and perhaps 
force Congress to address the underlying problem and fix the eligibility requirements for 
disability. A similar article that acknowledges the need and opportunity for reform in 2016 
suggests any reform would take years before the benefit was realized and that Social Security 
would likely have to be reformed at the same time but laments the fact that politicians will 
likely do nothing. See Disability insurance, Not working, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21640367-many-disabled-people-can-work-
washington-prevents-them-ruinous-cost-not-working. 
 65  Kat Lucero & Stephen K. Cooper, Congress Passes 2-Year Federal Budget, 149 TAX 
NOTES 642, 642 (2015) (the additional 0.57% increases raises the Disability program share to 
2.27% from 1.8%). The two-year budget contained a revenue raiser in reducing the required 
pension contribution rates. Id.  
 66  Andrew G. Biggs, Averting the Disability-Insurance Meltdown: The out-of-control 
$150 billion program is in urgent need of reform, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:19 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/andrew-g-biggs-averting-the-disability-insurance-meltdown-
1424733559. 
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To assess the actuarial status of the system over the seventy-five-year time 
period, the Trustees use three tests: (1) annual cash-flow measures, including income 
rates, costs rates, and balances; (2) trust fund ratios; and (3) summary measures, such 
as actuarial balances and open group unfunded obligations.67 These are expressed in 
percentages of taxable payroll or GDP and in dollars. An additional indication of the 
long-term status of the system is the infinite horizon values.68 
According to the first measure, the annual cash-flow, under the intermediate 
assumption, the combined OASDI trust fund remains positive until it is exhausted in 
2032.69 After 2032 continuing income could only support expenditures at a level of 
77% decreasing to 72% by 2088.70  
According to the second measure, the trust fund ratios, the OASI, DI, and 
combined OASDI all peaked in 2014 and are projected to be depleted in 2034, 2016, 
and 2033 respectively.71 
The third measure, referred to as the summary measures, is the actuarial balance, 
which includes the beginning period asset reserves, all costs and income during the 
period, and the cost of reaching the reserve objective at the end of the period. Thus, 
the actuarial balance, or deficit if negative, is essentially, “the difference between the 
present values of income and cost from 1937 through the end of the valuation 
period.”72 It is expressed as a percentage of the taxable payroll needed over the 
valuation period to bring the balance to zero. 
Under the intermediate-cost assumption the actuarial deficit for the combined 
OASI and DI trust funds is 2.88% of taxable payroll.73 The Trustees estimate the 
total unfunded liability to be $10.6 trillion through 2088 representing 2.73% of 
                                                            
 67  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 10. 
 68  Id. at 10, 49. An additional test is the long-range close actuarial balance which requires: 
(1) the trust fund satisfies the short-range financial adequacy and (2) the trust fund ration stays 
above zero through the seventy-five-year projection period assuring that benefits would be 
payable on a timely basis. The OASDI and individual OASI and DI trust funds all fail this test 
under the intermediate-cost assumption. Id. at 10-11. 
 69  Id. at 11. 
 70  Id. at 11. The combined OASDI trust funds reserves will increase through 2019 because 
the interest credited to the trust funds will make total revenues exceed total costs. Id. at 3. 
After 2019, total costs will exceed total revenues and the combined trust funds will be 
gradually depleted until they are exhausted in 2033. See id. at 24. The exhaustion of each trust 
fund occurs at different times. Finally, the ratio of workers per beneficiary remained stable at 
3.2 to 3.4 from 1974 through 2008 when, because of the economic recession and beginning of 
the “demographic” shift drove the ratio down, the ratio fell to 2.8. It will continue down to 2.1 
over the next 20 years. Id. at 13. The 2014 Trustees Report details the short-range estimates 
under all three cost assumptions by year. Id. at 39-48. As expected, the high-cost assumption 
has the trust funds being exhausted in 2028, while the low-cost assumption does not have the 
trust funds being exhausted through 2090 and actually increasing at that point. Id. at 18-19, 
fig.II.D7. 
 71  Id. at 15. 
 72  Id. at 16. 
 73  Id. at 16; see also ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 217 (recognizing that closing 
this deficit would require increasing the tax rate from 6.2% to 7.64% on both the employee 
and the employer, making the total tax roughly 15.28% of covered payroll). 
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taxable payroll and 1.0% of GDP for the seventy-five-year period.74 The actuarial 
deficit is higher than the unfunded liability because the former includes the cost of 
having an ending period trust fund ratio of 100%.75 These figures over the seventy-
five-year period do not necessarily produce “sustainable solvency” for the system, 
which is “achieved when the projected trust fund ratio is positive throughout the 75-
year projection period and is either stable or rising at the end of the period.”76  
To correct this imbalance the Trustees project the following options: 77 
For the combined OASI and DI trust funds to remain fully solvent 
throughout the 75-year projection period: (1) revenues would have to 
increase by an amount equivalent to an immediate and permanent payroll 
tax rate increase of 2.83 percentage points (from its current level of 12.40 
percent to 15.23 percent; a relative increase of 22.8 percent); scheduled 
benefits during the period would have to be reduced by an amount 
equivalent to an immediate and permanent reduction of 17.4 percent 
applied to all current and future beneficiaries, or a 20.8 percent if the 
reduction were applied only to those who become initially eligible for 
benefits in 2014 or later; or (3) some combination of these approaches 
would have to be adopted.78 
                                                            
 74  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 16. 
 75  Id. at 17. 
 76  Id. at 17 n.1. 
 77  Because of various demographic assumptions the projections in the 2014 Trustees 
Report may differ from those used by the CBO in its report on the future budget outlook. 
Under the CBO’s extended baseline, it would take an additional 4% of payroll (or a 
combination of tax increase or benefit cuts) to bring the system into actuarial balance through 
2088. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2014 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 50 (2014) 
[hereinafter CBO 2014 REPORT]. That is equivalent to 1.4% of GDP through that period. Id. at 
49-50. To be consistent with the Social Security Trustees Report, which shows a smaller short 
fall, it is pointed out that the CBO believes life expectancy will increase at a faster rate than 
the Trustees, the incidence of disability will be higher under the CBO estimate, and the 
interest rate used for the discounting would be slightly lower. Id. at 50 n.13 (referencing and 
comparing estimates from the THE 2013 TRUSTEES REPORT, infra note 84). No significant 
changes to Social Security are reflected in the CBO’s 2015 Report, and changes are unlikely 
to occur until the new administration takes office in January 2017. For example, the increased 
payroll tax percentage to meet the seventy-five-year Social Security shortfall increases to 
4.4% increase but continues to be equivalent to a 1.4% of GDP. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
CBO’S 2015 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 53-54 (2015) [hereinafter CBO 2015 REPORT]. 
 78  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 23. To make the program “permanently” 
sustainable would require increasing the payroll tax by 4.1%. Id. at 69. Any estimate of future 
solvency requires assumptions about future demographic conditions that may or may not 
prove accurate in actual practice. Included are assumptions about fertility, mortality, 
immigration, marriage, divorce, productivity, inflation, average earnings, unemployment, real 
interest rates, disability incidence, and termination. Related to these assumptions are 
independent factors such as total population, life expectancy, labor force participation, gross 
domestic product, and program-specific factors. Id. at 75. If the needed changes are delayed 
until the trust funds are exhausted in 2033, it would be necessary to increase the payroll tax 
rate by 4.2% to 16.6% in 2033, which would then increase to 17.7% by 2088. Id. at 24. 
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The actuarial deficit calculated in 2013 through 2087 was 2.72% of payroll and 
had the only change for 2014 been an increase of one more year to the valuation date 
the actuarial deficit calculated in 2014 would have been 2.78% rather than the 2.88% 
noted above. The addition of 0.1% was the result of changes in methods, 
assumptions, and starting values combined. Had such assumptions not occurred in 
2014, the “open group” unfunded obligation would have been $10.1 trillion in 2014 
rather than $10.6 trillion.79 Looking beyond the seventy-five-year period to the 
infinite horizon reflects an estimated unfunded obligation equivalent to 4.1% of 
taxable payroll or 1.4% of GDP, which is $24.9 trillion.80 Thus, there is a significant 
cost of delay.81 
One final measure is the “closed-group” unfunded obligation that was reported in 
the Trustees’ 2013 Report, but not in the 2014 Report. The closed-group unfunded 
obligation is the shortfall the system would incur if Social Security were closed to 
anyone under the age of fifteen.82 The calculation considers only the income and 
costs associated with persons aged fifteen years and older on the date the calculation 
is made and does not permit new entrants.83 The closed group unfunded obligation 
for past and current participants is $23.7 trillion, whereas the unfunded obligation for 
the infinite horizon for all participants is $23.1 trillion.84 Thus future participants 
will pay $0.6 trillion into the system more than they receive out of the system. The 
report summarizes the implications: 
This accounting demonstrates that some generations are scheduled to 
receive benefits with a present valued exceeding the present value of their 
dedicated tax income, while other generations are scheduled to receive 
benefits with a present value less than the present value of their dedicated 
tax income whether past general fund reimbursements are included or not. 
Making social Security solvent over the infinite horizon requires some 
combination in increased revenue or reduced benefits for current and 
                                                            
 79  Id. at 16, 68-69. The actuarial balance is a percentage of the taxable payroll over the 
seventy-five-year period to indicate the size of the surplus or shortfall. Id. at 49. Similarly, 
“[t]he open group unfunded obligation indicates the size of any shortfall in present-value 
dollars” and does not take into account the ending period trust fund balance. Id.  
 80  Id. at 18, 69, 191-92. The trustees further note that a more accurate measure is 4.3% of 
payroll because the 4.1% infinite horizon is an actuarial deficit that does not reflect “a 
behavioral response to tax rate changes.” Id. at 191 n.1. “In particular, the calculation assumes 
that an increase in payroll taxes results in a small shift of wages and salaries to forms of 
employee compensation that are not subject to payroll tax.” Id.; see also Mark J. Warshawsky, 
The 2014 Social Security and Medicare Trustee Reports, 144 TAX NOTES 967, 968, 969 
(2014) (summarizing information from THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18). 
 81  THE 2014 TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 18, at 68. 
 82  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 50-51. 
 83  Id. 
 84  THE BD. OF TR., FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, THE 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 69 (2013) [hereinafter THE 
2013 TRUSTEES REPORT].  
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future participants amounting to $23.1 trillion in present value, 4.0 
percent of future taxable payroll, or 1.4 percent of GDP.85 
The 2013 Report further compares the unfunded obligation through 2087 ($9.6 
trillion) with the unfunded obligation through the infinite horizon ($23.1 trillion).86 
The $13.5 trillion difference reflects the significant financing gap for the years after 
2087.87 It could be concluded that continuing the present program would cost $9.6 
trillion over the next seventy-five-year period whereas closing the program to 
persons under fifteen would cost $24.3 trillion until the death of the last person 
currently fifteen years or older. It is much easier to just kick the can down the street. 
C. Federal Government’s Long-Term Fiscal Problems 
Any discussion about Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable 
Care Act must include consideration of the impact these programs are projected to 
have on the overall federal budget. The changes to correct the system would be small 
if the impact were small, but the growth of the national debt and the inability to 
project anything but deficits into the future threatens the fiscal soundness of the 
nation and the well-being of every citizen. Correcting the system will require drastic 
change. 
The total federal debt held by the public is 74% of GDP, is the highest it has been 
in our nation’s history, except for a brief period around World War II, and it is 
almost twice the percentage as the end of 2008.88 While the percentage is expected to 
decrease slightly over the next couple of years, it will eventually grow again such 
that by 2024 it will reach 78% of GDP and by 2039 it will reach 106% of GDP.89 
While the projections do not incorporate the impact of higher debt levels on the 
overall economy, they are significant and would severely limit the economic well 
being of the country.90 The CBO’s projected impact of continued spending and 
taxing under current law (the “Extended Baseline”)91 is illustrated in the following 
summary: 
 
                                                            
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 68. 
 88  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 1. 
 89  Id. at 10. 
 90  Id. at 13. The 2014 CBO Report summarizes the effects as: 
The high and rising amounts of federal debt held by the public that CBO projects for 
the coming decades under the extended baseline would have significant negative 
consequences for the economy in the long term and would impose significant 
constraints on future budget policy, in particular, the projected amounts of debt would 
reduce the amounts of national savings and income in the long term; increase the 
government’s interest payments thereby putting more pressure on the rest of the 
budget; limit lawmaker’s flexibility to respond to unforeseen events; and increase the 
likelihood of fiscal crisis. 
Id. Chapter 6 of the report expands on these results under various scenarios. Id. at 69-86. 
 91  Id. at 10. 
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Table 1 
Note: All Numbers are Percentages of 
Gross Domestic Product (% of GDP) 
2014 2024 2039 
Spending Category    
Social Security 4.9% 5.6% 6.3% 
Medicare (Net of Offsetting Receipts) 3.0% 3.2% 4.6% 
Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange 
Subsidies 
1.9% 2.7% 3.4% 
Other Mandatory 2.5% 2.2% 1.7% 
Discretionary 6.8% 5.1% 5.2% 
Net Interest 1.3% 3.3% 4.7% 
Total Spending 20.4% 22.1% 25.9% 
Total Revenues 17.6% 18.3% 19.4% 
Deficit -2.8% -3.7% -6.4% 
Debt Held by the Public at the End of 
the Year 
74% 78% 106%92 
Projected Spending and Revenues in Selected Years 
Under CBO’s Extended Baseline93 
Notably, the growth in expenditures as well as taxes as a percent of GDP over the 
next twenty-five years greatly exceeds past growth averages. For example, total 
federal spending would increase to 26% of GDP while it was 21% in 2013 and 
20.5% on average over the past forty years.94 This represents an increase to 14% 
                                                            
 92  Buttonwood, Land of the falling yield: The return of an old relationship between asset 
prices, ECONOMIST 79 (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21603448-return-old-relationship-between-asset-prices-land-falling-yield (noting 
that Japan’s government debt is currently 230% of GDP and has been at such levels for some 
time without overwhelming the economy). 
 93  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 10. The 2014 CBO Report states: 
CBO’s base line projections are not a forecast of future outcomes. They are 
constructed in accordance with provisions set forth in the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. As those laws specify, CBO constructs its baseline 
projections under the assumption that current laws will generally remain unchanged; 
the projections can therefore serve as a benchmark against which potential changes in 
law can be measured. However, even if federal laws remained unchanged for the next 
decade actual budgetary outcomes could differ from CBO’s base line projections, 
perhaps significantly, because of unanticipated changes in economic conditions and 
other factors that affect federal spending and revenues. CBO’s updated baseline 
projections incorporate the effects of legislation and administrative actions through 
April 1, 2014. 
Id. at 10; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS 2014-2024, at 2 
(2014), http://cbo.gov/publication/45229. 
 94  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 3; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET 
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2016 TO 2026, at 4 (2016) (projecting that a 2016 deficit will be 
$544 billion which is $105 billion more than the deficit recorded in 2015, and explaining that 
the deficit represents 2.9% of GDP and the expected shortfall for 2016 will mark the first time 
that the deficit has risen in relation to the size of the economy since peaking at 9.8% in 2009). 
The estimated cumulative deficit from 2017 to 2026 is $9,378 billion. Id. at 2. Further, in 2026 
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from an average of 7% over the past forty years for Social Security and the 
government’s major health programs.95 The government’s net interest payments 
would increase to 4.7% of GDP compared to an average of 2% over the past forty 
years.96 
The growing costs of both Social Security and Medicare have a significant 
impact on the long-term federal deficit. In 2014, the total contributions from general 
revenues will be $80 billion for Social Security, $25 billion for Medicare 
Hospitalization Insurance (known as Part A), and $248 billion for Supplementary 
Medical Insurance (known as Part B).97 The total, $352 billion or 2% of GDP, will 
more than double to 4.4% by 2040.98  
At the same time there will be increased demands on the federal budget including 
increasing debt service as interest rates rise. At that point, payroll tax increases may 
be unpalatable and the only decision will be whether to cut Social Security benefits 
or Medicare benefits.99 Notwithstanding the looming crisis, a number of people 
advocate increasing benefits in various ways.100 
                                                            
the ratio of debt held by the public to GDP is estimated to be 86% ($23,817 to $27,660 (in 
millions)). Id. at 2; see also Jed Graham, Deficit To Hit $544 Billion This Year CBO 
Forecasts, INV. BUS. DAILY, Jan. 20, 2016, at A1. 
 95  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 3. 
 96  Id. 
 97  SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OF TR., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE 
PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2014), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr14summary.pdf. 
 98  Id. at 974. The relative size of any changes will be determined by the timing of such 
changes. Without changes, it is estimated, in 2010, that benefits under current formulas would 
have to be cut by 20% in 2040 to have benefits paid and equal taxes received. CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, supra note 18, at ix. That number would rise to a 24% cut by 2084. Id. at 6. 
 99  It is suggested that, because the CBO finds the health care cost to dominate the future 
deficit requirement, Social Security and health care can be addressed separately. One 
observation is that: 
Under the CBO projections, health care is clearly the heart of the adverse outlook. 
Some people view these projections as an indicator that Social Security is not causing 
our financial dilemma and that we can address its financing imbalance in the narrow 
context of its own operations. But this is akin to the homeowner behind on his 
mortgage payments who asks his banker to finance a new car. While the banker sees a 
creditor already in over his head wanting to take on more debt, the applicant insists 
that his mortgage is the problem and the new car a separate issue. 
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 311-12. 
 100  Id. at 313 (citing surveys showing a high percentage of respondents believe various 
benefits should be added or increased such as extending benefits to children of deceased or 
disabled parents from nineteen years to twenty-two years; increasing the benefit by fifty 
dollars per month for retirees age eighty-five; improve benefits of widowed spouses; make 
benefits for early retirees at least the at the poverty level; and giving service credits for 
persons taking time off to care for children). Often those who seek to increase benefits tend to 
ignore the impact of private employer plans (both defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans) on retiree security. Id. When the benefits under private employer plans are combined 
with benefits under Social Security retirees in the United States compare favorably with 
retirees in other developed economies. Id. at 315-16. However, when the focus is on lower 
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The most important causes of the projected growth in Social Security and the 
major health care programs through 2039 are aging (55%); Excess Cost Growth 
(24%); and Expansion of Medicaid and Exchange subsidies (21%).101 Using the 
figures in Table 1, between 2014 and 2039, Social Security will grow by 29%; 
Medicare by 53%; Medicaid, CHIP, and exchange subsidies by 79%; and interest 
payments by 262%.102 As long as the deficit percentage of GDP exceeds the rate of 
growth of the economy, the percentage of GDP dedicated to national debt will 
continue to grow with the likelihood that interest will grow accordingly. 
While the CBO projections do not incorporate the impact of higher debt levels on 
the overall economy, this level of growth of debt will restrain future budget policy 
and severely limit the economic well being of the country and its ability to respond 
to future crises.103 One prominent study suggested that debt level exceeding 90% of 
GDP posed particular problems.104 
                                                            
earners there is concern that the favorable comparison does not hold true so that an across the 
board reduction in social security benefits would impact the lower earners more than higher 
earners. Id. at 317. 
 101  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 23. Within the major health care programs alone 
the impact of aging is less through 2039. The causes are aging (39%); Excess Cost Growth 
(33%); and Expansion of Medicaid and Exchange subsidies (28%). Id. 
 102  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 18. The authors suggest the problem is not 
spending on seniors but the result of rising health care costs, both public and private and the 
tax cuts benefitting the very well-off. The authors further state that changes to Social Security 
will reflect our “priorities, what kind of a society we want for ourselves, our children, and our 
grandchildren.” Id. at 19.  
 103  CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 13. The 2014 CBO Report summarizes the effects 
as: 
The high and rising amounts of federal debt held by the public that CBO projects for 
the coming decades under the extended baseline would have significant negative 
consequences for the economy in the long term and would impose significant 
constraints on future budget policy, in particular, the projected amounts of debt would 
reduce the amounts of national savings and income in the long term; increase the 
government’s interest payments thereby putting more pressure on the rest of the 
budget; limit lawmaker’s flexibility to respond to unforeseen events; and increase the 
likelihood of fiscal crisis. 
Id. Chapter 6 of the Report expands on these results under various scenarios. Id. at 69-86. 
Loss of flexibility in dealing with domestic and international problems while carrying a high 
level of debt is particularly worrisome. The CBO recognizes that the ability to address the 
recession of 2008 and 2009 was available because the debt was lower. To this point, the CBO 
states: 
Several years ago, when federal debt was below 40 percent of GDP, the government 
had some flexibility to respond to the financial crisis and sever recession by increasing 
spending and cutting taxes to stimulate economic activity, providing public funding to 
stabilize the financial sector, and continuing to pay for other programs even as tax 
revenues dropped sharply because of the decline in output and income. As a result, 
federal debt almost doubled as a percentage of GDP. If federal debt stayed at its 
current percentage of GDP or increased further, the government would find it more 
difficult to undertake similar policies under similar conditions in the future. As a 
result, future recessions and financial crises could have larger negative effects on the 
economy and on peoples’ well-being. Moreover, the reduced financial flexibility and 
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1. Intergenerational Inequality 
Another recent analysis points to the fiscal imbalance in spending which 
overemphasizes spending on the elderly compared to an under emphasis on the 
young. Federal spending consumed by the elderly is $26,355 per person compared to 
$3,822 being invested per child.105 Taking it a step further, between 2012 and 2022 
federal spending will increase by $1.19 trillion of which $780 billion (66%) will be 
spent on programs benefitting the elderly,106 while $29 billion (2.22%) will be spent 
on children.107 
Most of the future spending priorities are mandatory and will prevent addressing 
spending alternatives. As stated: “Whatever the merits of Keynesian and supply-side 
economics, these schools of thought gave our legislators a license to pass the cost of 
tax cuts and increased spending to future generations.”108 Ending open-ended and 
                                                            
increased dependence on foreign investors that accompany high and rising debt could 
weaken U.S. leadership in the international arena. 
Id. at 14. The inability to address financial crises can be costly for many countries. See id. 
(citing Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial Crises, 99 AM. 
ECON. REV. 466 (2009)); Carmen M. Reinhart & Vincent R. Reinhart, After the Fall, 
Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY JACKSON HOLE 
SYMP. (2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/Reinhart_final.pdf; see 
also Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Cries Database: An Update, (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/63, 2012), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12163.pdf. 
 104  CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009). But see Free Exchange, the 90% question, 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013, at 82 (noting that the Reinhart-Rogoff study is challenged as to the 
drop in GDP growth after debt exceeds 90% of GDP). 
 105  Charles McElwee, Nation’s financial peril will be physical peril soon, PUTNAM METRO 
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.metroputnam.com/article/20140928/ARTICLE/140929375/ 
(citing STEUERLE, supra note 4). 
 106  For example, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid other than for children. 
 107  See STEUERLE, supra note 4 (finding deficits as a symptom of a broader disease, which 
is “the effort by both parties to control the future”). Steuerle’s thesis is: 
Both parties have conspired to create and expand a series of public programs that 
automatically grow so fast that they claim every dollar of additional tax revenue that 
the government generates each year. They also conspire to lock in tax cuts that leave 
the government unable to pay its bills. The resulting squeeze deprives current and 
future generations of the leeway to choose their own priorities, allocate their own 
resources, and reach for their own stars. Those generations are left largely to maintain 
yesterday’s priorities. 
Id. at 4; see Martin A. Sullivan, Treat All Parts of The Budget Equally, 144 TAX NOTES 312, 
314 (2015) (describing Steuerle’s book and his solution which is to free up assets by limiting 
automatic growth of entitlement spending, as well as tax expenditures, by reforming the 
budget process). 
 108  Sullivan, supra note 107, at 313.  
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automatic spending for retirement and healthcare could change the current 
downward trend for spending on infrastructure, education, and research.109 
Altman and Kingson explain that although Social Security’s primary 
goals are not alleviating poverty or income inequality, the program does 
more to rectify income inequality and prevent poverty among older 
Americans than any other program, public or private, while also providing 
crucial protections for orphans and the disabled. More important, they 
prove that the widely made claims that Social Security adds to the federal 
governments perennial budget deficits have no basis in fact.110 
Notwithstanding the Altman and Kingson arguments, maintaining the current 
Social Security system with the growing intergenerational inequality will strain and 
even curtail the federal government’s ability to address other pressing needs 
including those needs of the youngest members of society.   
2. Standard Solutions to Social Security Financing 
Fixing Social Security can be a simple process. Increase revenues or decrease 
benefits. The time when the economy could outgrow the entitlement crisis is past.111 
However, Social Security is not referred to as the “third rail of American politics” 
for nothing. Whenever you bring Social Security reform up, there are strong 
emotional responses by large numbers of voters ready to penalize any politician bold 
enough to propose any changes. Changes are talked about in general terms with little 
prospect of effecting change before the problem reaches a level of crisis. With that in 
mind, it is necessary to acknowledge that Social Security has a long history of 
change that resembles a lobster in the soup pot. At first the water is cool, but 
gradually the water is heated to a boil and the lobster realizes its predicament and is 
cooked.  
For the first couple of years after its adoption in 1935, the rate of Social Security 
contribution was 1% on a tax base of $3,000 by the employee and the employer.112 
The contribution level was to increase to 3% by 1939, but was delayed until 1950.113 
Subsequent increases raised the contribution level to 4.4% on a tax base of $6,600 by 
1967 and to 4.8% on a tax base of $7,800 by 1969, resulting in covered payroll being 
82% of total United States earnings.114 
                                                            
 109  Id. at 314. 
 110  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xiii. 
 111  Amity Shlaes & Ike Brannon, Get Real: We Can’t Grow Out of Entitlement Mess, INV. 
BUS. DAILY (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.investors.com/politics/brain-trust/entitlements-must-
be-reformed-we-cant-outgrow-their-costs/. Shlaes and Brannon point out that federal 
government payments to individuals grew from 5% of GDP in 1964 (before Medicare and 
Medicaid), to 10% in 1980 before President Ronald Reagan took office, to 15% today. Id. 
They believe the time has come to address the entitlement question since failure to do so will 
likely block other spending options. They suggest starting by delinking pensions from 
economic growth. Id. 
 112  GEOFFREY KOLLMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY: SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CASH 
BENEFITS PROGRAM 1 (2000), https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/crsleghist2.html. 
 113  Id. at 3. 
 114  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 72.  
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Congress gradually and periodically increased the benefit and expanded the 
coverage as prompted by then Commissioner of Social Security, Robert M. Ball.115 
In 1965, Medicare added a medical benefit for seniors and thereafter Commissioner 
Ball continued his efforts to increase benefits for all current and future retirees.116 
Following significant increases in 1969, 1971, and 1972, a beneficiary went from 
receiving a $500 benefit in 1969 to receiving $759 in 1972 (a 52% increase) while 
the cost of living index rose by only 20%.117 
In 1972, the indexing of benefits was instituted so that benefits were indexed 
based on increases in the consumer price index.118 Benefit increases continued until 
the 1977 amendments, which reduced benefits for the first time so that, by 2010 
retirees classified as low earners would receive 33% less, average earners 25% less, 
and maximum earner s 31% less than a comparable worker in 1977.119 The slow 
pace of benefit increases came to an end.120  
As the working age population was increasing relative to the number of retirees 
and wage growth exceeded the growth of benefits, it appeared any funding 
insufficiency could be easily accommodated with a modest tax increase. Prominent 
economist Paul A. Samuelson found the beauty of Social Security in the fact that it 
was actuarially unsound so that everyone could get benefits far in excess of any 
amount they paid into the system, a phenomenon he would explain stems: 
[F]rom the fact that the national product is growing at compound interest 
and can be expected to do for as far ahead as the eye cannot see. Always 
there are more youths than old folks in a growing population. More 
important, with real incomes going up at some 3 percent per year, the 
taxable base on which benefits rest in any period are much greater than 
the taxes paid historically by the generation now retired. Social security is 
squarely based on what has been called the eighth wonder of the world—
compound interest. A growing nation is the greatest Ponzi game ever 
contrived.121 
                                                            
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. Wilber Cohen, the first member of the Social Security Board, and Robert Ball, 
Social Security Commissioner from 1962 to 1973, envisioned a grand plan of “cradle to 
grave” social insurance. Cohen recognized that the grand plan could only be taken in small 
steps because it could not be consumed in a single bite. Id. at 71-72. 
 117  Id. at 73. 
 118  The 1972 changes applied the indexing to the initial benefit, which itself automatically 
reflected inflationary wage growth and productivity increases and a double benefit was 
created which was soon recognized as a catastrophic mistake which was rectified in 1977 
legislation that decoupled the wage indexing from the benefit indexing. Id. at 76. 
 119  Id. at 78. 
 120  Id. at 76. 
 121  Id. at 74 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Social Security, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1967, at 88). 
Samuelson had previously published a very influential article suggesting that a pay-as-you-go 
system could be sustained so long as the workforce grows over time relative to the retiree 
population. See Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or 
without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958). 
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Notwithstanding such optimism, the inevitable funding crisis arrived in the early 
1980s and a bipartisan commission chaired by Alan Greenspan was formed to make 
appropriate recommendations.122 The result was to increase the retirement age 
gradually from sixty-five to sixty-seven over an extended period of time, slightly 
reduce benefits, and increase taxes so the system would be solvent for a seventy-
five-year period.123 The projections proved to be inaccurate and the solvency period 
was reduced to approach fifty years.124  
Nevertheless, the Commission’s changes combined with the large population of 
Baby Boomers in the workforce caused significant surpluses to accumulate, and a 
debate developed over whether to keep the surplus or go back to a pay-as-you-go 
system, which would eliminate any surpluses.125 Ultimately, the surplus was kept 
and loaned to the government who used it to reduce the deficit.126 Some observers 
concluded that the surplus permitted excessive and wasteful federal spending 
referring to it as “thievery or embezzlement.”127 Today the numbers are reversed as 
large numbers of Baby Boomers are retiring and thereby accelerating the growth of 
the dependent population, eliminating the surplus, and creating a deficit requiring 
actual transfers from general revenues to make required benefit payments. Such 
transfers will continue, at least until the accumulated surpluses and the accrued 
interest is exhausted.128 
Because initial benefits are based on past earnings and are indexed to the average 
growth of wages reflecting productivity increases that grow faster than the cost of 
                                                            
 122  See GREENSPAN COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
REFORM (1983). 
 123  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 86. The President, the Speaker of the House of 
Representative, and the Senate Majority Leader each appointed one-third of the Commission 
to be known as the Greenspan Commission. The changes effected by the Greenspan 
Commission, as well as subsequent changes which began taxing up to 85% of Social Security 
benefits, have been severely criticized as benefits cuts up to 7% over a lifetime. ALTMAN & 
KINGSON, supra note 8, at 60-61; see also RAVI BATRA, GREENSPAN’S FRAUD: HOW TWO 
DECADES OF HIS POLICIES HAVE UNDERMINED THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11-46 (2005). 
 124  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 85-86 (noting that in 1983 the system was projected to be 
solvent through 2063 but the projection was reduced to 2049 in the 1985 trustee’s report and 
to 2029 1n the 1995 trustee’s report). 
 125  See, e.g., Kilolo Kijakazi & Wendell Primus, Would Using the Budget Surplus for Tax 
Cuts or Entitlement Expansions Affect Long-Term Social Security Solvency, CTR. ON BUDGET 
POL’Y & PRIORITIES (Mar. 13, 1998), http://www.cbpp.org/archives/313socsec.htm. 
 126  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 96. 
 127  A commission created by President Bush concluded that the 1983 funding legislation 
that resulted in surpluses which could theoretically be used to increase national savings: 
[T]aught the nation a clear lesson about how unlikely this is as a practice. The Social 
Security surpluses have enabled the government to finance other government 
spending, rather than raising current year taxes and effectively saving Social Security 
funds for the future. 
Id. 
 128 As a result of the unemployment during 2007 and 2008 Social Security experienced its 
first annual deficit since the passage of the 1983 amendments. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 100.  
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living, future beneficiaries will have greater purchasing power than current ones. The 
following table demonstrates the increased purchasing power in 2061 (in 2011 
dollars) for low, medium, and maximum earners.  
Table 2 
Age 65 SS 
Benefit129 
 
2011 2061 
(in 2011 dollars) 
Increased 
Purchasing Power 
Low Earner $ 10,232 $ 17,080 $ 6,848 (67%) 
Medium Earner130 $ 16,860 $ 28,143 $ 11,283 (67%) 
Maximum Earner $ 26,573 $ 45,466 $ 18,893 (71%) 
 
A 2010 report suggested indexing initial benefits to prices rather than wages so 
the average benefit would be one-third lower by 2060 and one-half lower by 2080.131 
Further, by reducing COLAs after benefits commence would also reduce benefits. 
Under current adjustments, 25% of benefit payments by 2040 will be the result of 
COLA adjustments.132 
While future retirees’ benefits will have greater purchasing power, the 
contribution levels will also increase. Therefore, a single male turning sixty-five in 
2014 whose lifetime earnings were 60% of average, between $25,000 and $30,000, 
will receive lifetime benefits worth only $0.91 for every dollar of payroll taxes paid 
on his behalf accumulated with interest.133 Medium earners and maximum earners 
would receive benefits worth $0.67 and $0.46 per dollar invested respectively.134  
Considering the poor investment that Social Security has become, Schieber asks: 
Given that many low earners today are getting back less than the value of 
lifetime contributions on their earnings and higher earners are doing 
worse—and that every additional dollar we put into the system will make 
the outcome worse—how much more money do we want to pump into 
this system? With total obligations for benefits in excess of $20 trillion 
that have already been earned by people who are now alive we cannot 
walk away from the program but we can choose to constrain the future 
losses.135 
Not only has Social Security become a poor investment for most people but it 
also is not sufficient for most people to retire. Considering the lifetime cost of health 
                                                            
 129  Id. at 114.  
 130  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xv (suggesting the average benefit is roughly 
equal to the gross pay of someone working full time at the federal minimum wage). 
 131  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 5. 
 132  Id. at 4. After 2050, it is anticipated that the trajectory will resume its upward climb 
reaching 6.3% in 2080. Id.  
 133  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 283. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 241. 
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care and retirement savings, an average earner can expect to dedicate 31% of their 
lifetime earnings to these two costs alone.136  
Benefits received by early participants in Social Security were far larger than 
could be justified based on their contributions to the system. One analysis compared 
the present value of the benefits received for a given level of contributions made to 
the system to the present value of a private insurance annuity that could be 
purchased with those contributions. To the extent that the present value of the 
benefits received exceeded the present value of the private insurance annuity, the 
beneficiary received a “windfall.” The analysis considered people retiring in 1940, 
1970, and 1980 whose income level, compared to those retiring in the respective 
year, was (i) 40% of such average income (the “low earner”), (ii) 100% of such 
average income (the “average earner”) (iii) was 1.6 times such average income (the 
“high earner”), and (iv) the maximum income for the year (the “maximum 
earner”).137 The table below demonstrates the windfall received for retirees in three 
cohorts. These windfalls may help explain the popularity of the Social Security 
system and how, at one time, it could be said that: “The way our Social Security 
system was structured, we could give away literally trillions of dollars in unearned 
benefits and yet almost all the windfall recipients had the sense that they had paid for 
what they received.”138 
Windfalls received by retirees in three different age cohorts in constant 2009 
dollars:139 
Table 3 
Income Level 1940 1970 1980 
Low Earner $ 38,000 $ 115,000 $ 73,000 
Average Earner $ 50,000 $ 146,000 $ 106,000 
High Earner $ 59,000 $ 160,000 $ 126,000 
Maximum Earner $ 77,000 $ 159,000 $ 126,000 
 
The windfall has largely dried up such that it can now be said: 
From 2,000 onward, on average, the “return” for workers in each retiring 
cohort will be less than it would be from a funded pension program 
invested solely in government bonds. Having spent younger worker’s 
contributions on inflated “start-up” benefits for earlier retirees meant the 
program had to forego the interest income on those contributions. So as an 
investment vehicle, Social Security could not match a funded system no 
matter how conservative the funded system’s investments.140 
                                                            
 136  See infra tbl.6, n.749 and accompanying text.  
 137  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 64-65. 
 138  Id. at 65. 
 139  Id. at 66. Another commentator estimated that in 1980 a two-earner couple making the 
average, who retired at sixty-five, would have paid $219,000 of Social Security and Medicare 
taxes in their lifetimes, but would receive $635,000 worth of benefits, and a similarly situated 
one-earner couple would have paid $110,000 in taxes and would receive $547,000 in benefits. 
STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 50 n.6 (citing C. EUGENE STEUERLE CALEB QUAKENBUSH, SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND MEDICARE TAXES AND BENEFITS OVER A LIFETIME: 2013 UPDATE 2013).  
 140  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 65. 
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To some extent the windfall continues in spousal benefits where a non-working 
spouse, who never contributed to the Social Security system, qualifies for a benefit 
equal to one-half the working spouse’s benefit, or when a working spouse’s benefit 
is less than one-half of the higher earning spouse’s benefit.141 In either case if the 
higher earning spouse dies first then the lower earning spouse will receive a benefit 
equal to that earned by the higher earning spouse.  
The spousal benefit makes a marked difference in the overall return received by 
family units. Since the 1960s, there has been a rapid increase in the employment of 
women in the workforce.142 To some extent, women entered the workforce to 
supplement family income when wages were depressed because of the large number 
of Baby Boomers entering the workforce.143 This additional wave of female workers 
created significant wealth and swelled tax revenues during those years.144 Thus the 
spousal benefit may be less significant today than in the past, but neutral observers 
might still find it unfair and open the door to an avenue of change. 
In a 2000 survey, Social Security assets were approximately 48% of total 
dedicated retirement assets for respondents ages sixty-three to sixty-seven.145 
Table 4 
Earnings Level Single 
male 
Single 
female 
One-earner 
couple 
Two-earner 
Couple 
Very low 1.25 1.41 2.47 1.41 
Low 0.91 1.02 1.81 1.03 
Medium 0.67 0.76 1.36 0.77 
High 0.56 0.63 1.12 0.64 
Maximum 0.46 0.52 0.92 0.52 
Expected Value of Social Security Benefits Relative to Accumulated Lifetime 
Contributions with Interest for Hypothetical Workers Born in 1949, Retiring at Age 
65,by Earnings Level146 
 
The Table assumes that a hypothetical twenty-one-year-old began working in 
1970, worked continually through 2013, and began retirement at age sixty-five in 
2014. The very-low single male earner will receive benefits 1.25 times the value of 
his contributions (and his employer’s contribution on his behalf) accumulated at trust 
fund interest rates. The chart confirms that, except for “one-earner couple” 
                                                            
 141  Id. 
 142  See generally Lisa Quast, Causes and Consequences of The Increasing Numbers Of 
Women In The Workforce, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2011, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lisaquast/2011/02/14/causes-and-consequences-of-the-
increasing-numbers-of-women-in-the-workforce/#55c29c71c76d. 
 143  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 372. 
 144  Id. at 371-73. 
 145  Id. at 281. 
 146  Id. at 283 tbl.24.2. The payroll taxes are accumulated over a lifetime at the applicable 
rates and are credited with interest at the rates that the bonds in the Social Security trust fund 
earned interest. Id. at 282. In calculating the benefits, the actuaries considered the 
comprehensive package of benefits including retirement, disability, and survivor benefits. Id. 
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households, all medium, high, and maximum earning households receive a negative 
return on their Social Security contributions.147 
Converting the percentages from the previous chart into dollars (without 
accounting for the value of the survivorship or disability benefits), the single male 
medium earner at age sixty-five will have $353,800 from his lifetime (from age 
twenty-two) payroll taxes accumulated at the trust fund interest rates. The benefits 
received by this same taxpayer using a present value of expected benefits would be 
$273,049 for a net loss of $80,751. If the medium earner were a single female, the 
lifetime benefit would be $304,767 for a net lifetime loss of $49,033. If the medium 
earner were a one-earner couple, the lifetime benefit would be $554,229 for a 
lifetime gain of $200,429. Similar analysis can be done for the two-earner couple 
and for a very low, high, and maximum earner.148 
The spousal benefit might have made sense when most families had one member 
in the workforce; however, today most families have two wage earners so that the 
lower wage earner is paying into the system, but will likely receive no greater benefit 
than if he or she stayed out of the workforce.149 One solution to this problem could 
be providing a joint and survivor annuity that reflects the value that each spouse paid 
into the system.150 The myriad of family situations makes equalizing the benefits 
based on lifetime contributions a complicated task.151  
Raising the age at which workers qualify for benefits would be an obvious way 
to reduce costs but such a proposal is one of the most politically sensitive areas of 
discussion in any Social Security proposal.152 Fifty years ago men worked five years 
longer and women seven years longer than current workers, and that was at a time 
                                                            
 147  Id. at 93, 282. 
 148  Id. at 284-85 tbl.24.3 (providing the results of the full analysis by the author). 
 149  The pattern of Social Security was set with the 1939 amendments. Social Security has 
not kept up with the changing times. In 1950, less than 40% of the women between twenty 
and sixty-four were in the workforce. Id. at 367. By the beginning of the twenty-first century 
nearly 75% were working outside the home including a majority of those with children under 
school age. Id. The age when one starts work has changed, as has the age of retirement. Id. at 
366-69. 
 150  Id. at 340. 
 151  STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 144. Steuerle recognizes that, at the margins, Social 
Security has performed poorly and states: 
A well-designed minimum benefit and perhaps a minimum credit for child-bearing 
years would greatly help achieved the goal of a minimum standard of living in old 
age. Meanwhile, we should also reform current spousal and survivor benefits that 
discriminate unjustifiably against many groups: single heads of household (who pay 
for but do not get spousal and survivor benefits); those who have children before age 
40 (who pay for but do not get the children’s benefits provided to the men and 
occasionally women who have children at a late age to supplement their retirement 
benefits); and those who divorce before ten years of marriage (who can lose hundreds 
of thousands of dollars in spousal and survivor benefits because they failed to delay 
their divorce by as little as one day or until the marriage lasted ten years and 
additional spousal and survivor benefits become available). 
Id. at 144-45. 
 152  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 326. 
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when work was more physically demanding and life expectancy was shorter than 
today.153 There is evidence that both men and women are beginning to work longer 
hours, which may be explained by the shift over the past two decades from defined 
benefit plans to defined contribution plans.154  
Today’s expectation of retirement grew out of an era when life spans were 
shorter, the working age population was growing, and companies were able to 
finance defined benefit plans and retiree health care plans from current income.155 
Although the retirement age has crept up slightly, there are tremendous advantages 
for individuals to continue working an extra year or so, which would lighten the 
burden on other workers and reduce the time for which an individual’s savings 
would have to cover.156 One way to encourage the elderly to continue working and 
enhance the equity of the system is to exempt the earnings from Social Security 
taxation when the person arrived at either full retirement age, or age seventy, when 
the enhanced benefit reaches its maximum. 
Other areas of change could come from changing elements in the Social Security 
calculation, such as reducing the wage indexing of initial benefits for determining 
AIME, or adjusting the bend points and percentages used in the PIA to reduce some 
benefits. The payroll tax cap could also be raised to 90% of covered earnings, trust 
funds could be invested in the stock market, or other taxes, such as the estate tax 
receipts, could be dedicated to Social Security.157 
Any changes to the system will create winners and losers. Recent proposals have 
been reluctant to impact persons aged fifty-five and above. The idea is that they have 
planned on the current system and it would be unfair to change it in a way that it 
would be too late to make up the difference. Since most everyone in the system 
benefits by the excessive benefits, they could be asked to participate in the fixes that 
affect all participants.158 By failing to act in a timely fashion the youngest cohort of 
Baby Boomers will turn age fifty-five by 2019, which is fast approaching. We are 
                                                            
 153  Id. 
 154  Id. at 326 (noting this shift in the type of retirement plan means that, rather than 
depending on the employer to take care of the annuity, the employee will have to do it 
themselves). 
 155  Id. at 326. 
 156  Id. at 373. 
 157  Id. at 318. The options considered in the 2010 Report did not include the possibility of 
private accounts, options to draw general revenues into the system, or investment of Social 
Security moneys in securities other than government debt. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 
18, at 8-10. Although Sylvester Schieber supported private accounts when he served on an 
advisory council in the 1990s, he has come to a different conclusion today: 
But realistically, I have come to believe that we ought to drop the subject. The 
conversation about individual accounts had been so poisoned by the accompanying 
political discourse that all rationality has been lost. Further argument on the subject 
simply delays our progress in tackling an urgent problem.  
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 330. 
 158  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 344 (suggesting that those nearing retirement and retired 
should bear some of the cost of reform). 
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nearly, if not already, at the point when any change will totally exempt the entire 
Baby Boomer generation.159 
It is generally recognized that Social Security cannot be considered the sole 
source of income during the retirement years, at least, for most people desiring to 
live in a manner commensurate with their standard of living during their working 
years. Thus, Social Security must be considered in the context of private retirement 
savings and overall healthcare needs.160 For example, a typical family of four with an 
average income of $50,000 has a surplus of only $9,400 after payment of Federal 
Taxes ($3,600); state/local taxes ($1,400); property taxes ($2,000); food costs 
($7,800); utility, phone, cable, internet expenses ($3,800); mortgage payment 
($13,000); and health care costs ($9,000).161 
That $9,400 must pay for everything else, including charitable contributions, 
movies, restaurants, family vacations, car expenses, childcare, braces for kids, 
tutoring or counseling, and saving for college and for retirement. Today, many 
young families have the additional cost of paying student loans that burden the 
family for twenty-five or more years after graduation.162 Furthermore, employee 
compensation is reduced by the employer costs of Social Security, retirement plan 
contributions, and healthcare costs all of which affect the employee’s take-home pay. 
Considering these demands it is no wonder that many individuals have very little 
extra savings for retirement and rely almost exclusively on Social Security for most 
of their retirement income.163 
The American dream, coined by James Truslow Adams is the “dream of a land in 
which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for 
each according to his ability or achievement.”164 The American dream also includes 
the desire that each generation would leave the world a better place and that our 
                                                            
 159  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 181 (suggesting that exempting reflects a strategy 
to undermine the system by passing the burden on to today’s young people and children). 
These authors see a vast conspiracy to undermine Social Security that has been going on for 
decades. They devote a chapter to this conspiracy entitled “There They Go Again: Why 
Supporters of Social Security Must Remain Vigilant.” Id. at 185-99.  
 160  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 370. 
 161  Howard Gold, Social Security can’t save us from the poor house, MARKETWATCH 
(Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/social-security-cant-save-us-from-the-
poorhouse-2014-04-04 (reproducing data attributed to “Bankrate, National Associations of 
Realtors, Maliman, and Whitefenceindex.com.”). 
 162  The College Board reports that between 2009 and 2013 Private Non-Profit average 
tuition and fees (in 2013 dollars) rose from $26,356 to $29,593 (a 12% increase) while that for 
Public institutions rose from $7,008 to $8,821 (a 26% increase). COLL. BD., TRENDS IN 
COLLEGE PRICING, at tbl.2B (2013), http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-
pricing-2013-full-report.pdf. Accompanying these tuition increases, student debt from 2009 to 
2013 for graduates receiving a bachelor’s grew at Private Non-Profit institutions from $18,000 
to $19,500 (an 8% increase) and at Public institutions from $11,700 to $14,300 (a 22% 
increase). Graduating to Debt: Why student loan debt is on the rise, ONINVESTING (2014) 
(referring to the College Board 2014). 
 163  See infra note 741 and accompanying text. 
 164  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 365 n.3 (citing JAMES TRUNSLOW ADAMS, THE AMERICAN 
EPIC 404 (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, Inc. 1931)). 
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children would have a better start than we did. Social Security leaves no inheritance 
for the heirs of the deceased beneficiary. It is noted that: “Psychologists tell us that, 
as humans age, they are wired to want to leave a legacy. A Greek proverb says the 
societies become great when old men plant trees whose shade they know they will 
never sit in.”165 
Social Security has grown from a simple pension system in which pay-as-you-go 
was an easy funding device that was deceptively simple. There were many 
contributors but few beneficiaries. However, underneath the surface a huge unfunded 
federal liability was growing that today is creating significant long-term budgetary 
problems in which any solution will involve considerable complexity as the change 
filters through a diverse population with diverse family situations. 
3. The Easy Solution—Not So Easy 
Making Social Security sustainable for the long run is often seen as a problem 
involving relatively simple mathematics. You can raise taxes, cut benefits, or a 
combination of the two. But the discussion does not remain simple when it expands 
to all kinds of retirement benefits that are supported by the government tax system. 
The discussion might suggest that reducing other retirement subsidies or tax 
expenditures should be done to save Social Security. High-end taxpayers may not 
give up their very lush benefits easily to fund the changes to save Social Security. In 
reality, it is a question of who is going to suffer to make the system work and none 
of the players are particularly interested in helping the solution. 
At some point, the demands of the retirement crisis will significantly impinge on 
other government spending and the country will look to raise taxes. When this 
happens, it may be that the large and untaxed 401(k), IRA, and other large retirement 
assets may be the target of greater taxation. Some people think the efforts are already 
under way when they look at the problems in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy 
where overspending and over borrowing has become a problem for which these 
countries are looking to Germany to bail them out. Of course, Germany may be 
strong today, but, as noted above, it has its own looming unfunded pension 
problem.166 
Those political activists seeking to bring federal spending into balance should not 
expect revolutionary change. The move to greater spending and greater deficits and 
debt seem irreversible. It has been observed: 
The fact that even Ronald Reagan could not “curb the size and influence 
of the federal establishment,” as he promised in his 1981 inaugural 
address, indicates that the battle between liberals and conservatives over 
                                                            
 165  Paul Taylor, Mending the Safety Net, AARP BULL., Oct. 2014, at 18, 20. 
 166  MARIN, supra note 2, at 46. Marin states: 
I contend that if you plumb the depths of Angela Merkel’s consciousness, you will 
find an acute awareness that the problem Germany faces with regard to its own 
looming pension crisis . . . and their severely underfunded status and aging population 
make Merkel very unwilling to tackle the problems of Southern Europe . . . who 
ALSO have their own pension crises looming behind the current overborrowing crisis. 
And the other pillar of the European Union, France, is . . . in even worse shape than 
Germany and entirely unable to shoulder this burden.  
Id. at 46-47. 
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the welfare state is fundamentally asymmetric. What’s at stake in their 
political contest is not whether the permanent liberal project of expanding 
the welfare state will or won’t go forward, but whether it will proceed 
rapidly or slowly. Liberal victories advance liberalism; conservative 
“victories” postpone liberalism.167 
Several balanced proposals have been put forward, but have not received serious 
attention in Congress. The Simpson-Bowles Proposal, which was sponsored by a 
committee appointed by President Obama, did not receive any serious consideration 
either at the White House or in Congress although it received an inordinate amount 
of press coverage.168  
In the face of severe deficits and growing debt, there are proposals being made 
that would expand Social Security in significant ways both to expand the coverage 
and to raise the funds necessary to pay for them.169 
Social Security has just passed its 80th birthday and seems more ingrained in the 
American system than ever before. Yet, in spite of the many defects and inequalities 
built into the system, and the many proposals for change, the dependence of so many 
people on the system is likely to militate against any significant change. At some 
point the weakness of this first leg of retirement planning will need to be reformed. 
II. JUSTIFYING SOCIAL SECURITY 
A. Stay the Course with the Present Social Security Structure 
New York University Law Professor Daniel Shaviro sees the Social Security 
issue as one between the existing system and a system modeled after private 
insurance. He generously refers to the issue as whether Social Security should be 
more “market-based.”170 Expanding on that issue, Professor Shaviro states: 
What makes it non-obvious whether Social Security and Medicare should 
be more market-based . . . is the fact that these programs specifically 
address problems of market failure and defective consumer choice. 
Accordingly, . . . one needs to assess the issue of more versus less market-
based design in terms of how it would affect achieving the underlying 
objectives that one has already agreed markets do not provide. In addition, 
one has to ask how political choice problems would change within the 
                                                            
 167  WILLIAM VOEGELI, NEVER ENOUGH, AMERICA’S LIMITLESS WELFARE STATE 212 
(2010). 
 168  See, e.g., Brain Faler, The ghost of Simpson-Bowles, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/the-ghost-of-simpson-bowles-haunts-2014-112199. 
 169  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 107-08.  
 170  Daniel Shaviro, Should Social Security and Medicare Be More Market-Based?, 21 
ELDER L.J. 87, 90 (2013) (stating, more specifically, “that of whether the retirement programs 
should be made more market-based, with differences from privately offered insurance being 
mainly limited to the fact that the government mandates, regulates and subsidizes retirees’ 
private coverage”). 
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new structure, rather than presuming that they would go away, given that 
the government will be heavily involved in any event.171 
Although Social Security and Medicare have insurance like characteristics, 
Shaviro says the two programs are quite distinct: 
[T]hey are deliberately designed to limit people’s ability to make their 
own choices—in particular, with regard to how much or little to save for 
retirement; how to invest these savings; and how to structure the eventual 
payout. While limiting choice may sound bad, . . . it turns out to be well 
justified in this context. Both paternalism (however dubious an approach 
in many contexts) and externality problems provide convincing grounds 
for imposing the life cycle planning equivalent of requiring people “to eat 
their spinach.”172 
Shaviro describes Social Security as a “widely accepted conceptual structure that 
reflects the deliberate linkage between its taxing wages and its offering retirement 
benefits that creates a sense of ‘earned entitlement’ even if the taxes one pays are not 
present value-equivalent to the benefits one eventually receives.”173 This 
arrangement is justified based on two analogies. The first, by economist Paul 
Samuelson, set out in his 1958 article,174 and the second, by Professor Shaviro, in his 
book on Social Security published in 2000.175 Samuelson posits that, with the demise 
of a social structure where children cared for parents in old age, a stable system was 
created in which one generation supported the prior generation with the expectation 
that they will be similarly supported by the succeeding generation.176 While the first 
generation gets a “free ride” because they pay so little into the system, each 
succeeding generation will support the prior generation and receive support from the 
next succeeding generation. The system works and is stable so long as the 
generations continue. The last generation, of course, is cheated; although, this will 
not occur as long as the nation endures. 
Shaviro draws three conclusions from Samuelson’s model. First, there is no 
inherent reason the program would be unsustainable since the model simply posits 
that the money paid into the system by the succeeding generation will be taken out 
by the first generation.177 This merely says that what is taken in is given to the senior 
                                                            
 171  Id. at 90 (asserting that proponents of market-based approaches have conceded that 
markets cannot entirely handle the core problems that make the programs necessary—leaving 
them in a posture of merely “haggling about the price.”)  
 172  Id. at 92. 
 173  Id. at 93. 
 174  Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the 
Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 (1958); see also Shaviro, supra note 170, 
at 93 n.21; SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 10-11. 
 175  DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2000). 
 176  Samuelson, supra note 174, at 480. 
 177  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 93-94. 
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generation. So long as payroll tax funding is constant relative to wage levels, 
benefits will not explode and will likely not grow faster than the economy.178 
The second conclusion is from the standpoint of the working-age participant. 
This “pay-as-you-go” system with fixed payroll tax funding creates an implicit 
financial instrument with no rate of return, because each generation takes out of the 
system the same amount that it put into the system.179 However, if the population of 
the junior generation increases or wages grow beyond what was true of the prior 
generation, an investment return will be realized by the senior generation.180 
Samuelson’s model posited a situation in which participation in Social Security was 
the only investment option but suggested that a return in excess of that provided by 
the capital market could be realized if the population or wages grew significantly.181 
If his suggestion is correct, it supports the idea that ever-increasing benefits not 
funded in advance could be continued until the last generation in the program.182 
As Shaviro notes, Social Security sustainability in practice has suffered from 
adverse conditions inconsistent with Samuelson’s model.183 Birth rates have fallen, 
life expectancies have increased, and wage growth has slowed in the past several 
years putting pressure on the effectiveness of Samuelson’s “ever increasing benefits” 
analysis. Nevertheless, Shaviro finds the analysis constructive since any imbalance 
in the system can be addressed “so long as the needed changes to taxes and/or 
benefits were adopted in a timely fashion.”184 
The third conclusion, involves the political economy of obtaining approval from 
one generation to pay taxes with the promise of ultimately receiving a return in 
retirement based on assumed fixed parameters.185 The idea was to overcome the 
selfish impulses by approving a system with an assumed fixed payroll tax rate and a 
pure pay-as-you-go benefit payout.  
While recognizing that the program has continued for over fifty years since 
Samuelson’s model, and many changes have occurred, including the clear separation 
of the payroll tax rate from the benefit formula, Shaviro notes: “Yet the two sides of 
the ledger will only be in balance, either for a given year or over the long term if 
                                                            
 178  Id. 95-96. 
 179  Id. at 96. 
 180  Id. at 97. 
 181  Id. at 97-98 (citing Henry J. Aaron, The Social Insurance Paradox, 32 CAN. J. ECON. & 
POL. SCI. 371 (1966)). In his article, Aaron provides an algorithm proving that “social 
insurance can increase the welfare of each person if the sum of rates of growth of population 
and real wages exceeds the rate of interest.” Aaron, supra, at 372. He calls his theorem the 
“social insurance paradox” such that he can assert that “if no reserve is accumulated in the 
financing of old age pensions, each person will receive a larger pension than he has paid for . . 
. .” Id. at 372. Of course, if the combined rate of population growth plus the wage growth fall 
below the prevailing interest rate the system will leave everyone with a smaller pension than 
was paid for. Id. at 374. 
 182  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 97. 
 183  Id. at 99-100. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. at 100-01. 
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Congress adjusts them suitably and without undue lag, as demographic events alter 
the fiscal relationship between the two sides of the ledger.”186 
Shaviro suggests Social Security is sustainable, even with a lack of pre-funding, 
so long as benefits do not grow too fast relative to the size of the economy, because 
“simply increasing taxes relative to benefits over the long term” can fund system 
benefits.187 Although the terms of the “ever increasing benefit” analysis has in 
practice encountered certain “risk factors” (e.g. adverse demographic growth and 
wage growth), Shaviro does not see any “inherent” reason the system should not 
continue to be sustainable so long as adjustments to taxes and/or benefits are made in 
a timely fashion.188 However, the policy of one generation paying for the next has 
become weaker as the fiscal situation has deteriorated. The large senior age cohort 
has created a “third rail” of politics in Social Security and Medicare that makes 
solving the fiscal problem of who will pay either in the form of higher taxes or lower 
benefits politically difficult.189 
The second model Shaviro uses to help conceptualize Social Security comes 
from his earlier book, Making Sense of Social Security Reform, which does not focus 
on the system but instead focuses on the individual in the system.190 Here, he 
outlines Social Security as a three-part system in which the benefit (B) is equal to the 
taxes paid (T) plus the return on taxes paid (rT) plus an amount (X) needed to adjust 
the system into balance.191 The formula (B = T + rT + X) allows Social Security to 
be viewed as distinct programs wrapped together.192 
“T” is viewed as an amount of forced savings to acquire a benefit that is simply a 
fixed lifetime annuity that cannot be transferred or assigned. “rT” represents a 
restricted portfolio choice over which the participant has no opportunity to choose 
between alternate investments.193 “X” is either a positive, if someone benefits from a 
wealth transfer, or a negative, if one’s benefit is reduced.194 The redistributive 
feature represented by “X” is a “modestly progressive” and seldom-understood 
factor that favors one-earner married couples over two-earner couples and single 
individuals.195 
                                                            
 186  Id. at 98. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. at 100. 
 189  Id. at 100-01. 
 190  Id. 
 191  Id. at 102. 
 192  Id.  
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. at 102-04. 
 195  Id. at 104 (raising questions as to whether the transfers are good policy, whether the 
transfers should be done within or outside the system, and whether the relationship between 
taxes paid and benefits received should be more transparent). Descriptions of Social Security 
as a plan of forced savings and as a redistributive program are elaborated in an earlier book, 
see SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 29-32. 
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In recognizing that the sytem is financially challenged, Shaviro states that 
making Social Security self-financing is simply a matter of arithmetic:196 “All it 
takes is some combination of increasing its tax financing and/or reducing projected 
future benefits. One of the most important issues raised here is what mix between 
changes to these two sides of the ledger should be utilized.”197 
Suggested changes include increasing the retirement age and indexing benefits to 
increases in life expectancies, making the benefits less generous to high-income 
earners, or changing the inflation index for benefits.198 Regardless, making the 
system more progressive by reducing the benefits to higher earners seems inevitable. 
Such a change might escape economic inefficiences if the system is simply viewed 
as a tax on work, but would likely create further obscurities in the tax/benefit 
relationship and raise issues of political economy as higher earners may be less 
inclined to continue supporting the system. This problem was recognized by Social 
Security architects, as Shaviro notes: 
Social Security architects, such as Wilbur Cohen and Robert M. Ball, 
famously argued that “a program for the poor will end up being a poor 
program,” and that universality was thererfore needed to keep the 
program politically strong. If this is correct, a more progressive benefit 
skew might endanger poor retirees’ benefits over time.199 
A strong political consideration is that any change in benefits may affect current 
retirees and those close to retirement who have planned on certain levels of benefits. 
However, such benefits are not legal obligations and may be legally changed by 
Congress.200 Recent discussions have sought to reassure such persons by stipulating 
that changes (i.e. reducing benefits) would not affect those fifty-five years or older. 
On the other hand, Social Security benefits and taxes are often considered 
independently such that raising taxes means greater “forced” savings having the 
same effect as a benefit reduction.201 Under the current system taxes could be raised 
by raising the rate of tax or by lifting the ceiling on the tax base that is subject to the 
tax. Raising the rate affects all taxpayers but lifting the ceiling will affect higher 
income taxpayers who may not need the increased benefit but may see the increased 
redistributional effects and be less willing to support the system.202 
Finally, Shaviro believes that the label, as well as, the substance of any change 
implementeed should be evaluated. In one plan he mentions, taxes were increased by 
making health benefits received by an employee subject to the Social Security tax. 
                                                            
 196  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 105. Other commentators describe the needed adjustments 
at “slight increases.” ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at xii. 
 197  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 105. 
 198  Id. at 105-06. 
 199  Id. at 107 (citing EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, ROBERT BALL AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY 4 (2005)). 
 200  Id. at 107-08. 
 201  Id. 
 202  Id. at 107-09. Shaviro finds the current system of placing a ceiling on the tax base 
subject to the Social Security tax reflects a “high political economy value” on limiting the 
actual and apparent redistribution effects. Id. at 108-109. 
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Such a change allows one to argue that at least the observed rate of tax was not 
increased when in fact the tax revenue increased primarily among those lower 
income persons who are below the wage ceiling.203 
B. Arguments for Forced Savings 
That some element of forced savings should be instituted is supported by three 
arguments—paternalism, market failure, and externalities. Paternalism suggests that 
optimal lifetime behavior requires people be forced to save for, and throughout, 
retirement based on their own self-interest.204 The theory of declining marginal 
utility from consumption within a time period leads to the conclusion that smoothing 
out consumption between periods should be a common objective regardless of your 
income level. Thus, forced saving for retirement is consistent with one’s ability to 
maintain a constant level of consumption throughout retirement making Social 
Security’s lifetime annuity highly desirable even though it might mean that person’s 
wealth is exhausted at the time of death with no intergenerational transfer.205 Finally, 
looking to psychological studies, some people concentrate more on present 
consumption and therefore act in such a way as to undermine their ability to 
maintain their level of consumption in future years.206 Some level of forced savings 
should be required and failing to do so would be a mistake.207 
Market failure is the second argument for forced savings. Here, the idea is that 
the government can do a better job of addressing the failures of the market than 
private firms. Further, by using income tax and transfer payments the government 
can provide better insurance against individual career or planning failure that does 
not provide adequate retirement than can private firms. The government guarantee 
provides everyone at least a minimal level of living. Thus, under the economic 
principle of the declining marginal utility of money, the amount taken from a high 
income individual and given to a low income individual has greater utility (e.g. 
value) to the low income person than the utility lost by the high income person 
thereby creating net social utility.208  
Private firms are unable to provide this type of insurance because it can create an 
incentive for someone to intentionally have a low income and collect from the 
insurance company. It also allows for adverse selection in which the purchaser of a 
                                                            
 203  Id. at 109-10. 
 204  Id. at 122. 
 205  Id. at 123. 
 206  Id. at 125. 
 207  Id. at 124-25. 
 208  Declining marginal utility is a concept that economists consider so obvious that needs 
no proof. See 7 FRED GOTTHEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 108-12 (2013). Nevertheless, the 
concept is the primary justification for the graduated income tax notwithstanding that no one 
is able to quantify utility or any decline in utility. However, no one is able to determine the 
appropriate tax rate that equalizes the economic sacrifice between taxpayers. Thus, when 
someone states that it is important for the wealthy to pay his or her fair share of taxes, it is 
impossible to determine his or her fair share. Such comments also misuse the term “wealthy,” 
since the income tax taxes income and not wealth. Perhaps the best one can say is that your 
fair share is what Congress determines is your fair share. See infra note 703 and 
accompanying text. 
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life annuity has better information than the insurer on his or her own health and life 
expectancy. Only a stable government requiring the entire population to participate 
in the program can provide this type of insurance.209 Shaviro argues that the 
government must, to some extent, have a fixed demographic; although, if demand is 
sufficiently large, it may be possible for private firms to provide the required 
annuities on somewhat more actuarially fair terms than is presently available.210 
Fiscal and altruistic externalities support forced savings, arguing that, when 
individuals fail to save or insure against the exigencies of retirement, they become a 
burden on the national, state, or local treasuries.211 It is also unsettling to others who 
observe the elderly suffering in old age because of a failure to save adequately for 
retirement. These concerns are alleviated by a forced savings plan.212 
Portfolio choice is the final argument Shaviro addresses, which, for Social 
Security, is no portfolio choice. He posits that departures from optimal investor 
behavior present errors and negative externalities that could be prevented by 
paternalism.213 Optimal investor behavior varies depending on the investor’s degree 
of risk aversion, which in turn reflects the declining marginal utility of money.214 
Optimal investor behavior requires broad diversification of investments that are 
often unavailable to the private investor such that Shaviro sees this criticism of 
Social Security as speculation.215 Investor error is expected and likely to lead to bad 
results, thereby raising questions of negative fiscal and altruistic externalities.216 
Since most private saving account “PSA” proposals restrict investment options 
during accumulation and retirement, Shaviro characterizes the argument about 
investment choice as merely a “haggling about the price” and deems PSAs as 
unrelated to future Social Security sustainability.217 
C. Arguments Favoring Investor Participation 
Three basic arguments are presented in favor of allowing participants to trade 
their future benefits for an investment in a diversified stock or bond portfolio. First, 
Social Security is the bottom tier of anyone’s retirement, and everyone investing this 
basic amount exhibits an inordinate amount of risk aversion.218 Someone who 
prefers more risk could invest other monies in risky assets to make the overall risk 
                                                            
 209  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 125-27. 
 210  Id. at 127. 
 211  Id. at 128. 
 212  While arguing that Social Security is an insurance program rather than a welfare 
program proponents of Social Security expansion stress the needs of “older women, people of 
color, the LGBT community, low-wage workers, many early retirees, and the oldest old.” 
ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 49. 
 213  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 134. 
 214  Id. at 134. 
 215  Id. at 135. 
 216  Id. at 135-36. 
 217  Id. at 136. 
 218  Id. at 137. 
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consistent with that person’s objectives. Second, the private sector trend of shifting 
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, where one’s retirement 
success depends on the success of investment decisions, should be extended to 
Social Security.219 Resistance to this trend generally is strongest among collective 
bargaining units (primarily in the public sector), who point out that the private sector 
trend is being initiated by the employer and not the employees.220 Therefore, Shaviro 
argues that diversification would require that one’s retirement is not entirely 
dependent on the financial markets and that some “defined benefit” is preserved.221 
Finally, the volatility of the financial markets in the past few years suggests that 
returns on such investments are not as assured as some have asserted; and, since 
people are risk adverse, they should not invest in risky investments until such time as 
they are assured of some base of retirement savings.222 
Characterizing a flat rate payroll tax as a form of “forced savings” might suggest 
some element of investor participation. However, the dedicated payroll tax was 
implemented for a different purpose which was to insure that people would feel they 
had paid for the benefits and politicians would be reluctant to interfere with them in 
the future.223 There is only a general relationship between the payment of taxes and 
benefits, but not on a dollar for dollar basis. In fact, the system has a significant 
wealth distributional effect such that lower income individuals receive a higher 
percentage of their preretirement income (the so-called “replacement rate”) than 
higher income individuals.224 The ceiling on the earnings covered by the Social 
Security tax can be justified on the grounds that the purpose of the program is to 
insure that every person has a minimum amount at retirement and persons with 
incomes higher than a certain level will likely have additional savings of their 
own.225 
Creating a distinct relationship between taxes and benefits could make Social 
Security more efficient by making the relationship more transparent in that a person 
                                                            
 219  Id. at 137-38. 
 220  Id. at 138. 
 221  Id. at 138. 
 222  Id. at 139-40 (noting that even people who do not hold stock already bear some of the 
risk associated with market performance through the market’s macroeconomic impact). 
 223  Id. at 140. In response to an inquiry from a reporter challenging the economic 
incentives in the system, President Roosevelt stated: 
I guess you are right on the economics, but those taxes were never a problem of 
economics. They are politics all the way through. We put those payroll tax 
contributions there so as to give the contributor a legal, moral, and political right to 
collect their pensions . . . . With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap 
my social security program.”  
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 66; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 117 (noting that with 
Medicare only part A was given a dedicated tax because of the “popularity of Social 
Security’s program design” but unlike social security, the more you pay does not correlate to 
greater benefits but since this relationship is “sufficiently obscure to the general public” the 
dedicated finance might protect this program as well as Social Security). 
 224  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140-41. 
 225  Id. at 141-42. 
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who views the tax as a burden on labor can more easily see how the extra work could 
result in an additional benefit.226 But Shaviro suggests the lack of transparency is no 
accident, and notes the political economy argument that a “program for the poor” is 
often a program because it can easily be cut when voters refuse to support it.227 The 
opacity also served to allow the first generation, which suffered during the Great 
Depression, to do very well with little or no payment into the system, although such 
a transfer may be justified.228  
Finally, even though Social Security does not provide a benefit of inheritability, 
consumer failure, market failure, or altruistic or fiscal externalities would not be 
alleviated by a provision for inheritability.229 Shaviro, having made a strong case for 
Social Security, challenges anyone desiring to replace it with PSAs must be prepared 
to address the following criteria: 
1. Since $100 can be invested in treasury bonds, other bonds, or stock, 
each investment is said to be “equally valuable,” although risk and 
expected return may be different. Noting that the Social Security 
benefit (T + rT + X) is one such investment, choosing something 
other than Social Security should reflect a basis for concluding a 
riskier portfolio is better.” If the riskier portfolio is preferable overall, 
PSAs are unnecessary and the government could make the alternative 
investments.230 
2. Since PSAs will also offer limited investment choice, proponents are 
merely “haggling about the price” such that proponents must 
demonstrate the merits of “greater choice” in relationship to Social 
Security’s accepted purposes.231 
3. If desirable, a PSA system could be made “progressive” by 
transferring funds from higher income PSA owners to lower PSA 
owners.232 
4. PSAs make the marginal relationship between contributions and 
benefits transparent and encourage work, an effect that could also be 
achieved under Social Security.233 
5. Actuarial conventions make PSAs look attractive by, among other 
things, under-estimating the cost of implicit government guarantees 
                                                            
 226  Id. at 143. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. at 143-44. Other reasons include the Samuelson thesis discussed earlier, the extreme 
poverty caused by the depression, and a belief in the progressivity provided by rising lifetime 
incomes. Id. 
 229  Id. at 145-46. 
 230  Id. at 112-13 (noting that this approach seemed viable in the 1990s when the internet 
bubble caused large market returns making stocks look “artificially reliable,” but the stock 
market performance in the years subsequent have dampened enthusiasm for this approach).  
 231  Id. at 113-14. 
 232  Id. at 114 (citing SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 152-56). 
 233  Id. at 102-04. 
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or overemphasizing their safeguards against future government 
interference.234 
6. Shifting money into PSAs will reduce any Social Security surpluses 
and limit government’s ability to use those funds for other programs. 
Since the surpluses have been largely eliminated, general revenues 
are needed to pay current benefits and PSAs will increase that 
need.235 
Eliminating investor participation based on the Samuelson/Aaron analysis is not 
as clear as it seems. That analysis can be simplified by positing a society in which 
there are 1,000 participants at every age so that there are 1,000 one-year-olds, 1,000 
ten-year-olds, 1,000 sixty-six-year olds and so forth. Assume everyone enters the 
workforce at age twenty and leaves at age sixty-five and dies at age eighty. If 
everyone between age twenty and sixty-five produces $400 worth of goods then 
those 45,000 persons will produce $18,000,000. If we divide the product between all 
persons twenty and older (age eighty), 60,000 people would each receive $300.00. If 
the population increases or if the workers become more productive, there is more to 
distribute and everyone is better off. Of course, if the population begins to decline or 
becomes less productive then everyone will have a reduced standard of living.  
However, reality sets in, because the individual impact varies due to differences 
in longevity, waves of population growth and decline, earnings, and an infinite 
variety of other conditions all of which can be addressed by policy makers (called 
“ethical observers” by Samuelson) who select the winners and losers.236 
Nevertheless, this ideal suggests, as does Samuelson, that the system could generally 
be sustainable. 
If the system is sustainable, the next step is to make appropriate allocations to 
achieve some “equitable” or “optimal” state. Recognizing that free markets might 
reach a “Pareto efficiency,”237 achieving an “ethically optimal” distribution would 
require governmental interference with the market results by using taxes, subsidies, 
fiat, or other such action.238 To achieve the ethically optimal distribution mankind 
enters into a Hobbes-Rousseau social contract instructing the young that if they 
                                                            
 234  Id. at 114-15. 
 235  Id. at 115-16 (noting that Social Security surpluses caused increased government 
spending in the past is no longer the case as the process is now reversed and payments are 
now needed for interest on the trust fund). 
 236  Samuelson, supra note 174, at 480. These conditions must be addressed by policy 
makers and the views of economists can be helpful for as Samuelson states: 
We economists have been told . . . to economize . . . in the sense that we want what 
there is to go as far as possible. But it is also the task of political economy to point out 
where common rules in the form of self-imposed fiats can attain higher positions on 
the social welfare functions prescribed for us by ethical observers.  
Id. 
 237  Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is 
impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse 
off. Id. at 479-80. 
 238  Id. at 479. 
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support the aged then the unborn will be charged with supporting them.239 Although 
social coercion is used on the young, “the young never suffer, since their successors 
come under the same requirement. Everybody ends better off. It is as simple as 
that.”240 
The end result of the Samuelson/Aaron analysis is a series of governmental 
interferences which are not necessarily preferable to the choices made by investor 
participation. With investor participation the “ethically optimal” distribution would 
reflect at least some element of self interest. 
D. Acknowledged Faults 
Shaviro acknowledges a number of caveats that have a tendency to 
weaken his argument, which supports the current system, including the 
following: 
1. Social Security provides greater security against loss than private 
investments, assuming that the government is solvent and politically 
stable.241 
2. If payroll taxes and benefits to be received were allocated on an 
“actuarially fair individual basis,” a PSA structure would be 
preferable to the current system.242 
3. Social Security lacks transparency between the taxes paid and 
benefits received. Few understand the wide disparity of benefits 
between individuals because of marital status.243 There is also a lack 
of transparency when it comes to the national debt, where the 
unfunded liability of Social Security is not listed as a separate item. 
4. If a failure to leave an inheritance constituted an irrational decision 
then consumer failure might be implicated and should be addressed 
by Social Security.244 
5. Medicare over emphasizes relatively routine care relative to high-end 
catastrophic coverage.245 
6. The political situation has acknowledged the unsustainability of 
Social Security for over a quarter century, but, in spite of 
considerable dialogue and acknowledgement, the political situation 
has been unable to take action and has allowed the problem to grow 
worse and more costly to repair. 
                                                            
 239  Id. at 479-80. 
 240  Id. at 479. In this way, Samuelson asserts it is “easy” to set the rules to get to an 
optimum solution that is better than everyone insisting on a “quid pro quo” where we end up 
with each person being worse off. Id. 
 241  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140-41. 
 242  Id. at 140-41. 
 243  Id. at 145. The opacity of the system obscures the disparity between household types 
such as between one and two wage earner couples and between single individuals and one 
wage earner couples that cannot easily be justified on the basis of distributional grounds or 
grounds that the biases are offset in other areas of the fiscal system. Id. 
 244  Id. at 146. 
 245  Id. at 92. 
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7. Immigration could upset the system.246 
Part II has set forth Professor Shaviro’s arguments supporting the present Social 
Security system but has also acknowledged some of its weaknesses. The next section 
will demonstrate the inability of state and local governments as well as private 
employers to fulfill pension promises. That the federal government can succeed 
where so many other entities have failed reduces the case for Social Security to the 
public’s reliance on the federal government’s power to control the supply of money.  
III. ABANDONING LEG TWO: DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
A prime advantage of having Social Security sponsored by the federal 
government is the perception of long-term solvency and stability. The dramatic 
drops in the stock market in 2000 and 2008 have enhanced this perception, leaving 
the impression that the only stability retirees have is Social Security. However, there 
is evidence of long-term stability in the returns on stocks. From 1980 to 2014, a 
period of thirty-four years, the Dow Jones Industrial Average grew from 1,000 to 
over 17,000— a return of approximately 8% per annum.247 During the same period, 
the gross federal debt (including debt held by the public as well as debt held in 
government accounts) grew from nearly $1.0 trillion to just under $18 trillion with 
deficits projected as far into the future as can be estimated.248 
The long-term solvency and stability of the United States government and 
whether it will continue funding unsustainable programs is in question. The wisdom 
of continuing the Social Security program in its current state becomes questionable 
when one looks around the world at the ability of governments as well as private 
companies to sustain defined benefit plans. The next few sections look at the ability 
of cities, states, countries, and corporations to sustain defined benefit plans. In a 
sense, these plans have traditionally been the second leg of the three-legged 
retirement security plan in the United States. 
A. The Municipal Bankruptcy: Detroit 
Detroit is a city that watched its tax base decline as a result of business 
relocation, citizen flight, and growing obligations for pension and retiree healthcare 
costs that rely on current taxes to fund them.  
In July 2013, Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in what was the largest-ever 
municipal bankruptcy with debt totaling about $18 billion.249 The $18 billion debt 
included unfunded pension liabilities of approximately $2 billion owed to city 
                                                            
 246  Id. at 99. 
 247  Dow Jones Industrial Average, Jan. 1, 1980 – Dec. 8, 2014, MARKETWATCH, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/ 
index/djia/charts?symb=DJIA&countrycode=US&time=100& 
startdate=1%2F4%2F1980&enddate=12%2F8% 2F2014 
&freq=1&compidx=none&compind=none&comptemptext=Enter+Symbol%28s%29&comp=
none&uf=7168&ma=1&maval=50&lf=1&lf2=4&lf3=0&type=2&size=2&style=1013 (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 248  Historical Tables, supra note 5; CBO 2014 REPORT, supra note 77, at 2 & 3.  
 249  Ashley Woods, A Guide To Detroit’s Chapter 9 Default And How Bankruptcy Could 
Change The City, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
07/24/detroit-bankruptcy-chapter-9_n_3640734.html. 
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retirees and employees in the General Retirement System (“GRS”) and $1.25 billion 
owed to the Police and Firefighter Pension System (“PFRS”).250 The other major 
creditors are holders of bonds issued by the city for various purposes that include 
funding the escalating costs of pension and retiree health care.251  
1. Urban Flight and the Anemic Tax Base 
Critics point to the Detroit riots in 1967 and the recession in the early 1980s that 
impacted the auto industry and its component suppliers, resulting in significant 
losses of tax revenues to the city as the beginning of Detroit’s decline.252 The city 
responded to the loss of tax revenues with tax increases, which caused many 
corporations, residents, and non-resident workers to move out of the city into the 
suburbs.253 Detroit was left with the highest combined property and income tax for 
the state of Michigan; and, as a consequence, in 2012, the State of Michigan 
drastically cut its revenue sharing to the city.254 Mismanagement also played a part 
in Detroit’s decline.255 
2. Adverse Demographic Shifts  
Pay-as-you-go pension systems are heavily impacted by decreases in the 
taxpayer base and increases in the longevity of beneficiaries. Detroit was impacted 
by both demographic effects, seeing its ratio of employees to pensioners fall from 
two to one in 1960 to one to one in 1991 to one to two in 2012.256 The life 
                                                            
 250  Lawrence J. McQuillan, Detroit bankruptcy reveals 401(k)’s virtues: Column, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.usa today. com/story/opinion/2014/08/18/detroit-
bankurptcy-trial-pension-column/14228253/; Andrea Riquier, Detroit Bankruptcy Deal 
Largely Spares Pensions, INV. BUS. DAILY, Apr. 28, 2014, at A1 (noting that, prior to the 
bankruptcy, the unfunded liability was listed as approximately one-fourth of the $3.5 liability 
determined by the Emergency Financial Manager Kevyn Orr). 
 251  See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts 
Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never Die . . . and How They 
Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 778 (2014) (“[f]inally, there are 
the city’s creditors/lenders, including general obligation bondholders, some of whom were 
promised that the city’s taxing power and/or dedicated revenue streams would be available for 
repayment, but who now are being told that they should expect substantial losses. Put simply, 
Detroit is faced with toxic stew of competing rights and obligations, and it cannot simply tax, 
cut or borrow its way out of economic distress.”). 
 252  Nathan Borney & John Gallagher, How Detroit Went Broke, SUNDAY FREE PRESS, Sept. 
15, 2013, at 12A. 
 253  Id. 
 254  Chung, supra note 251, at 793. 
 255  The City’s mismanagement is epitomized by its mayor from 2002 to 2008, Kwame 
Kilpatrick, who is now in prison. See Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2014, at 36. 
 256  The employee to pensioner ratio in Detroit in 1960 was 26,386 employees to 10,629 
pensioners; in 1991 it was 18,548 employees to 18,615 pensioners; and in 2012 it was 10,525 
employees to 21,113 pensioners. Borney & Gallagher, supra note 252, at 14A. 
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expectancy for men was 66.6 years in 1960, but it increased to 76.2 years by 2010.257 
During this same time frame, Detroit’s population decreased by 57%.258 These 
changes, coupled with pensioners’ unwillingness to reduce benefits while looking 
for cost of living increases, made the pension system unsustainable. Further, in 1997, 
when the Michigan moved from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution 
plan, Detroit failed to follow suit and its legacy costs continued to increase.259 
3. Inaccurate Projections of Financial Returns 
Pension management requires making complex financial projections of receipts 
from the City and/or workers, returns on pension fund investments, and benefit 
estimates. If a high investment return is estimated, the fund can be balanced with 
lower contributions from the City and the workers. In administering Detroit’s two 
pension plans, the pension board members were union officials who employed static 
return percentage (most recently 7.9% annual rate of return) far exceeding the actual 
returns realized on the pension funds.260 Allegedly, political pressure on plan 
administrators to use artificially enhanced investment return estimates reduced the 
City’s annual contribution.261 With the adverse forces described above in play, this 
                                                            
 257  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2015 (2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf. 
 258  FAZLEY SIDDIQ, FIFTY YEARS OF GROWTH AND DECLINE OF LARGE COUNTIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1960-2010, at 14, 18-20 (2013). 
 259  Borney & Gallagher, supra note 252, at 14A. 
 260  Estimates made on assumptions of return as high as 8% have been seen as unrealistic. 
William K. Tabb, If Detroit Is Dead, Some Things Need to be Said At the Funeral, 37 QUEENS 
COL. J. URB. AFF. 1, 8 (2015). It has also been observed: 
That is, the pension obligations of the city constitute an expense equal to almost 200% 
of the city’s total payroll. Most departments and operations of the city of Detroit are 
understaffed and layoffs have occurred. Currently in the cases of both plans, active 
members constitute less than 40% of the members. That is, over 60% of the members 
of these funds are not contributing to annuity funds which are invested in the capital 
markets to grow the amount of money available to fund the plans’ obligations. 
Moreover, the market values of the assets held by such funds were significantly lower 
than the value of those assets assumed in the actuarial analysis of the funds. 
Mark P. Franke, The Detroit Pensions Bankruptcy Trust: A Proposal for the Resolution of 
Detroit’s Pensions Obligations under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 23 BANKR. L. & 
PRAC. 2, art. 5 (2014) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 261  Fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption in the city’s two pension funds and all employee 
benefit programs were also alleged. The emergency manager ordered an investigation into 
possible violations. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit Division, Jury 
Convicts Former Detroit City Treasurer, Pensions Officials of Conspiring to Defraud 
Pensioners Through Bribery (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/detroit/ press-
releases/2014/jury-convicts-former-detroit-city-treasurer-pension-officials-of-conspiring-to-
defraud-pensioners-through-bribery. An executive responsible for $200 million in real estate 
investments pleaded guilty earlier this year to conspiring to bribe a city treasurer. Id. The 
former city treasurer also is under indictment. Id. In addition, a federal grand jury indicted a 
former general counsel for Detroit's police and fire pension fund. Id. The government claims 
that people that had business with the city pension extorted thousands of dollars in the form of 
payments to individual trustees. Id.  
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situation could not go on forever and plan administrators sought to alleviate the 
problem by investing large sums into alternative high-risk investments, which, 
unfortunately, did not provide the return hoped for.262 
4. The Approved Workout Plan 
On November 7, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes issued an oral opinion 
confirming the City’s eighth amended plan of adjustment.263 The opinion approved a 
reduction in both pensions and the amount to be paid to bond holders.264 The City’s 
art collection held by the Detroit Institute of Art (“DIA”) was an asset sought by 
creditors, which the City desperately wanted to protect.265 The plan reflected 
compromises and settlements of various claims, which the court found reasonable, 
fair, equitable, nondiscriminatory, and feasible. 
The pension settlement was part of what was called the “Grand Bargain,” a 
collection of settlements among parties interested in the two pension plans and a 
desire to protect the City’s art.266 The settlements include the pension settlement, the 
state contribution, and the DIA. The Grand Bargain allows an unfunded accrued 
actuarial liability (the “UAAL”) in the amount of $1.879 billion for GRS and $1.25 
billion for PFRS.267 Under the Grand Bargain, the art will be preserved for the City 
and the City’s two pension plans will receive $816 million over twenty years to be 
paid by the State of Michigan, the Detroit Institute of Arts, and a number of 
charitable foundations and individuals.268 
Under the Grand Bargain GRS pensioners’ benefits are reduced by 4.5% and the 
cost of living adjustment (COLA) is eliminated while the PFRS pensioners’ receive 
                                                            
 262  This type of hedge fund investing, coupled with other alternative investments such as 
venture capital and private equity has steadily increased in the last thirty years and now 
account for 20% of public pension fund allocations. Detroit also made very speculative and 
ultimately disastrous derivative deals in relation to their debt offerings in connection with its 
special financing offer, which was basically a Band-Aid over a large wound. See THOMAS 
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT xx 
(2014) (“In 2005 [Mayor Kwame] Kilpatrick approved the largest municipal restructuring to 
date. A ‘veritable army’ of financial professionals from the nation’s top investment banks and 
insurance companies put together a $1.44 billion deal to fund the city’s unfunded pensions 
liability using innovative but complex and highly risky derivatives and credit default swaps . . 
. But just a few years later, the deal, like many of the high-risk credit deals that proliferated in 
the 1990s and 2000s, unraveled.”). 
 263  Oral Opinion on the Record at 1, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/notices/ 
Oral_Opinion_on_Detroit_Plan_Confirmation_Judge_Rhodes_FINAL_for_Release.pdf 
[hereinafter Detroit Oral Opinion]. 
 264  Id. at 4-6. 
 265  Id. at 12-13. 
 266  Id. at 3. 
 267  Id. at 4 (finding through June 30, 2023 the pension plans will use a 6.75% discount rate 
to value liabilities and a 6.75% assumed investment return rate to estimate future growth of 
assets). 
 268  Id.; see also Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end, supra note 255. 
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no benefit cut; however, their COLA is reduced from 2.52% to 1%.269 In approving 
the plan the court determined that federal bankruptcy power was sufficient to impair 
municipal pension rights even with state constitution protection.270 
The pension settlement also relates to a voluntary savings plan called the Annuity 
Savings Fund that was comingled with the GRS and was credited with excessive 
interest accruals.271 The settlement provided that, subject to certain caps, excess 
interest accrued between 2003 and 2013 would be repaid to the GRS, amortized at 
6.75% over the participant’s life expectancy and deducted from the participant’s 
monthly pension check.272 This part of the settlement is estimated to recoup $190 
million into the GRS.273 
To settle the claims consistent with Michigan Constitution article IX, section 24, 
which prohibits the impairment of municipal pensions, the State of Michigan will 
make an immediate payment of $194.8 million to settle pension claims.274 The DIA 
Settlement involves the transfer of the City’s art to a permanent trust in exchange for 
contributions to be paid over a twenty-year period into the GRS and the PFRS in the 
                                                            
 269  Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 4-5. The pension plans were frozen as of July 
1, 2014 and current employees will get a less generous hybrid pension plan. Each pension 
claimant will receive an adjusted pension amount. Projected funding targets for 2023 are 70% 
for GRS and 78% for PFRS with full funding by 2053. The plan was approved by 73% for 
GRS and 82% for PFRS. Id. This settlement was a victory for current pensioners since they 
were initially offered a plan, called the “Hybrid Plan,” that would rectify the pension situation 
by immediately reducing the benefits for GRS pensioners by 35% and eliminating their cost of 
living increases and by reducing benefits for PFRS pensioners by 10% but maintaining their 
cost of living increases. McQuillan, supra note 250; see also Chris Isidore & Melanie Hicken, 
Detroit vote: Key to comeback, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/06/news/ economy/detroit-bankruptcy-vote/. Additional cuts 
are proposed to health care benefits promised to retirees. Id.; see also Andrea Riquier, 
Detroit’s Pensions Largely Avoid Cuts In City Bankruptcy: Precedent For Future Flops?, 
INV. BUS. DAILY, Apr. 29, 1014, at A1. Voting on the proposal took place in July 2014, and 
both the General Pensioners (73% of retirees and employees with pension benefits who voted 
supported the plan) and Police and Firefighter Pensioners (82% those eligible for a police or 
fire pension who voted supported the plan) approved the plan. David Sirota, Detroit’s latest 
pension disgrace, SALON (July 24, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/24/ 
detroits_pension_disgrace_a_gaudy_new_stadium_at_retirees_expense_partner/ (last visited 
7/29/2014). 
 270  Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 5. The court rejected challenges to the 
settlement under the Michigan constitution as well as arguments that the art at the DIA should 
be available for sale to fund the pension obligations. In fact, the court felt that the pension 
reduction were “minor” compared to any foreseeable result at the time the bankruptcy was 
filed and was only possible because of the Grand Bargain. Id. at 6-7. 
 271  Id. at 8. 
 272  Id. The recoupment is limited to 20% cap of the highest value of the participant’s ASF 
account or of the participant’s annual pension. The settlement of the ASF claim will net 
approximately $190 million for the GRS. Id.  
 273  Id.  
 274  Elizabeth Pratt, Legislation Related to the Detroit Bankruptcy, ST. NOTES, Summer 
2014, at 1, 
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Notes/2014Notes/NotesSum14lp.pdf. 
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amounts of $100 million from contributions guaranteed by the DIA and $366 million 
from various local and national charitable foundations.275 
The overall bankruptcy settlement included six settlements beyond the Grand 
Bargain.276 The parties settled a claim for other post-employment benefits (OPEB), 
which includes healthcare and life insurance benefits.277 The allowed amount of 
OPEB claims was $4.3 billion of which $2.1 billion was for GRS retirees and $2.2 
billion for PFRS retirees.278 In settlement of these claims, the City established two 
associations to administer the claims and provided funding to the level of 10% of 
what the claims asserted.279 The remaining five settlements reflected recoveries 
ranging from 13% to 74% of the amount claimed.280 Overall, the City was able to 
reduce its unsecured liabilities by $7 billion out of the $18 billion owed by going 
into bankruptcy.281 
In settling the claim, the City was given approval to borrow $325 million in exit 
financing.282 However, the court admonished the City’s labor unions, retirees, and 
the State of Michigan to take actions to make sure this never happened again. 
Finally, the court also admonished the Governor regarding the composition of the 
Financial Review Commission responsible for ensuring the long-term feasibility of 
the plan and the City’s fiscal health that is composed of seven members, two of 
which are elected City officeholders.283 The court’s concern was that these two 
members have an interest in advocating for the City’s position rather than providing 
oversight.284 That meant only seven members are independent, thereby requiring five 
out of remaining seven members to overturn any action proposed by the City.285 
The Detroit bankruptcy raised two important issues that were settled without the 
requirement of a court decision, aside from whether the settlement was fair and in 
                                                            
 275  Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 12. The Court also found in its discussion 
regarding the settlement being in the best interests of the creditors that “[t]o sell the DIA art 
would be to forfeit Detroit’s future” and that the City made the right decision in refusing to 
sell the art. Id. at 24; see also Sirota, supra note 269 (noting that the $816 million represents 
the present value of Detroit’s world-class collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts, which the 
City has indicated would be placed in a separate trust, and finding concerning that, at the same 
time pensioners were seeing their pensions cut (“slash” according to Sirota), billionaire 
owners of the Detroit Red Wings, the Ilitch family, unveiled details of an already approved 
taxpayer-financed stadium for the professional hockey team). 
 276  Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 2. 
 277  Id. at 14. 
 278  Id. The City claimed the OPEB liability was $3.8 billion and the retirees asserted it was 
$5 billion with the difference resulting from certain actuarial assumptions and discount rates. 
Id. 
 279  Id. 
 280  Id. at 15-20. 
 281  Can Detroit recover? Chapter 9 draws to an end, supra note 255. 
 282  Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 37. 
 283  Id. at 43. 
 284  Id. 
 285  Id. at 42-43. 
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the best interests of the creditors. These issues were the extent and application of the 
constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of municipal pensions, and 
whether art is subject to a trust that prohibits the City from selling it to pay debts. 
These issues await another day, but Detroit is out of bankruptcy and the only clear 
winners are those providing services to the bankruptcy who have received $126 
million thus far, and are estimated to receive a total of $150 million, which is in 
excess of the GM bankruptcy ($110 million) and the Chrysler bankruptcy ($77 
million), but no way near the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy ($2.2 
billion).286 
B. The States: New Jersey, California, Illinois287 
Just as Detroit’s fiscal insolvency led to bankruptcy, many states are in a similar 
position as a result of irresponsible borrowing, unfunded pensions, and healthcare 
liabilities. Unlike municipalities, bankruptcy courts are not available to states.288 
In a recent report using 2012 data, the fifty states were ranked according to the 
state’s “financial health based on a variety of measures, such as cash on hand to pay 
its current bills, budget surpluses or deficits, unfunded liabilities and ability to 
provide adequate public services.”289 The report notes that, although the Great 
Recession290 is now history, states still struggle with the repercussions of the 
economic downturn and balancing budgets continues to be a problem for the states 
due, in part, to rising healthcare costs and the cost of funding state and local 
pension.291 New Jersey, Illinois, and California are three states ranked among the 
                                                            
 286  Matthew Dolan, Cost of Detroit’s Historic Bankruptcy Reaches $126 Million, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-detroits-historic-bankruptcy-
reach-126-million-1410557043 (noting that such fees are for lawyers, accountants, financial 
advisers, and experts on everything from police work and pension funds to art appraisals and 
public relations). The Bankruptcy Judge’s oral opinion noted that the fees in this case would 
exceed $100 million. Detroit Oral Opinion, supra note 263, at 27. 
 287  Frank, supra note 3, at x. 
 288  Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2013). 
 289  John Merline, New Jersey Dead Last In U.S. For Fiscal Solvency, Study Finds, INV. 
BUS. DAILY, Jan. 17, 2014, at A1. “Cash solvency” looks to how much cash a state can easily 
access to pay near-term bill. “Budget solvency” is mainly a measure of a state’s per-capita 
budget surpluses or deficits. “Long-term solvency” looks at a state’s ability to pay its long-
term obligations, such as guaranteed pension benefits and infrastructure maintenance. Id. 
“Service solvency” examines whether a state has sufficient resources to provide its residents 
with an adequate level of services, such as public safety and education. Id. The article was 
based on a study from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Sarah Arnett, State 
Fiscal Condition: Ranking the 50 States (Mercatus Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper 
No. 14-02, 2014).  
 290  “The ‘Great Recession’ is a term used to describe the nationwide United States 
recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009 . . . .” Arnett, supra note 289, at n.1 
(citing US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). 
 291  Arnett, supra note 289, at 3. 
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five lowest and have recently been in the news for their pension difficulties.292 Their 
ranking is as follows: 
Table 5 
Name of 
State 
Rank by 
Cash 
Solvency
293 
Rank by 
Budget 
Solvency 
Rank by 
Long-
Run 
Solvency 
Rank by 
Service-
Level 
Solvency 
Overall 
Rank: 
Fiscal 
Condition 
Fiscal 
Conditio
n 
Index294 
California 48  
(-2.58) 
45  
(-1.37) 
46  
(-2.67) 
31  
(-0.96) 
46 -2.01 
Illinois 50  
(-2.66) 
46  
(-1.37) 
49  
(-4.81) 
29  
(-0.50) 
48 -2.42 
New 
Jersey 
36  
(-1.72) 
50  
(-2.84) 
50  
(-5.12) 
39  
(-1.99) 
50 -2.81 
Ranking by Fiscal Condition (Fiscal Year 2012) 
In describing the results, the report suggests the bottom performers were 
especially hit hard in two categories: Budget Solvency and Long-Run Solvency.295 
These states’ status reflects years of poor financial management, adverse economic 
conditions, and/or a combination of both.  
New Jersey and Illinois are similar in that; (1) tax revenues have not kept up with 
spending, (2) budget practices only appear to balance the budget, (3) bonds are 
issued without the means of paying for them, and (4) pension liabilities underfunded 
by billions of dollars.296 Calculating unfunded liabilities is always difficult, in that 
the choice of an appropriate discount rate will often determine whether the fund is in 
deficit or surplus.297 It also seems that in times of economic downturns, states will 
underfund pension obligations and use the funds for other purposes.298 
                                                            
 292  Id. at 3. For a broader list of states that are in the winner and in the loser category, see 
MARIN, supra note 2, at 13 (identifying the winner states as Delaware, Idaho, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, and the loser states as Arkansas, Connecticut, 
California, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and 
Rhode Island.) The winners made provision for retirement and post retirement medical needs 
of workers and the general population while the losers did not and are now faced with playing 
catch up through tax increases and service cuts. Id. 
 293  Note: Solvency indices are in parenthesis next to the rank whereas the index of fiscal 
condition is in the separate last column. For each index the all state mean is 0.00. The top 
rated state in each category are as follows: Cash Solvency: Alaska (15.25); Budget Solvency: 
Alaska (7.76); Long-Run Solvency: Nebraska (8.77); Service-Level Solvency: Nevada (6.93); 
and Fiscal Condition: Alaska (8.80). Arnett, supra note 289, at 34-40. 
 294  Arnett’s State Fiscal Condition identifies the fiscal condition index as “the sum of the 
cash, budget, long-run, and service-level solvency indices weighted as follows: (0.35 x cash 
solvency score) + (0.35 x budget solvency score) + (0.2 x long-run solvency score) + (0.1 x 
service-level solvency score).” Id. at 38.  
 295  Id. at 34-40. 
 296  Id. at 24. 
 297  Arnett describes the method of selecting an appropriate discount rate as follows: 
The method used to calculate a state’s unfunded pension liabilities is a point of much 
discussion. The controversy centers on how to determine the appropriate discount rate, 
which is the interest rate used to determine the future value of pension assets. The 
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1. New Jersey 
On September 25, 2014, a specially appointed commission to study the status of 
New Jersey’s pension and health benefit systems issued the “NJ Status Report.”299 
The Report outlined New Jersey’s fifteen-year history of underfunding its state and 
local pensions. New Jersey’s 2014 budget called for $700 million in pension 
spending and $2.8 billion in health benefit spending, for current employees and 
retirees, out of its $33 billion state budget.300 Fully funding New Jersey’s pension 
obligation would require an additional $3 billion.301 Looking at the long-range 
prospects the unfunded pension liability is at $37 billion and the unfunded post-
employment health benefit liability is at $53 billion.302 
                                                            
unfunded pension liabilities presented in this section of the paper come from state 
estimates. State pension plans currently use their own rate-of-return and discount-rate 
assumptions, resulting in underestimated liabilities that are different to compare 
between states. To address this difficulty, Moody’s Investors Service, a credit rating 
agency, proposed that state pension plans use a common rate of return/discount rate 
base on a high-grade bond index. Changing the discount rate in accordance with 
Moody’s proposal would result in higher estimated unfunded liabilities that most 
estimates currently report. For example, using Moody’s new methodology, Illinois’s 
estimated unfunded pension liability would be over $200 billion. When New Jersey’s 
unfunded pension liability is calculated using a method consistent with private-sector 
accounting standards, the state’s unfunded liabilities rise to over $273 billion. For the 
purposes of calculating the long-run solvency index, this paper uses the total long-
term liabilities figure reported in state CAFRs [Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reports produced by state and local governments], which includes pension liabilities.  
Id. at n.18 (internal citations omitted). Another method that understates pension liabilities 
occurs when an out of date table of mortuary experience is used which underestimates the 
anticipated life expectancy. See Jean Lotus, Police and fire pension funds report $200,000 
shortfall: Actuarial change leads to property tax boost to cover pensions, FOREST PARK REV. 2 
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.forestparkreview.com/News/Articles/9-9-2014/Police-and-fire-
pension-funds-report-$200,000-shortfall-/ (reporting that Forest Park, Illinois used GAM-
1971, a 1971 actuarial table, rather than RP-2000, a 2000 actuarial table, that showed an 
additional four years of life expectancy thereby increasing the amount of the unfunded 
liability). 
 298  Arnett, supra note 289, at 16. 
 299  TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE: STATUS REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY PENSION AND HEALTH 
BENEFIT STUDY COMMISSION (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pdf/ 
NJPHBSC.pdf [hereinafter NJ STATUS REPORT]. Governor Christie in Executive Order No. 
161, signed on August 1, 2014, appointed a ten member commission to examine the status of 
the pension and health care systems of the State of New Jersey. The status report is factual and 
explanatory in nature and a final report will offer solutions. Id. at 2. 
 300  Id. at 3. 
 301  Id. (stating the unfunded liability is for the pension funding only since the health care is 
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis). 
 302  Id. at 4 (the combined $81 billion is almost three times the state’s annual budget). The 
funded pension liability is $44 billion making the pension funded at the level of 54%. Id. The 
unfunded liability is defined as the “present value of: 1) the cost of providing pension benefits 
to current retirees and 2) the pension benefits earned through that date by current employees.” 
Id. at 5. In making the calculation, a 7.9% expected rate of return was used which is a number 
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The states underfunding is blamed on the drag on plan asset values caused by the 
2000-2002 downturn, the Great Recession of 2008-2009, as well as, elected officials 
of both political parties making long-term commitments for benefits based on 
assumptions that were unduly optimistic.303 Reforms initiated by Governor Chris 
Christie in 2010 and 2011 helped by reducing benefits for new employees, 
increasing contributions, and temporarily suspending the cost of living adjustment; 
however, many saw them as a political compromise and not a permanent solution.304 
It remains to be seen whether Governor Christie will again seek to curb pension and 
health care costs or even make the promised contributions given current budget 
constraints.305 
2. Illinois 
One recent report identified Illinois as the worst state in terms of pension funding 
with their plans only 39% funded, followed by Kentucky at 48%; Connecticut at 
49%; and New Jersey at 54%.306 
Officially, in 2011 the combined unfunded pension liability for Illinois’ five 
state-run pension plans was $83 billion, using an expected return of 8% to value the 
                                                            
used by other states. Id. A lower rate of return would increase the amount of the unfunded 
liability. 
 303  Id. at 6. Local governments in New Jersey participate in the same plans but their plans 
have funded ratio of 75% compared to the state’s funded ration of 54%. Id. 
 304  Id. at 7. The changes in 2010 and 2011 are currently being challenged in litigation. Id. 
Suspending COLAs reduced the unfunded liability by $11.5 billion. Id. Health care is 
particular problem because the plans provide little incentive for employees to reduce costs, 
and, when the “Cadillac Tax” under the Affordable Care Act becomes effective in 2018, New 
Jersey will likely see an excise tax imposed in the amount of $58 million rising to $284 
million in 2022. Id. at 7-8. Citing Pew Charitable Trust data, the Report points out that the 
annual cost of individual health insurance coverage in New Jersey is $9,096 compared to a 
public and private national average cost of $5,884 and for family coverage $19,488 in New 
Jersey compared to $16,351 for the national average. Only Alaska and New Hampshire had 
higher costs. Id. at 24. 
 305  Elise Young & Terrence Dopp, Christie Pension Fixes Range From Unlikely to 
Unpalatable, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-
04/christie-pension-fixes-range-from-unlikely-to-unpalatable. The article also notes that West 
Virginia adopted a defined contribution plan in 1991, but changed back to a defined benefit 
plan in 2005 because they found it was cheaper to administer over the long run. Id. 
 306  NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 6. Regarding Kentucky’s problems, see CHRIS 
TOBE WITH KEN TOBE, KENTUCKY FRIED PENSIONS: EXPANDED WORSE THAN DETROIT EDITION 
9 (2d ed. 2013) (noting: “[T]he two states most corrupt in their funding practices are also 
corrupt in their investment practices. In the cases of Illinois and Kentucky the plans seem to 
be linked in a strange quid pro quo in which the retirement systems look the other way at their 
underfunded plans, while the legislature and governors look the other way and turn a blind eye 
to the investment corruption. As put by Matt Taibbi in Rolling Stone ‘With public budgets 
carefully scrutinized by everyone . . . the black box of pension funds makes it the only public 
treasure left that’s easy to steal.’”); see also Timothy W. Martin, Despite Cuts, More Pension 
Woes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/kentuckys-governor-matt-
bevin-prepares-another-pension-overhaul-1453842769 (describing the efforts of Kentucky’s 
new governor to overhaul Kentucky’s state pension system). 
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funds.307 Moody’s Investment Service, a bond-rating agency, found the short fall to 
be $135 billion, using a 5.67% discount rate.308 For 2012, Moody’s used a discount 
rate of 4.1% under the agency’s new methodology, at which time the unfunded 
liability approached $200 billion.309 To cover its annual pension obligations, Illinois 
has issued bonds, which now constitute 60% of Illinois’ outstanding debt.310 Illinois 
is using long-term borrowing to cover current obligations and squeezing other 
spending to accommodate its pension underfunding.311  
In 2012, Illinois attempted to control retiree healthcare costs by eliminating the 
statutory standards for determining the state’s contribution to health insurance 
premiums for certain retirees, and instead placed responsibility for allocating the 
health insurance premiums to the director of a public agency.312 The beneficiaries 
challenged the legislation, alleging, among other things, the legislature’s action 
violated the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.313 In July 
2014, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the health insurance benefit was a 
“benefit of membership” under the plain and ordinary meaning of the constitutional 
provision, and was therefore within that provision’s protections.314 The case was 
remanded for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims.315 
                                                            
 307  Ted Dabrowski, Illinois Pension Debt to Double as New Moody’s Methodology Kicks 
In, ILL. POL’Y INSTIT. BLOG (June 17, 2013), http://www.ilinoispolicy.org/illinois-pension -
debt-to-double-as-new-moodys-methodology-kicks-in/. 
 308  Id. 
 309  Id. (finding the Illinois state pension system is squeezing out everything from prisons to 
education and state pensions are grossly underfunded with unfunded liabilities of $100 billion 
and assets of 39%). Illinois has all the problems common to other pension systems and is 
trying all the common solutions from raising taxes to extending age limit, and eliminating 
retiree health care. Squeezed, ECONOMIST (Jan. 26, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21570733-illinois-lawmakers-fail-tackle-states-
pension-crisis-squeezed. 
 310  Dabrowski, supra note 307. 
 311  Arnett, supra note 289, at 21–22 (estimating that the unfunded liability approaches 
$200 million using Moody’s Investors Service proposed state discount rate); see also 
Dabrowski, supra note 307; Money to Burn, ECONOMIST (May 4, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21577088-muddle-headed-world-
american-public-pension-accounting-money-burn. 
 312  Retiree Health Insurance Ruling to Increase State Costs by $128 Million, INST. ILL. 
FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY (July 17, 2014), https://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/retiree-health-
insurance-ruling-increase-state-costs-128-million. 
 313  Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228, 1239 (Ill. 2014); ILL. CONST. 1970, art. XIII, § 5 
(“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state . . . shall be an enforceable 
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”). 
 314  Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1239. In its examination of the floor debate on the pension 
protection clause during the drafting of the state constitution in 1970, the opinion says:  
The intent of the pension protection clause was “to guarantee that retirement rights 
enjoyed by public employees would be afforded contractual status and insulated from 
diminishment or impairment by the General Assembly. In light of the constitutional 
debates, we have concluded that the provision was aimed at protecting the right to 
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In December 2013, while the healthcare litigation mentioned above was ongoing, 
the Illinois Legislature passed a pension reform law that decreased cost-of-living 
adjustments, capped pensionable salaries, and raised retirement ages while 
decreasing employee contributions by one percentage point.316 The legislation was 
immediately challenged under the Illinois Constitution and the reforms were placed 
on hold pending the outcome of the litigation.317 During the 2014 gubernatorial 
election, Governor Pat Quinn and the Republican gubernatorial candidate, Bruce 
Rauner, avoided definitive pension proposals while waiting for the outcome of 
litigation. Governor Rauner won the election and plans to propose replacing the 
defined benefit plan with a defined contribution plan that would reduce current costs, 
but would do nothing to address the burden of paying for the accrued unfunded 
liabilities of the old plan.318After the November election, the Sangamon County 
Circuit Court overturned the 2012 health care reforms and the case proceeded to the 
Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the circuit court, finding a violation of the 
pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution.319 Governor Rauner’s efforts to 
                                                            
receive the promised retirement benefits, not the adequacy of the funding to pay for 
them.” 
Id. at 1242. Interestingly, the court noted language in the debates that recognized the 
importance of providing pension assurance to “those persons who have worked for often 
substandard wages over a long period of time could at least expect to live in some kind of 
dignity during their golden years.” Id. The court cited two other cases reaching opposite 
conclusions based on similar constitutional language. Everson v. State of Hawaii, 122 Haw. 
402, 228 P.3d 282 (Haw. 2010) (holding health care benefits covered by the provision); In re 
Lippman, 487 N.E.2d 897 (1985) (holding that health benefits were not covered and the 
provision only extended benefits directly related to the terms of the retirement annuity). The 
Everson court found the decision in In re Lippman unpersuasive, and the Weems court agreed. 
Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1243; see also Paul Merrion, Pension reform dealt blow by Illinois 
Supreme Court, CRAINS (July 3, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140703/ 
NEWS02/140709930/pension-reform-dealt-blow-by-illinois-supreme-court# (emphasizing 
Justice Burke’s dissent stating that the court did not decide that the 2012 law was an 
unconstitutional diminishment or impairment of the constitutional rights). 
 315  Weems, 13 N.E.3d at 1230. Justice Burke dissented, pointing out that the clause in the 
constitution was titled “Pension and Retirement Rights,” which implied that only pensions 
were covered and that there was no discussion at the time the provision was adopted about 
health care benefits. Id. at 1245,1247 (Burke, J., dissenting). The dissent also objected that the 
remanding of the case did not definitively answer the issued raised by the appeal. Id. at 1251-
52.  
 316  Charles Chieppo, The Real Culprits in Illinois’ Pension Disaster, GOVERNING STATES 
& LOCALITIES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-real-culprits-illinois-
pension-underfunding-voters.html. The changes were intended to save $145 billion and fully 
fund the state pension system by 2044. Id. 
 317  Id. 
 318  Steven Malanga, A Pyrrhic Pension Victory: Illinois public workers may pay dearly for 
a court decision to overturn retirement reforms, CITY J. (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.city-
journal.org/html/pyrrhic-pension-victory-11470.html. 
 319  In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ill. 2015). The Illinois constitution 
provides: 
 
53Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
822 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:769 
 
balance the Illinois budget caused deadlock in the state capital.320 Indeed, the failure 
to approve a budget has delayed state aid to colleges and universities for low-income 
students forcing them to fail to return to school.321 
Not only is the State of Illinois having problems, but the city of Chicago is as 
well. Although not in bankruptcy, Chicago has a more serious pension problem than 
Detroit. Detroit’s aggregate unfunded public-worker pension liabilities are estimated 
at $4,100 per resident, while Chicago’s is at $18,200.322 Chicago also faces the 
problem of decreasing population that has gone from 3.6 million in 1950 to 2.7 
million today with 200,000 leaving in the first ten years of this century.323As reforms 
have taken shape, unions have threatened suit to stop the legislation from taking 
effect and suggest that Chicago instead borrow and raise taxes to fund the 
pensions.324 Prior Chicago administrations used one-off sources of cash, such as 
selling the right to collect parking fees until 2084.325 More recently, newly re-elected 
                                                            
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local 
government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an 
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or 
impaired. 
 ILL. CONST. 1970, art. XIII, §5. The court in In re Pension Reform Litigation found that the 
term “benefits” in the pension protection clause does not “only include the right to receive 
payments in the amount determined by the most recent calculation” and that a retiree “has a 
right in the existing formula by which his benefits are calculated as of the time he began 
employment and any beneficial modifications made during the course of his employment.” In 
re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d at 21-21 (citing Fields v. Elected Officials’ Retirement 
Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1165-68 (Ariz. 2014). 
 320  Aaron M. Renn, It’s Reform or Misrule In Basket Case That’s Illinois, INV. BUS. 
DAILY, Jan. 4, 2016, at A13 (describing the budget stalemate between Illinois’ Republican 
Governor and Democratic Legislature). “Short-term solutions and tax increases will never 
solve Illinois’s problems: unsustainable public pensions and health care benefits, coupled with 
a complete lack of fiscal responsibility. But Democrats and their union backers say they have 
ruled out the substantive changes necessary to shore up the state’s financial future.” Emily 
Zanotti, The Man Stopping Illinois From Digging a Deeper Hole, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-man-stopping-illinois-from-digging-a-deeper-fiscal-hole-
1454715881. 
 321  Douglas Belkin, Illinois Budget Deadlock hits College Enrollments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
19, 2016, at A2. 
 322  Chicago: Rahmbo’s toughest mission, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2014, at 25 (referencing 
Civic Federation; Morningstar). Mayor Rahm Emanuel was encouraged by a pension reform 
bill that required a 29% increase in contributions from existing city-government employees 
for a “smaller” pension and raises an additional 50 million dollars in taxes. Id. Emanuel still 
has to address the issue with teachers and with police and firefighters. Id. The latter groups 
comprise approximately 39 million employees and retirees. Id. 
 323  Id.  
 324  Id. 
 325  Id.; see also Charles Chieppo, Can Chicago Ever Dig Itself out of Its Pension Hole?, 
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (Nov. 4, 2014), www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col- 
chicago-public-pensions-cut-benefits-increase-contributions.html (noting that Chicago’s 
pension contribution in 2013 was $476 million and is scheduled to double by 2016 and 
escalate thereafter but even in 2016 the contribution would be barely half of the $2.2 billion 
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Mayor Rahm Emmanuel suggested allowing gambling casinos in the city with 
revenue dedicated to paying the City’s pension obligation as a way to address the 
pension problem.326  
3. California 
California, unlike New Jersey or Illinois, has seen its fiscal condition improving 
slightly as a balanced budget was proposed for the 2013-2014 fiscal year with a $1.2 
billion surplus after years of billion-dollar deficits and sever political gridlock.327 
California has been the victim of many unrealistic expectations about the 
sustainability of pension benefits, such as assuming liability greater than funding 
available, and the lack of adequate contingency planning.328 Estimating the size of 
California’s unfunded pension obligations is often in the eye of the beholder, but one 
bipartisan study estimated the unfunded liabilities of the ten largest public pension 
plans, encompassing over 90% of the assets and participants in public pension plans, 
at $240 billion.329 The two largest public pension funds in the United States are in 
California: the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), which is 
estimated to be 61% funded, and California State Teachers Retirement System 
(CalSTRS), which is estimated to be 58% funded.330 
In 1998, CalSTRS was fully funded for the first time primarily due to a thriving 
stock market, increased state contributions, and a robust economy from the dot-com 
                                                            
payment the city should make under the Governing Accounting Standards Board 
requirements). Chicago is likely a Detroit in the making. 
 326  Allysia Finley, Rahm Emmanuel Rolls the Dice to Pay Chicago’s Pension Bills, WALL 
ST. J., June 6, 2015, at A9. The Chicago schools started 2016 with a $480 million shortfall 
driven by pension payments and a decline in state funding. Illinois Governor Rauner is calling 
for a state takeover of the Chicago and legislation that would allow the school district to file 
for bankruptcy. Mark Peters & Kris Maher, Schools in Detroit, Chicago Seek State Help, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2016, at A3. 
 327  Arnett, supra note 289, at 24-25; see also Beermann, supra note 288, at 3 (discussing 
the pension crisis in California). 
 328  David Crane, Dow 28,000,000: The Unbelievable Expectations of California's Pension 
System, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703315404575250822189252384 (written by an advisor to former 
Governor Schwarzenegger). 
 329  LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY ii, 3, 4, 21 
(2011). California’s state retirement system has eighty-five separately managed “defined-
benefit” plans and forty-six “defined contribution” plans covering a total membership of 4.4 
million workers and retirees in California. Id. at 3. By 2015 California’s largest cities could be 
devoting one-third of their budgets to pension costs. Id. at 21. Beermann cites studies showing 
the estimated unfunded liability of public pensions as high as $4.6 trillion while another study 
estimates it as low as $647 billion. See Beermann, supra note 288, at 11-12 and studies cited 
therein.  
 330  LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, supra note 329, at 4. CalPERS covers over one-half of all 
California government workers and CalSTRS provides uniform benefits for all K-12 teachers 
and administrators and community college faculty, was started in 1913, and is under strict 
state control. Id. at 4-5. 
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boom.331 Seeking a political advantage from the positive developments, the 
Legislature and Governor enhanced teachers’ pension benefits believing that stock 
market gains would absorb the increased cost.332 The retirement of teachers who 
worked twenty-five years was calculated based on their highest single year of salary 
rather than a three year average of the top three.333 Longevity bonuses and 
supplemental retirement accounts were also created, and, at the same time, state 
contributions were reduced while teachers and school system payments went 
unchanged.334 In 2001, the dot-com bubble burst, which led to a $20 billion shortfall 
and the Legislature, relying on a 40% chance of covering it with market gains, did 
nothing.335 Then, with the 2008 recession, the funding levels plummeted to a level 
many considered unhealthy.336 
CalSTRS is on the road to insolvency337 and the government can no longer rely 
on stock market returns to close the deficit.338 Tax hikes or cuts in government 
services will have to be used to compensate. In the fiscal year ending in June 2014, 
payments into CalSTRS by school employees, school districts, and the state were $6 
billion, creating the need for additional $4.5 billion if investment returns do not meet 
expectations.339 While California expects to have a budget surplus this fiscal year, 
lawmakers also have other expenditures to consider.340 
CalPERS, the nation’s largest public employee pension fund, administers health 
and retirement benefits for more than 3,000 city, state, and local agencies with over 
1.6 million retirement system members and 1.4 million health plan members.341 Like 
CalSTRS teachers, CalPERS members received generous plan increases in 1999 that 
could allow workers as young as fifty-years-old to retire with lifetime pensions up to 
                                                            
 331  Chris Megerian, No Easy Fix for California’s Teacher Pension Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
20, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-teacher-pensions-20140221-
story.html#page=1. 
 332  Id. 
 333  Id. (referring to a sixty-two-year-old teacher who retired in 2013 with twenty-five years 
of service receiving a monthly pension of $3,980). 
 334  Id. State contributions into the pension fund were reduced from 2.6% to 2% of the 
statewide teacher payroll. Id. Teachers continued to pay in 8% of their salaries, as they have 
since 1972. Id. Schools have contributed 8.25% of their payrolls since 1990. Id. 
 335  Id. 
 336  Id. 
 337  Id. 
 338  David Crane, Teachers' pension crisis: How it happened, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. 
(Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/mar/08/david-crane-calstrs-funding-
nightmare/. 
 339  Megerian, supra note 331. 
 340  Crane, supra note 338. With the recent stock market surge, pension plans are finding 
some relief while unions are thinking about how to raise pensions with the increased returns. 
Steven Greenhut, Pension funds cheer good news. So why do they need us?, PUB. SECTOR INC. 
(Aug. 4, 2014). 
 341  Facts at a Glance, CALPERS, www.CalPers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at0a-
glance.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2014). 
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90% of final year salaries.342 This bill was the largest issuance of non-voter-
approved debt in California’s history, and CalPERS assured (some say misled) the 
Legislature that investment returns would cover the cost of the pension 
enhancements.343 
In 2012, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Public 
Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013.344 The law was essentially aimed at 
reducing pension payments for newly hired workers, but was somewhat undermined 
when CalPERS’s board approved nearly one hundred different types of extra pay 
that count towards pensions (referred to as “pension-spiking”) for workers hired 
since 2013.345 A 2014 bill aimed to fund CalSTRS over a thirty-two year period by 
increasing school district contributions.346 
Reforms in California are hindered by politics and judicial decision. In 2014, San 
Jose Mayor Chuck Reed proposed amending the California Constitution to permit 
government employers to change pension and healthcare benefits earned by public 
employees going forward and, when pension and healthcare retirement benefits are 
underfunded and are impeding the government from providing essential services, to 
reduce pension payments, increase employee contributions, decrease cost of living 
                                                            
 342  Crane, supra note 338. SB 400 signed into law in 1999 by then Governor Gray Davis 
increased pension benefits retroactively and prospectively for all public sector employees. Id. 
 343  Id. Allegedly, CalPERS “failed to disclose . . . that (1) the state budget was on the hook 
for shortfalls . . . , (2) those assumed investment returns implicitly projected the Dow Jones 
would reach roughly 25,000 by 2009 and 28,000,000 by 2099 . . . , (3) shortfalls could turn 
out to be hundreds of billions of dollars, (4) CalPERS’s own employees would benefit from 
the pension increases and (5) members of Calpers’s board had received contributions from the 
public employee unions who would benefit from the legislation.” Id. 
 344  Assemb. B. 340, 2012 Assemb., (Cal. 2013) (making several changes to pension 
benefits that may be offered to new employees, hired on or after January 1, 2013, affecting 
contribution rates and funding in California public retirement systems, and these changes 
include, among others, a new maximum, a lower-cost pension formula that increased the age 
and service requirements for retirement and a cap on pensionable compensation, as well as 
increasing the period used to calculate final average compensation to three years). The bill 
also included pension-spiking reform for new and existing employees. See generally 
CALPERS, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ PENSION REFORM ACT OF 2013 AND RELATED 
CHANGES TO THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT LAW (2012), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/summary-pension-act.pdf. 
 345  Tim Reid, California Governor decries Calpers vote on pensions, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/20/us-usa-pensions-calpers-
idUSKBN0GK23220140820. California Governor Jerry Brown opposed this vote since the 
action would increase the costs of state pensions which are calculated on the total amount of 
pensioners’ monthly income. Id.; see also Steven Greenhut, California Embraces Pension-
Spiking Bonanza, HUM. EVENTS (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://humanevents.come/2014/08/27/californai-embraces-pensin-spiking-bonanza/ (providing 
pension-spiking techniques such as including extra pay for clerical workers for typing and 
taking dictation, extra pay for police officers taking physical fitness programs, maintaining 
licenses required for the job and other similar items to employees hired after January 1, 2013 
thereby undermining the recent legislation). 
 346  Victor Nava, California’s Pension Reforms Don’t Go Far Enough, ORANGE CNTY. 
REG., (July 29, 2014) (lamenting that the reform did not address the overly optimistic assumed 
rate of return on investments). 
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adjustments, or increase retirement age.347 The initiative was scheduled for the 
November 4, 2014 ballot but was withdrawn by its sponsor after the Attorney 
General of California, Kamala Harris, released the ballot language and summary of 
the bill. Reed thought that the language misrepresented the bill by focusing on the 
pension takeaways rather than the positive side of the initiative.348 Litigation is 
ongoing and the initiative may be reset for the 2016 election.349 
The 2014 pension reform initiative was aimed at the so-called “California Rule,” 
a judicially created rule significantly restricting California’s ability to initiate 
decreases in public sector pensions.350 In a series of cases beginning in 1917, 
California courts began a process to secure state pensions, even those not yet earned, 
by linking pensions to unbreakable contracts.351 By 1955, in the Allen v. City of Long 
Beach decision, the final link in the “California Rule” fell into place when the court 
held that “changes in a pension plan which result in a disadvantage to employees 
should be accompanied by comparable new advantages.”352 One commentator, who 
concluded that the California Rule is inconsistent with both contract law and 
economic theory,353 describes the most significant criticism: 
California courts have put in place a highly restrictive legal rule that binds 
the legislature without the court ever finding clear and unambiguous 
evidence of legislative intent to create a contract. This break with 
traditional contract clause analysis is potentially the most troubling in that 
                                                            
 347  California Pension Reform Initiative, BALLOTPEDIA (2014) 
http://ballotpedia.org/California-Pension-Reform-Initiative-%282014%29#text-of-measure 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
 348  Id. 
 349  Id.; see also Tim Reid, Democrats Feud Over California Pension Reform Measure, 
REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/us-usa-california-
pensions-idUSBREA131EH20140204; Editorial, CalPERS About to Undo Pension Reform, 
L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20140814/calpers-
about-to-undo-pension-reform-editorial. 
 350  LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PUBLIC PENSION AND RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: AN 
INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNOR’S PROPOSAL 18 (2011). 
 351  O’Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366 (Cal. 1917); see also Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as 
Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1029, 1052 (2011) (describing O’Dea v. Cook as the first step of departure from the traditional 
position that pensions were gratuities that the legislature could amend as it saw fit). Through 
the court’s dicta that pensions, “as a form of compensation” became “in a sense a part of the 
general contract of employment,” O’Dea was the first court “to suggest that pension statutes 
might create contracts; however, the court developed this idea without authority for the 
position and without an examination of legislative intent.” Id. at 1053, 1076. Later courts 
would build on that dictum. 
 352  Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955). Allen has been described 
as a “bombshell” in that it ignored any inquiry into legislative intent to create a contract it 
impliedly held that reasonable modifications could be made to pensions so long as any 
detrimental change was offset by a comparative new advantage. Monahan, supra note 351, at 
1060. 
 353  Monahan, supra note 351, at 1029, 1044, 1075-82.  
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it infringes on the power of the legislative branch without apparent 
authority.354 
A “flawed legal theory” creates a “flawed economic theory.” Locking one part of 
a compensation package (i.e. pension accruals) in place355 while other areas of 
compensation can be bargained for or eliminated creates a distorted economic 
plan.356 The California Rule has also been criticized because the court found a 
contractual relationship contrary to the well-established “presumption that statutes 
do not create contractual rights absent clear and unambiguous evidence that the 
legislature intended to bind itself.”357 
States protect pension plan participants from significant modifications to their 
plans under both constitutional and contract law theories.358 While there are distinct 
protections under state provisions as compared to federal law, “the considerations 
state judges use to decide whether to protect pensions under state law are very 
similar to the considerations they use to determine whether a reform violates the U.S. 
Constitution’s Contract Clause.”359 Present and future pension promises are 
contractually protected under the California Rule from the first day of hire.360 Illinois 
and Michigan, along with five other states, have state constitutional protection 
                                                            
 354  Id. at 1070.  
 355  Id. at 1079. There is some authority in California that prior to retirement an employee 
does not have an absolute right to a particular pension but only to a substantial or reasonable 
pension. Beermann questions how far this “flexibility” would go. Beermann, supra note 288, 
at 41, and cases cited therein. 
 356  Monahan states, “Yet California courts have held that even though the state can 
terminate a worker, lower her salary, or reduce her other benefits, the state cannot decrease the 
worker’s rate of pension accrual as long as she is employed.” Monahan, supra note 351, at 
1033. 
 357  Id. at 1032 n.5 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985)). Beermann does not accept this criticism because he believes 
that pensions are different than other contracts since persons who accept employment with the 
government usually have options, which they give up to accept the employment thinking the 
pension is a firm commitment. Beermann, supra note 288, at 58-59. Another commentator, 
while finding nothing invalid about the California Rule, states: “But the rule is unsound as a 
policy matter, insofar as it locks governments and public employees into compensation 
structures different than what they would otherwise negotiate, and makes it harder for states to 
reform their pension systems.” ALEXANDER VOLOKH, OVERPROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
PENSIONS: THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE CALIFORNIA RULE 4 (2013), 
http://reason.org/files/overprotecting_pensions_california_rule.pdf. Volokh would agree with 
Monahan that there was no explicit promise that the state would not change the pension. He 
notes cases that have struck down changes to a COLA. Id. at 5. 
 358  Beermann, supra note 288, at 36 n.118 (citing Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan 
Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617 (2010)). 
 359  “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Beermann, supra note 288, at 36 n.116. 
 360  Beermann, supra note 288, at 37 n.119 (citing Monahan, supra note 351, at 1032). 
Monahan references twelve other states which have followed the California Rule, as 
announced including Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. Id. at 1071. 
59Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
828 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:769 
 
although Illinois protects present and future benefits while Michigan protects only 
accrued benefits.361 Some state courts find protection under the Contracts Clause of 
the United States Constitution once a contractual relationship is found under state 
law.362 Federal bankruptcy, while available to municipalities, is not available to 
states.363 
4. Future of State Pensions 
Illinois, New Jersey, and California allow public employees in their fifties to 
retire with 90% of final pay, which is often increased by excessive pension spiking; 
this is unsustainable.364 The major problem with public retirement plans is the lack 
of transparency and enforcement.365 The Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
has set standards, but there is no enforcement mechanism when the states do not 
comply. One federal proposal was to eliminate the tax exemptions on bonds issued 
by non-compliant states. However: 
The record of private plans suggests that consistent and uniform 
disclosure encourages more rigorous oversight by stakeholders. It is time 
the federal government intervened to make sure the residents of state and 
local jurisdictions are fully aware of the pension obligations their local 
governments are creating for them. Beyond that, the states and local 
governments are going to have to adjust their commitments to levels that 
their taxpaying citizens can afford and will support.366 
States are being forced to allocate large portions of their limited revenues to 
satisfy high pension costs at the expense of education and other essential state 
                                                            
 361  Liz Farmer, How Are Pensions Protected State-by-State, GOVERNING (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-pension-protections-state-by-state.html; see also 
Beermann, supra note 288, at 37-38. 
 362  A question might arise as to when the contract is effective. Some courts look to a 
“vesting” requirement while more generous courts might find a contract upon the employee 
“accepting” employment thereby limiting the State’s ability to amend the contract without 
consideration or employee consent. Other states view the employee as having a reliance 
interest after working for an extended period of time, which may limit the benefit to those in 
effect during his employment. Beermann, supra note 288, at 38-41, and cases cited therein. 
 363  Under federal bankruptcy law, current and retired municipal workers’ pensions can be 
reduced or eliminated if the balance of equities favors revision or rejection. This is seen in In 
re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012), where the bankruptcy court denied the 
retirees’ request for an injunction to restore their benefits to pre-bankruptcy levels, mainly on 
the ground that the court had neither the power nor the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction. 
The bankruptcy court in the Stockton also observed that the Contract Clause is no impediment 
to adjustment of municipal contracts pursuant to bankruptcy because the Contract Clause does 
not apply to federal law. Beermann, supra note 288, at 69-72 n.265. CalPERS opposed the 
decision, believing it was their fiduciary duty to do so. CalpERS Performs Its Fiduciary Duty, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-performs-its-fiduciary-duty-
letters-to-the-editor-1424717233. 
 364  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 354. 
 365  Id. 
 366  Id. at 355. 
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funded programs. California once had “one of the most comprehensive and 
inexpensive higher education systems in the nation,” but is “now finding it 
impossible . . . to continue to offer sufficient community college slots for 
students.”367 According to Beermann, the pension crisis differs from other deficit 
spending because there is a human element involved; people depend on the mostly 
modest benefits in their retirement and have made career and personal decisions 
based on these promises. The apparent fairness of proposed reductions should thus 
be dependent on a multitude of considerations, including:  
[T]he magnitude of the contributions made by retirees and employees to 
the retirement system; the degree to which pensions were spiked in ways 
not related to the true earnings of the employees; the degree to which 
employees accepted lower current wages in exchange for generous 
retirement benefits; and the other ways in which employees structured 
their finances and their personal and professional lives around their 
pension expectations.368  
Reform centered on closing loopholes, such as elements that allow for inflated 
pension benefit calculations (overtime, artificial promotions, etc.) are more likely to 
be accepted.369 
Government pensioners are only beginning to sense that their pensions may not 
be as secure as once thought. Prior to the 2012 presidential elections, candidate Mitt 
Romney was unexpectedly recorded saying he would not get the votes of 47% of the 
citizens who do not pay taxes.370 However, it was pointed out that this so-called 
“tax-gap” is not the deepest divide in the electorate. Indeed, the deepest divide is the 
divide between those who have defined benefit pensions with a fixed annuity at 
retirement and those who do not. In the early 1980s, 62% of American workers were 
covered by some kind of defined benefit plan.371 Around that time, IRAs and 401(k) 
plans were introduced with interest rates in the double digits and the great stock 
market rally was beginning.372 Today, interest rates are close to zero and although 
the stock market is at new highs (17,000), that high is a mere recovery from setbacks 
in 2000 (11,700) and 2006 (14,100) caused by incredibly low interest rates and 
Federal Reserve Bank quantitative easing, both of which are likely to end.373 In any 
                                                            
 367  Beermann, supra note 288, at 84. 
 368  Id. at 86. 
 369  Id. at 84-66. 
 370  Jim Rutenberg & Ashley Parker, Romney Says Remarks on Voters Help Clarify 
Position, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/us/politics/in-
leaked-video-romney-says-middle-east-peace-process-likely-to-remain-unsolved-
problem.html?_r=0. 
 371  ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., 2010 SCF SUGGESTS 
EVEN GREATER RETIREMENT RISKS 3 (2012). 
 372  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 358. 
 373  The Federal Reserve’s third round of quantitative easing ended in late 2014 and the 
first rate hike in nearly a decade occurred in late 2015. Patrick Gillespie, Finally! Fed raises 
interest rates, CNN (Dec. 6, 2015, 3:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/16/news/ 
economy/federal-reserve-interest-rate-hike/. In making the minimal 0.25% increase in the 
federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve suggested there would likely be four additional quarter 
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event, the pension divide will likely close as those expecting lifetime annuities from 
public pensions are eventually forced to face the reality of underfunding. The market 
recoveries after 2000 and 2008 have not improved funding levels of public pension 
plans. Many plans were almost fully funded by 1999, but the funding gap grew to 
$670 billion by 2013 and $1.0 trillion by the end of 2015.374 Investment return is not 
likely to close the gap.375 The conclusion of a 2012 article remains true today: “The 
reality is that a big public-pension crash, which will eventually occur no matter who 
wins the [2012 or, now, the 2016] election, will make clear that the government 
employees won’t get what is promised. It will reveal the truth: We are all in the same 
boat fiscally and even financially.”376 
5. Impact of the Employer Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) 
Public pension plans are exempt from most ERISA rules, although they are 
subject to some IRS requirements.377 In a comparison of wages plus benefits, 
multiple researchers concluded that, although wages were comparable between 
public sector workers and private sector workers after controlling for differences in 
the nature of their work, when benefits were factored in on the basis of equitable 
valuations that public sector workers compensation was almost one-third higher.378 
Stories abound about public servants padding their final year of service to qualify for 
                                                            
point increases in 2016, but weaker economic data and financial-market volatility in January 
2016 following their rate increase caught the Federal Reserve off-guard and caused them to 
signal they would likely delay any further increases. Jed Graham, Fed Signals Policy Pause 
After Dec. Hike Fallout, INV. BUS. DAILY, Jan. 28, 2016, at A1. Further, the Federal Reserve 
action in December 2015 has been confirmed as a bad idea as evidenced by the collapsing oil 
and commodity prices, a cratering Chinese economy, and slowdowns in Japan, Brazil, Russia, 
and other European countries as well as the United States. Take Fed Hikes Off the Table, INV. 
BUS. DAILY, Feb. 1, 2016, at A16. After pumping $2.5 trillion into the financial system, the 
Federal Reserve is facing new challenges in trying to pull the cash out and returning to a more 
normal interest rate. Katy Burne, Fed Risks New Distortions When It Raises Interest Rates, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A7; Greg Ip, Fed’s Message Is Key To Soothing Markets, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2016, at C1 (characterizing the Federal Reserve’s inability to control the 
long term economic conditions as the “leader of a mob it inspires but doesn’t control.”). “This 
creates a dilemma: Even when the Fed sets interest rates correctly for the needs of the 
economy, markets routinely overreact, frustrating its plans.” Id. 
 374  Steven Malanga, Bear Mauls Gov’t Pensions Even A bull Couldn’t Heal, INV. BUS. 
DAILY, Jan. 22, 2016, at A13. 
 375  Id. (noting that the biggest obstacle to real reform is the notion that a few good years of 
investment return coupled with some additional contributions will solve most pension 
underfunding). 
 376  Amity Shlaes, War on Pensions Will Make Election Battle Look Tame, INV. BUS. 
DAILY, Sept. 28, 2012, at A15; see also Gerald Skoning, Welcome to Illinois, the Deadbeat 
State, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2014, at A19 (decrying the debt of state and local governments as 
well as the United States government and hoping newly elected republicans can help rectify 
the situation). 
 377  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 216. 
 378  Id. 220 n.14 (citing Andrew G. Biggs, Are Government Workers Underpaid? No., 
AMERICAN (June 9, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/june-2010/are-
government-workers-underpaid-no). 
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much higher pensions, and many policy makers in government condone such 
behavior.379 
Using the modern finance theorem the value of an enterprise or activity is 
independent of how it is financed.380 Applying that theorem to the valuation of state 
pension liabilities would reject the standard 8% valuation discount typically used to 
value pensions assets in favor of a more realistic rate of 4% reflecting a relatively 
risk free investment such as government bonds.381 With current government bonds 
paying practically nothing, it is difficult to conclude that such a rate is risk free while 
the government makes every effort to have a 2% inflation rate. One study calculated 
a $1 trillion deficit using traditional methods, but a $3.2 trillion deficit using a 
treasury rate and $1.3 trillion deficit using municipal bond rates.382 
Illinois and New Jersey experimented with issuing bonds to the public with the 
expectation that the money could be invested at a greater than the interest rates they 
would have to pay on the bonds they issued.383 New Jersey issued $2.7 billion in 
pension obligation bonds in 1997 which had to be paid from general revenues when 
the market crashed in 2000 and 2002 while Illinois issued $10 billion in general 
obligation pension bonds in 2003 with a thirty-year maturity, expecting to invest the 
money at the same rate their actuaries were using to discount the state’s pension 
obligations (8.5%).384 When the expected 8.5% return was not realized the bonds had 
to be paid along with the state’s unfunded obligations.385 
The levels of protection given to public pensions vary with some protections 
based on contract or property rights, while other pensions, like those in New York 
and Illinois, are irrevocably fixed as of the date the employee enters the pension 
plan.386 
The federal government has three primary pension plans in effect: the Civil 
Service Retirement System (CSRS); the Federal Employee Retirement System 
(FERS); and the Military Retirement System (MRS). The CSRS was merged into the 
FERS for new employees in 1984, but the benefits under the old plan continue to 
                                                            
 379  Id. at 223. One report noted that nineteen Miami firefighters had salaries and benefits of 
$300,000 and another 161 made $200,000. 
 380  Id.  
 381  Id. 
 382  Id. at 324. One study in 2010, assuming that plans would realize annual returns of 8% 
and that contributions would cover normal costs, predicted that Illinois’ public plans would 
deplete their assets in 2018; Connecticut, Indiana, and New Jersey will follow suit by 2019; 
and Hawaii, Louisiana, and Oklahoma in 2020. Id. (citing Joshua D. Rauh, Are State Public 
Pensions Sustainable? 26-27 (May 15, 2010) (unpublished), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596679). Of all states, only Alaska, 
Florida, Nevada, New York, and North Carolina would still have funds beyond 2047. Id. 
Indiana and New Jersey adopted legislation in 2011 to slow the growth of pension obligations. 
Id. at 224-25 (internal citation omitted). 
 383  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 227. 
 384  Id. at 228. 
 385  Id. at 225-27. 
 386  Id. at 229; see also id. at 231-32 (describing the actions of New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie and the ensuing law suit challenging pension adjustments). 
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accrue and there seems to be little cost savings from the change.387 As of October 
2008, the unfunded liability for the three systems was approximately $1.578 
trillion.388 
C. Demographic Problems Worldwide Strain Pension Funding 
Richard A. Marin did an interesting analysis of the status of pension funding 
around the world in his recent book on the pension crisis.389 Marin begins his 
analysis by estimating the extent of worldwide wealth and retirement assets. He 
estimates worldwide GDP at approximately $70 trillion and worldwide wealth at 
$132 trillion.390 Taking the analysis a step further he estimates that, of the worldwide 
wealth, approximately $50.4 trillion is allocated to retirement assets.391 Worldwide 
the assets allocated to retirement are 72% of global GDP.392 In gross, these numbers 
may sound like a solid base to build worldwide retirement; however, Marin takes the 
analysis one step further to demonstrate how various countries compare to each 
other.  
First, he looks at fourteen countries that account for $40 trillion of retirement 
assets that equate to 58% of the GDP of those countries.393 The spread of pension 
assets to GDP among the countries is disturbing with the United Kingdom at 112%; 
the United States at 108%; Australia at 101%; Canada at 84%; Japan at 62%; 
Germany at 15%; and France at 7%.394 The adequacy of any level of retirement 
assets as a percentage of GDP will depend on the years of retirement and the 
discount rate used to value the cost of retirement. The length of retirement is a 
function of the average age of retirement and longevity of the taxpayers in a 
particular country. Looking to four of the countries noted above the average period 
of retirement are: the United States at thirteen years; Japan at sixteen years; Germany 
at nineteen years; and France at twenty-two years.395 These are the time periods that 
must be funded with retirement assets. 
                                                            
 387  Id. at 233-34. 
 388  Id. at 232-36. 
 389  MARIN, supra note 2. Marin is the Clinical Professor of Asset Management at The 
Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. He has extensive finance and 
management experience with several Wall Street firms, with hedge funds, and with several 
firms that he founded. Id. at xv. 
 390  Id. at 21. Global wealth includes private wealth, pension funds, mutual fund, insurance 
companies, and sovereign wealth funds. Id. 
 391  Id. at 22-23. 
 392  Id. at 23. 
 393  Id. at 24. 
 394  Id. at 24 ex.2.1. The other countries are Ireland at 55%; Switzerland at 118%; 
Netherlands at 156%; Brazil at 14%; China at 18%; Chile at 61%; and South Africa at 64%. 
Id.  
 395  Id. at 27 ex.2.2 (noting the average age of retirement, life expectancy, and retirement 
period are: for the United States 65, 78, 13; for Japan 68, 84, 16; for Germany 61, 80, 19; and 
for France 59, 81, 22 respectively). The table lists the information on all fourteen countries in 
the study. Id. at 27 ex.2.2. The United States has a shorter retirement period than the non-
United States Anglo countries and Japan on the list primarily due to its shorter life 
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Funding long-term commitments is tied to the growth of GDP, which is 
positively impacted by the growth of population.396 Historically, GDP in the West 
has been growing at a rate of 3% long-term, but that appears to be slowing while that 
of emerging markets is increasing.397 The GDP multipliers comparing the growth 
from 2010 to 2050 for the United States, France, Germany, and Japan are 1.4, 1.7, 
2.1, and 1.6, respectively, while those for Brazil, China, and Chile are 2.9, 6.9, and 
4.9, respectively.398 France, Germany, and Japan will see their working age 
population decline by 2050 while that of the United States will grow slightly due 
primarily to immigration.399 With a few exceptions, countries in Central and South 
America, the Middle East, and Africa will experience dramatic population growth 
and the accompanying GDP growth over the period 2010-2050.400 The dependency 
ratio, defined as the percent of the population in retirement, will increase by 2050 in 
the United States to 35%; to 45% in France; to 58% in Germany; and to 75% in 
Japan.401 In Japan, one worker will support three retirees.402 
Using the foregoing factors, Marin estimates a worldwide pension-funding gap of 
141% of worldwide GDP through 2050, representing $98 trillion.403 For individual 
countries, he estimates a pension-funding gap for the United States of $7.3 trillion, 
for France of $7.8 trillion, for Germany of $11.4 trillion, and for Japan of $17.2 
                                                            
expectancy. The shorter life expectancy may be due to a larger immigrant population in the 
United States, which have not benefited from the better health care. Id. at 28. 
 396  Id. at 28-29 (pointing to the fifty-year decline in population in Japan, which appears 
directly correlated to the decline in GDP). 
 397  Max Roser, GDP Growth Over the Last Centuries, OUR WORLD DATA, 
http://ourworldindata.org/data/growth-and-distribution-of-prosperity/gdp-growth-over-the-
last-centuries/#world-maps-of-real-annual-gdp-growth-max-roserref (last visited Apr. 2, 
2016). 
 398  MARIN, supra note 2, at 31 fig.2.6. Partly as a result of China’s one child policy, its 
aging population will likely limit China’s ability to grow its economy. See Ciaran McEnvoy, 
China Will Ease ‘Hukou,,’ 1-Child Policy Restrictions, INV. BUS. DAILY, Nov. 18, 2013, at 
A1. 
 399  The world population in 2010 included a “dependency ratio” of sixteen people aged 
sixty-five and over for every one hundred adults aged twenty-five to sixty-four–about the 
same as in 1980. Age Invaders, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601248-generation-old-people-about-change-
global-economy-they-will-not-all-do-so (“A generation of old people is about to change 
global economy. They will not all do so in the same way.”). By 2035, the number will have 
risen to twenty-six overall but vary between countries. Id. Germany will go from thirty-eight 
to sixty-six people aged sixty-five and over for every 100 people between ages twenty-five to 
sixty-four; Japan will go from forty-three to sixty-nine; and the United States will rise from 
about twenty-four to forty-four. Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX 
COMPOSITION 2010, C201OBR-03, at 2 (2011) (providing United States dependency ratio for 
2010). 
 400  MARIN, supra note 2, at 33-38, fig.2.7. 
 401  Id. at 37 Ex.2.8. 
 402  Id. 
 403  Id. at 39. 
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trillion.404 Marin also shows that the twenty-year gap in the United States could be 
closed by increasing taxes to collect an additional 3% of GDP while closing the gaps 
in France, Germany, and Japan would require an additional tax of 19%, 23%, and 
23% respectively.405 
The problem of aging is worldwide. The global population of persons aged sixty-
five or more is estimated to grow from 600 million to 1.1 billion over the next 
twenty years.406 The impact of aging is likely to divide the population in unexpected 
ways. In America, 65% of men age sixty-two to seventy-four with a professional 
degree are in the workforce compared to 32% of those with only a high-school 
certificate.407 In the twentieth century, greater longevity meant more years in 
retirement rather than more years at work. This shift has led many observers to 
expect slower economic growth and a “secular stagnation” in which swelling ranks 
of pensioners will bust government budgets.408 Policy changes may be part of the 
problem since older policies that pushed people into retirement have been 
abandoned.409 Also at the same time, life expectancy is increasing, and defined 
benefit pension plans are being replaced with less generous defined contribution 
plans forcing seniors desiring a comfortable retirement to work longer.410 
A population that is aging, but not growing, suggests three possible outcomes. 
First, it will result in lower GDP unless incentives are created to keep older workers 
in the workforce or productivity increases to offset the loss of GDP.411 There has 
been a trend for older and more educated workers to stay in the workforce longer 
than in the past. Second, the aging population may create incentives to innovation 
that will reduce the cost of aging.412 Third, if highly skilled and educated seniors 
remain in the workforce longer than in the past, the higher income will result in 
greater savings and Social Security contributions by this group of workers.413 
Considering these possible outcomes, policy responses could include the following: 
Age should no longer determine the appropriate end of a working life, 
mandatory retirement ages and pension rules that discourage people from 
working longer should go. Welfare should reflect the greater opportunities 
to the higher skilled pensions should become more progressive (i.e., less 
                                                            
 404  Id. at 40 Ex.2.12. The estimates of the long-term pension need is based on taking 60% 
of the final earnings level in the individual country reflecting general global retirement 
expectations. Id. at 38, 175. 
 405  Id. at 41 Ex. 2.13. 
 406  Global Ageing: A billion shades of grey, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2014, at 13. 
 407  Id. It is important to note that the divide being discussed is not between the young 
workers and the old idle pensioners, but between the well-educated Baby Boomers putting off 
retirement while many less-skilled younger people have dropped out of the work force. Id. 
 408  Id. 
 409  Id. 
 410  See id. 
 411  Age Invaders, supra note 399, at 24. 
 412  Id. at 24. 
 413  Id. at 25. 
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generous to the rich). At the same time, this trend underlines the 
importance of increasing public investment in education at all states of 
life so that more people acquire the skills they need to thrive in the 
modern labour market.414 
Adverse demographic changes would create problems for any long-term solution 
to Social Security financing.415 Recall Aaron’s social insurance paradox that the 
Social Security benefits of all participants will increase if the combined rate of 
growth for population and productivity equals or exceeds the current rate of interest. 
A caveat of Aaron’s analysis is that the paradox may not hold if the provision of 
social insurance causes a reduction in the rate of private savings.416 Aging skilled 
professionals staying in the workforce may to some extent offset this last caveat. 
In the United States, workers can retire at age sixty-two with a reduced amount 
of Social Security benefits, which will be further reduced if the person continues to 
work prior to reaching full retirement, currently sixty-six.417 The system then 
encourages people to continue working by increasing the full retirement amount by 
8% per year until age seventy when the person is required to start Social Security.418 
One disincentive to continue work after age seventy is that the person will continue 
paying Social Security taxes but their benefit will be modestly increased if the 
person’s AIME increases.  
In the United States, the demographic divide is dramatic. While the younger 
generation is becoming a non-Caucasian majority, a record share of the population is 
going gray. Primarily due to Social Security and Medicare programs, older adults are 
no longer the poorest age cohort of society, having been replaced by young adults 
and their children.419 The economic well-being of today’s youth is impacted by “a 
witches’ brew of deep recessions, sluggish recoveries, rising inequality, a shrinking 
middle class, automation, globalization and soaring student debt.”420 The federal 
government spends nearly $7 per capita on programs targeted at people sixty-five 
and over versus $1 for every child, all the while accumulating trillions of dollars in 
debt for the young people to pay off.421 
Marin suggests part of the solution to the pensions crisis lies in the emerging 
markets: 
                                                            
 414  See Global Ageing: A billion shades of grey, supra note 406. 
 415  SHAVIRO, supra note 175, at 99-100. 
 416  Aaron, supra note 181, at 347. 
 417  In 1956, the government established an early retirement age of sixty-two for women, 
and, in 1961, applied the early retirement age of sixty-two to men. This led the way for private 
employers to follow suit. Early out plans in the 1980s and 1990s helped open the way for 
younger workers. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 176. 
 418  Taylor, supra note 165, at 18. 
 419  Id.  
 420  Id. 
 421  Taylor notes that the median net worth of persons in the millennial generation is $3,700 
compared to $170,500 for people 65+ and that federal spending is $3,800 per child compared 
to $26,400 per person 65+. Id. at 20. 
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The emerging markets will be less impacted directly and the more the 
emerging countries grow, the more the problem will fade away for them 
and perhaps, eventually, the whole world. Their growth is already strong, 
and those where population growth is still strong will find themselves 
growing out of the problem and, of course, learning from the mistakes of 
the developed countries . . . [T]his may be the first time in history where 
the growth of countries with higher population growth rates and younger 
populations will create a more stable economic environment rather than a 
bigger drain on productivity.422 
Marin also observes the impact of pension burdens on countries with low 
population growth: 
The degree of this [pension] burden is clearly a function of economic 
growth, and we know that economic growth is very much correlated to 
population growth. Therefore, it is likely that in low population growth 
countries, where the burden is heaviest, growth will not likely provide a 
solution, and, indeed, the pension-funding burden will likely further 
impede growth.423 
Efforts are underway in many countries facing demographic situations to grow a 
workforce capable of supporting the growing over-sixty-five population. In Japan, 
where the population is predicted to shrink by one-third over the next fifty years, the 
government is not only seeking to convince women to have more children (to 
increase the current level of 1.41 children per woman to 2.07), but is also 
considering allowing more immigration into Japan.424 If Prime Minister Abe’s 
efforts to get Japanese women into the workplace is successful, it could raise female 
labor participation to that of men, add 8 million people to the workforce, increase 
GDP by as much as 15%, and increase consumer demand. In order to accomplish 
this, Abe is focusing efforts on expanding hours for kindergartens and arranging for 
breast-feeding outside the home.425 
                                                            
 422  MARIN, supra note 2, at 44. 
 423  Id. at 175. 
 424  The Incredible Shrinking Country, ECONOMIST (May 31, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21603076-first-time-proper-debate-starting-about-
immigration-incredible-shrinking-country (noting that traditionally Japan had a highly 
restrictive immigration policy). 
 425  Holding Back Half the Nation, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 23. A recent survey of 
pregnant women in Japan reported that 21% claimed they were mistreated in the workplace 
because of their pregnancy, although 74% reported receiving some sort of consideration 
because of their pregnancy. Of the 61% who left their jobs because of pregnancy, 55% said 
they wanted to focus on taking care of their baby. Jun Hongo, Survey: One in Five Women 
Experienced ‘Maternity Harassment,’ WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/02/24/survey-one-in-five-women-experienced-
maternity-harassment/; see also Michael Auslin, Japan’s Gamble on ‘Womenomics,’ WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2015, at A11 (noting that Japan’s Health and Welfare Ministry predicts Japan’s 
127 million population will shrink to 87 million by 2060 thereby inverting the entitlements 
pyramid leaving one worker supporting more than one retiree).  
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Japan is not alone. Many countries are creating incentives to encourage higher 
birth rates, particularly in Europe but also in some Asian countries. The normal 
replacement rate is 2.1 children per woman; however, some commentators are 
questioning that figure, arguing it could be lower in countries with “better-educated” 
people since they are more productive and healthier, retire later, and live longer, 
thereby making a greater contribution to the dependent population.426 Furthermore, 
longer working lives could increase youth unemployment.427 
Parts of the world other than Japan, such as Germany, China, and Iran have also 
experienced differing impacts on their aging economy due to birth rates. Germany, 
which is going through a great reduction in its native population, has encouraged 
significant immigration from Turkey to supply its need for workers.428 China, with 
its one-child policy, has found that the dramatic decrease in population is causing the 
need for additional workers to maintain its growing economy.429 Iran instituted 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s to reduce the population but is now making the 
following changes since the population is dropping faster than expected: 
Rhyming public-health slogans that used to extol “Fewer kids, better life” 
have recently been removed. Instead, billboards depict large, happy 
families juxtaposed with sad little ones. Budgets for subsidized condoms 
and family planning have been cut; paternity and maternity leave, already 
generous, has increased. Parliament has passed a bill that aims to raise 
Iran’s birth rate. If it is enacted, vasectomies and tubectomies, which were 
free until two years ago, will be treated like abortions, punishable by a jail 
term of up to five years and payment of diyeh, or blood money.430 
                                                            
 426  Why Shrinking Populations May be No Bad Thing, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 53. 
 427  MARIN, supra note 2, at 47-48 (noting that youth unemployment in France is 22%, in 
the United Kingdom is 21.8%, in Hungry is 26.1%, in Italy is 28.2%, and in Spain is 47.8%, 
as listed for 2012). 
 428  Germany has opened its borders to up to one million refugees from Syria and, although 
assimilation creates some problems, refugee children are filling seats in the schools that are 
vacant because of falling numbers of native children in many districts. Educating Refugees: 
Learning the Hard Way, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2016, at 41-42. The same is true of Sweden, who 
is also experiencing a declining native population. Id. 
 429  See MARIN, supra note 2, at 42 (“China, with the backfiring of its incredibly impactful 
one-child policy (perhaps the most effective and far-reaching single public policy ever 
instituted in the history of mankind) is not far behind [the European Union and Japan] in 
seeing its growth engine screech to a halt from its administered demographic shift.”). Marin 
further observes: “no single policy in the history of mankind has done more to alter the course 
of history than the one-child policy in China. In one generation . . . the largest and fastest 
growing population on Earth has not only been halted, it has actually been permanently altered 
such that the prevailing cultural belief in China is that the only path to prosperity . . . lies in a 
one-child household. This behemoth peaks and starts its downward move in the next 10 to 15 
years . . . .” Id. at 52. Marin provides extensive details of the population in China through 
2100. Id. at 53-57, tbl.3.2. 
 430  See Make More Babies, ECONOMIST, June 7, 2014, at 53 (recognizing that the culture 
may have changed since the revolution—women are now more educated and marriage has lost 
it luster and the divorce rate is climbing, all of which may undermine the government’s effort 
to encourage larger families). 
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Thus, a country’s decision to create incentives for women to enter the work force 
and to have or not have children may well have dramatic consequences on the 
country’s fiscal future as well as its culture, home life, and families. 431 
D. Protesting Plan Changes and Constitutional Litigation 
Litigation will be instituted by unions and other affected parties in connection 
with the Detroit bankruptcy and with attempts to control costs of pensions in 
California, Illinois, and New Jersey. Such litigation involves contract rights as well 
as protections under federal and state constitutions. Political conflict is also involved 
as officials seeking to make such changes are challenged when running for election.  
The 2014 election cycle demonstrates the difficulty politicians face when seeking 
to change pension plans to reflect economic realities. In 2011, Wisconsin Governor 
Scott Walker attempted to limit union collective-bargaining rights over benefits for 
state employees.432 Democrats in the Wisconsin Senate, who left the state to prevent 
a vote on the proposed legislation, first confronted Walker.433 At the same time, state 
employees mounted protests in the state capital, including a takeover of the state 
house all of which obtained daily and extensive national attention.434 When Walker 
secured passage of legislation without the need of the self-exiled Democratic 
senators, they returned, but the legislation was already signed.  
The next step in the battle was to challenge the legislation in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, where the legislation was approved, but only by a single vote from a 
justice that was elected shortly before the legislation reached the court.435 The 
justice’s election was challenged by unions and affected state employees.436 Finally, 
the disaffected parties sought to recall the Governor in a statewide election, which 
proved unsuccessful, possibly because the electorate did not think the allegations 
against the Governor were sufficient for a recall.437  
                                                            
 431  Schrieber describes the dramatic increase in labor force participation by women in the 
baby boom generation in the United States. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 178-79. 
 432  Stephanie Condo, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Signs Anti-union Bill—but Democrats 
Say They are the Political Victors, CBS NEWS (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-signs-anti-union-bill-but-
democrats-say-theyre-the-political-victors/. 
 433  Bill Glauber et al., Democrats Flee State to Avoid Vote on Budget Bill, J. SENTINEL 
(Feb. 17, 2011) http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/116381289.html. 
 434  Id.; see also Bill Glauber et al., supra note 433. 
 435  Mike Lowe, Wisconsin Supreme Court Uphold Act 10 Union Law. “It Will Affect All of 
Us,” FOX 6 NOW (July 31, 2014, 10:20 PM), http://fox6now.com/2014/07/31/wisconsin-
supreme-court-upholds-2011-union-law/. 
 436  Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 839 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2013); see also Jason Stein, 
Supreme Court upholds Scott Walker's Act 10 union law, J. SENTINEL (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/supreme-court-to-rule-thursday-on-union-law-
voter-id-b99321110z1-269292661.html. 
 437  See, e.g., John Nichols, Recall Campaign Against Scott Walker Fails, NATION (June 6, 
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/recall-campaign-against-scott-walker-fails/. 
70https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 839 
 
In 2014, Governor Walker stood for reelection in a contest that drew national 
attention in which unions spent enormous sums in an attempt to defeat him.438 
During the campaign, Milwaukee County Democratic district attorney, John 
Chisholm, targeted Walker’s supporters using a “John Doe” process to launch 
sweeping and virtually unsupervised investigations of those supporters while 
imposing gag orders to prevent investigated people from defending themselves, or 
rebutting politically motivated leaks.439 Chisholm was searching for evidence of 
‘“coordination’ between Walker’s campaign and conservative issue advocacy 
groups” and although his tactics were generally condemned, they nevertheless had 
the effect of chilling political speech by those favoring Governor Walker.440 
Walker won reelection with 52.3% of the vote and a spread of 5.7% over his 
opponent, Mary Burke, a former Secretary of Commerce with executive experience 
in her family business and a Harvard MBA.441 The campaign received national 
attention.442 
In Rhode Island, Gina Raimondo, the state treasurer, who survived a well-funded 
union backlash after she used her office to generate public opinion to support her 
reforms to public pensions, won the Democratic gubernatorial primary. The reforms 
lifted the retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-seven and froze cost-of-living 
adjustments for current pension recipients until pension funds are determined 80% 
solvent.443 The same intensity was put into the general election, which Raimondo 
won with 40.78% of the vote compared to 36.33% for her Republican opponents.444 
                                                            
 438  Daniel Bice, Union Bosses, Wealthy Donors Spend Big for Mary Burke, Scott Walker, 
J. SENTINEL (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://www.jsonline.com/watchdog/noquarter/union-bosses-wealthy-donors-spend-big-for-
mary-burke-scott-walker-b99377685z1-280475452.html. 
 439  George F. Will, The Nastiest Political Tactic this Year, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-in-wisconsin-done-in-by-john-
doe/2014/10/24/b30ee2ec-5ad8-11e4-b812-38518ae74c67_story.html?hpid=z2. 
 440  Id.; see also Guy Benson, Nail-biter: Democrats Go All In to Defeat Walker, Polls 
Show Tied Race, TOWNHALL.COM (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2014/10/24/nailbiter-democrats-go-all-in-to-defeat-
walker-polls-show-tied-race-
n1909725?utm_source=thdaily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl (suggesting that 
allegations of “coordination” between Walker’s campaign and outside donor sources that is 
“chilling” conservative voices could also be alleged against Democratic candidate’s activities 
with the unions in Wisconsin).  
 441  See Wisconsin Governor—Walker v. Burke, REAL CLEAR POLITICS, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/elections/live_results/2014/governor/ri.html (last visited Jan. 
3, 2015) (regarding election results). 
 442  Benson, supra note 440. 
 443  Matt Miller, Gina Raimondo’s Primary Win in R.I. Could Transform Debate on 
Progressivism, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washintonpost.com/opinions/matt-
miller-gina-raimondos-win-in-ri-could-transform-debate-on-progressiveism. Miller reports 
that Raimondo is a Harvard, Yale, and Oxford educated former venture capitalist. Id.; see also 
NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 21 (noting that Rhode Island made some interesting 
changes to their pension plans). 
 444  See Wisconsin Governor—Walker v. Burk, supra note 441. 
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Raimondo is Harvard educated, an Oxford Rhodes Scholar, and a graduate of Yale 
Law School.445 Prior to being elected state treasurer, she was a venture capitalist and 
started the first venture capital firm in Rhode Island. Her approach to pension reform 
is business oriented and some find it a template that may work on a national level: 
“Her pension-reform campaign was fascinating for its blunt talk of trade-offs, of 
sacrifices today for investments in tomorrow. She framed the cutbacks as 
progressive-as the only responsible liberalism-because without them education, 
infrastructure, transportation and more would suffer.”446 
The 2014, Illinois gubernatorial race avoided outright discussion of Illinois’ 
pension problem.447 When Republican Bruce Rauner won the election he was 
immediately faced with the expiration of a temporary 2% increase in the state 
income tax that will aggravate the state’s fiscal problems particularly since Rauner 
must work with a Democratic legislature.448 It is reported that Rauner, who railed 
against pension inefficiencies, now declares “that it is most important to ‘protect 
what is done—don’t change history. Don’t modify or reduce anybody’s pension who 
has retired, or has paid into a system and they’ve accrued benefits.’”449 Still, dealing 
with the problem may make Illinois the first state to find out whether courts will 
force cuts in pensions to avoid pushing the state into a “death-spiral” that occurs as 
people leave the state as the state is forced to cut vital services and raise taxes.450 
E. Private Employer Pensions: Problems with General Motors 
The growth of private pensions was, in large measure, a result of government 
regulation and the implementation of Social Security. This is particularly true of the 
impact of the income tax, which allowed contributions to a trust to be deducted by 
the employer and not taxed to the employee until many years later when the money 
was withdrawn from the trust.451 Initially, there was no funding requirement and the 
regulations were mostly interested in preventing discrimination in favor of highly 
compensated individuals and the loss of tax revenues, but later it became necessary 
to focus on funding the promises.452 Furthermore, tax deferral of pension 
contributions has in recent years become a topic of debate, as Congress needed 
additional revenue.453 
                                                            
 445  Frank Bruni, A Democrat to Watch in 2015: Gina Raimondo’s Approach to Income 
Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/opinion/frank-
bruni-gina-raimondos-approach-to-income-inequality.html?_r=0. 
 446  Id. 
 447  Mark Peters, Illinois Faces Big Revenue Hit in 2015, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/illinois-faces-big-revenue -hit-in 2015-1419967717. 
 448  Id. The temporary increase had been from 3% to 5% but would fall to 3.75%. 
 449  Public Pensions, America’s Greece?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2015, at 37. 
 450  See id. at 38 (referring to attorney James Spiotto’s argument that a point can be reached 
when a state is unable rather than unwilling to pay pensions and a court finds the well being of 
citizens overrides any state constitutional protections). 
 451  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 130. 
 452  Id. at 130-31. 
 453  Id. at 130. 
72https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 841 
 
The move toward adoption of private pension plans was also promoted by the 
institution of Social Security plans because an employer could supplement the Social 
Security payment with its own pension plan to provide workers with a reasonable 
retirement income without having to fund the entire cost. Of course, the employer 
could take credit for the benefit provided by the employer’s portion of the payroll tax 
as well.454 Government restrictions on wages during World War II excluded 
pensions and other benefits from the restriction thereby creating additional 
incentives to create such plans to attract employees during the War.455 Later during 
the 1950s and 1960s, unions began negotiating for pensions for their workers.456 
Private pensions face three types of risks. First is the agency risk of plan 
managers improperly handling plan assets. Second is the forfeiture risk of the 
employees leaving employment prior to vesting. Third is the default risk that plan 
sponsors would fail or be unable to make plan contributions which was a particular 
problem since creating a plan based on years of service and final annual pay meant 
there would be a substantial unfunded benefit for persons with existing years of 
service.457 
In the early 1970s, Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams, who published a 
report focused on the flaws in the private pension system, intensified congressional 
focus.458 Although their statistics were inaccurate, they were more concerned with 
stirring up public sentiment than accurate numbers.459 The same was true with a CBS 
ninety-minute documentary focusing only on the flaws in the system.460 The report 
and documentary had the desired effect and the public was outraged.461 The eventual 
result was Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).462 In 1978, 
President Carter recommended a savings account to be administered by Social 
Security in which 3% of compensation would be put into a Mandatory Universal 
Pension system.463 
There are three clear principles that apply not only to private pensions, but also to 
public pensions, that anyone should keep in mind when planning retirement security. 
First, the cost of a pension is not the benefits currently being paid but the benefits 
that are being accrued by current workers. Second, this current expense should be 
covered by a cash contribution to an independent fiduciary to secure their ultimate 
payment to the employee rather than rely on the ultimate success of the plan sponsor. 
                                                            
 454  Id. at 133. 
 455  Id. 
 456  Id. at 134-35. 
 457  Id. at 136-37. Ford Motor Company started its pension plan with an immediate 
obligation of $200 million for existing workers and nothing in the trust fund. The result was 
that employers and unions agreed to fund the initial obligation over 30 years. Id. at 138. 
 458  Id. at 142. 
 459  Id. at 143. 
 460  Id. 
 461  Id. at 143-44. 
 462  Id. at 144. 
 463  Id. at 150. 
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Third, the plan participants had to have a vested right to a payout from the system.464 
Although these basic principles have been recognized as early as the 1920s, they 
were not acted upon so that years later it could be said: 
Both business and union members on President Kennedy’s Advisory 
Committee on Labor-Management Policy felt that government had no 
business interfering in labor contracts, but officials at the Treasury 
Department were coming to believe that government had a prominent and 
legitimate interest in regulating employer-sponsored retirement plans. In 
the mid-1950s, Walter Blum began to develop a concept that ultimately 
became known as “tax expenditures.” Writing in the Joint Economic 
Committee’s 1955 study Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and 
Stability, Blum argued that if the government “decided to subsidize a 
certain activity, we should be hesitant about administering the subsidy by 
way of a tax preference. Subsidies in this form vary directly in amount 
with the tax brackets of the recipients; they are invariably hidden in the 
technicalities of the tax law; they do not show up in the budget; their cost 
frequently is difficult to calculate; and the accomplishments are even 
more difficult to assess.”465 
From the end of World War II in 1945 through the early 1990s, private 
employers were providing even more generous pension benefits.466 In order to 
protect worker’s pensions, Congress—in 1974—passed ERISA to provide a 
regulatory framework to make benefits available to workers and created the Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) to protect employee expectations if the 
employer went bankrupt.467 Initially the funding requirements were flexible, but the 
unusually large returns in the 1990s made many plans appear fully funded so that 
Congress instituted funding limitations as a way to raise revenues without raising tax 
rates.468 As the nation entered the new millennium, the unusually high rates of return 
in the 1990s disappeared making many plans appear unsustainable.469 Congress, in 
2004, reversed some of the funding limitations, but the reversal came too late to help 
the Baby Boomers that were preparing for retirement.470 
Since the late 1970s, another phenomenon was occurring, which was the 
introduction of defined contribution plans, but that trend changed and was even 
reversed as employers began to convert the defined benefit plans into hybrid plans 
                                                            
 464  Id. at 26-27. 
 465  Id. at 141 n.14 (citing The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer 
Morale, in Joint Econ. Comm. Fed. Tax Pol’y for Econ. Growth & Stability, 84th Cong., 250-
51 (1955) (statement of Walter J. Blum)). 
 466  An early reason for providing pensions was that they were seen, in the banking 
industry, as being less expensive than fidelity bonds. Id. at 130. 
 467  Id. at 13. 
 468  Apparently, avoiding tax rate increases became more important than securing 
retirement funding. Id. at 14. It is also noted that during this period lawmakers gave union 
pension plans waivers on funding requirements. Id. 
 469  Id. 
 470  Id. at 15. 
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that provided a cash balance.471 By 2008, the conversions, which were primarily a 
large plan phenomena, covered 2,984 plans representing 10.3% of total plans and 
31.3% of defined benefit participants as reported by the PBGC.472 Smaller plans 
began to reflect the need for change by freezing accruals under existing plans and 
denying new entrants. By 2007 the PBGC reported that 18% of covered plans were 
under a hard freeze representing 7.6% of all plan participants.473 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the funding of private pensions was discouraged or 
stopped by administrative regulations. In 2008, the Pension Protection Act took 
effect with the goal of reaching 100% of unfunded accrued liabilities over a seven-
year period.474 These new rules came at an inauspicious time considering the 
economic turmoil of the 2007-2010 period. Companies were required to make 
enormous extra contributions in this tumultuous economic environment.475 The 
resulting changes were seen as unfair to some workers, but many plans that did not 
change witnessed their unfunded pension obligations force them into bankruptcy.476 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the employer based pension was 
deteriorating and people were convinced they were better off relying on the new 
401(k) defined contribution investment vehicle, which had been showing consistent 
double digit gains during the 1990’s stock market boom.477 Furthermore, the end of 
the 1990s foreshadowed more problems: 
By the end of the 1990s, some defined benefit plan sponsors had been on 
contribution holidays for 10 or 15 years. Even back in 1967, when Pal 
Samuelson was writing about Social Security being “the greatest Ponzi 
scheme ever contrived,” the Social Security system at least required 
contributions. Pension operations in the 1990s seemed to be one-upping 
Samuelson’s assessment of Social Security. But along the way, we had 
forgotten that saving for retirement requires some actual saving. 
Samuelson’s assessment of Social Security would prove wrong when 
economic and demographic fundamentals changed. And the employer 
pension system would also run into problems when economic 
fundamentals changed at the beginning of the new millennium.478 
                                                            
 471  Id. at 192. 
 472  Id. at 195. In 1983, there were 175,000 private defined benefit plans covering 29.9 
million active workers, but by 2007 those numbers had declined to 49,000 plans covering 19.4 
million workers. Id. at 7. 
 473  Id. at 195. Other definitions of “freeze” can be found but the trend is among major 
employers is to freeze various pension plans in one way or another. Id. Among 723 companies 
that made the Fortune 1000 list every year from 2004 through 2010, 242 did not sponsor a 
defined benefit plan during the period and, among the 481 that did, one terminated its plan in 
2009 and eight others did the same in 2010. Id. at 196. 
 474  Id. at 199. 
 475  Id. at 198-99. 
 476  Id. at 199. 
 477  Id. at 180. 
 478  Id. at 181. 
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Private pension plans are not uniquely American. In fact, it is reported that 
globally, defined benefit plans, although often grossly underfunded, have $23 trillion 
of liabilities to current and future pensioners479 and are estimated to grow by 4% 
with each extra year added to one’s life expectancy.480 Several private companies 
have structured new financial instruments to absorb a portion of the longevity risk 
thereby making some pension plans safer recognizing the risks to the pension 
plans.481 
During the 1980s, reducing corporate tax deductions associated with such plans 
continually reduced funding requirements for private pensions in order to raise tax 
revenue.482 Such reductions in funding put benefits for Baby Boomers at greater 
risk.483 Seeking to more widely distribute the benefits of private pensions, Congress 
began reducing the vesting requirements.484 In addition, accounting rules were 
changed in a way that allowed lower levels of funding and plans were terminated 
with billions of dollars withdrawn as excess funding.485 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, many companies froze all or 
part of their defined benefit plans saving considerable amounts of money.486 Much of 
the savings went to defined contribution plans in which employees sought to offset 
losses in the stock market and in their defined benefit plans.487 The Pension 
Protection Act took effect in 2008 and required plans to attain full funding over a 
period of seven years.488 Further, single-employer plans with less than 80% funding 
are subject to benefit restrictions, those with between 60% and 80% cannot increase 
benefits and can only pay partial lump-sum distributions,489 and multi-employer 
plans must reach full funding over fifteen years.490 The timing for this Act to become 
                                                            
 479  Longevity Risk: My Money or your life, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2014, at 69. 
 480  Id. (referencing the International Monetary Fund). 
 481  Id. 
 482  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 154. 
 483  Id. at 154-55. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 slowed pension funding 
during the early part of the Baby Boomers careers and left many plans over funded so that no 
current funding was required. Id. at 168. Further hindering the funding of private pensions was 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which imposed a tax on taking money out of 
an overfunded pension plan as well as the possibility that overfunding might be considered a 
breach of management’s fiduciary duties to shareholders. Id. The author calls this erratic 
changing of the funding requirements in the 1980s and 1990s “regulatory schizophrenia” at 
the beginning years of the Baby Boomers work lives, which had a dramatic effect on the need 
to fund pensions in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Id. at 249. 
 484  Id. at 168. 
 485  Id. at 158-59. By the end of the 1980s, the funding of pensions had shifted from how 
much was needed to pay future retirees to how much had to be paid if the pension was shut 
down today. Id. at 163. 
 486  Id. at 95. 
 487  Id. at 195, 198. 
 488  Id. at 198. 
 489  Id. at 198-99. 
 490  Id. at 199. 
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effective was unfortunate because the increased liabilities hit companies just as the 
Great Recession hit and market values plummeted forcing many companies into 
bankruptcy and the loss of many jobs.491 The underfunding of plans was primarily 
the result of the boom in the 1980s and 1990s when funding requirements were 
curtailed, but government finds it a hard lesson to learn. In enacting the Highway 
Bill in 2014, it was proposed that “pension smoothing,” by which the funding 
requirements would be delayed thereby increasing the tax revenues by reducing the 
deduction, could offset some of the cost of the bill.492 
The effectiveness of employer provided pensions has been the subject of some 
debate. It appears the data to support its effectiveness is not available.493 While a 
high percentage of people report being covered under a pension plan (either a 
defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan, or both), the number of families 
receiving pension income is much smaller and the amount received seems 
inconsistent with reported assets in such plans.494 This seeming incongruity could be 
the result of workers taking a lump sum and not converting it into an annuity or 
workers using the money to pay off debts or some other use, but it could also suggest 
that employer sponsored plans are a poor way to provide for retirement security.495 
A major problem with most defined benefit plans is that the benefit accrues most 
rapidly at the end of a long career with a single employer. When employees leave 
after ten or fifteen years they have a greatly reduced pension that will only start 
when they reach retirement age. When they start work for an employer late in life, 
they have a limited time to accrue the pension so that the pension is often quite 
small.496 
Managing pensions has become cumbersome for employers who are now forced 
to put the liabilities and investment losses from pension funds on their balance 
sheets.497 Furthermore, the pension liabilities sometimes exceed the market 
                                                            
 491  Id. at 199. The $1.1 trillion Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill, enacted in December 
2014, contained a provision that would allow workers, retirees, and management an 
opportunity to voluntarily restructure retirement benefits to save a multi-employer pension 
plan from insolvency. Resistance to this legislation came from unions and the AARP who 
wanted to hold out for the plans to be bailed out, but a bailout seemed out of the question for 
law makers. Multi-employer plans are minimally covered by the PBGC, protecting retirees 
with 30 years of service for pensions less than $13,000. In 2014, the PBGC deficit for multi-
employer plans grew to $42.4 billion from $8.3 billion in 2013 while the deficit single 
employer plans fell to $19.3 billion from $27.4 billion in 2013. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 
CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 10 (2014); see also Daniel Borenstein, 
Before Retiring, Rep. George miller breaks ranks to help save trouble pension plan, MERCURY 
NEWS (Dec. 28, 2014), http://www.contracostatimes.com/daniel-
borenstein/ci_27201607/daniel-borenstein-before-retiring-rep-george-miller-breaks. 
 492  Luca Gattoni-Celli, Pension Smoothing Risks Losing Money, But Few Alternatives 
Seen, 145 TAX NOTES 50 (2014). 
 493 SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 260-62. 
 494  Id. 
 495  Id. at 254-62 (including various charts demonstrating retirement assets held by various 
household types). 
 496  MARIN, supra note 2, at 85. 
 497  Id. at 86 (noting the impact of FASB ASC 715 and FAS 158b). 
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capitalization of the company. Before General Motors transferred their pension 
liabilities to Prudential, its global pension liabilities were approximately $134.7 
billion ($25.4 billion unfunded), while its market capitalization was $30.7 billion.498 
Increasing the payment rate to the PBGC also increases the burden on employers 
providing defined contribution plans.499 Even with retiree health care plans, private 
employers as well as government employers have only gradually came to the point 
where accounting rules require disclosure of liabilities.500 As health care costs 
escalated and accounting standards began to require disclosure, many private 
employers began to dramatically reduce or eliminate the benefit.501 
1. GM’s Pension Troubles  
GM has been caught in a downward pension spiral since 1950 when the company 
signed the Treaty of Detroit with the UAW.502 First, pensions had the effect of 
retiring workers early. By 1960, ten years after the treaty of Detroit, only three out of 
every ten senior citizens remained in the labor force compared to six out of ten in 
1920.503 According to the UAW union’s Social Security department, “an increasing 
number of men in good health are choosing to retire rather than go on working.”504  
According to a UAW economist, “[p]ensions got better every year” and “there 
was little resistance.”505 However, the continued rise in pensions was primarily due 
to the fact it kept wage increases slow, was less inflationary than wage increases,506 
and GM did not have to account for the future obligations on its books.507  
In 1966, Walter Reuther, the original head of the UAW, testified in favor of 
federal pension insurance. However, federal pension insurance was viewed as a form 
of welfare that would make workers lazy and unproductive and the idea that 
                                                            
 498  Id. (describing General Motors as a pension company that happens to make cars). 
 499  Id.  
 500  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 296-300. Funding retiree health care face the same problems 
as pensions which included: (1) the cost of benefits was not the current cost but the cost 
accruing for current workers; (2) the benefits had to be funded as they were earned so retirees 
would not be dependent on future success of the sponsoring firm; and (3) participants had to 
be vested in their rights after some reasonable time. Id. at 296. An added problem with retiree 
health care is that it was often the case that the retiree’s spouse would also be covered by the 
plan. Id. at 299. 
 501  Id. at 301. 
 502  ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHILE AMERICA AGED: HOW PENSION DEBTS RUINED GENERAL 
MOTORS, STOPPED THE NYC SUBWAYS, BANKRUPTED SAN DIEGO, AND LOOM AS THE NEXT 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 24 (2008).  
 503  Id. at 28. 
 504  Id.  
 505  Id. at 47.  
 506  Firms did not have to pay out the pensions until retirement, a stark contrast to pay hikes 
which were payable immediately and would, intuitively, only grow bigger and bigger in 
response to inflation. 
 507  Id. at 18, 19, 45 (the government froze wages throughout World War II, which ended 
only five years before the Treaty of Detroit and had an impact on negotiations with the UAW).  
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pensions should be fully or partially funded annually was seen as a way for 
employers to slow down the gradual and exponential increase of benefits.508 Both 
views contributed to the unmitigated growth of pensions and their unfunded 
liabilities.509 Social Security only added fuel to the fire because, rather than being 
viewed as a supplement to retirement, Social Security’s “gross inadequacy” made 
higher pension insurance all the more necessary.510 
GM’s infamous “thirty-and-out” plan further hurt GM’s ability to compete 
because of three problems: (1) GM would lose an experienced worker to early 
retirement, (2) GM would have to support that worker for a longer period of time, 
and (3) there was an increased likelihood that the worker’s spouse and children 
would be eligible for benefits.511 Five months after GM’s “thirty-and-out” pension 
plan was increased in 1990, GM’s stock dividend was cut from seventy-five cents to 
forty cents512 and stockholders still had yet to receive a single dollar increase in their 
stock price for over the prior twenty-five years;513 proof that shareholders were the 
ones suffering. Observers noted that GM was being managed for the benefit of GM’s 
“institution” rather than its shareholders.514  
GM could have acquired half of Toyota motors with the same amount of money 
it used to fund pensions in the mid-1990s.515 As of 2006, GM workers were 
compensated between seventy-four dollars an hour compared to only forty-four 
dollars an hour for Toyota workers employed in American plants.516 Consumers 
have been given a choice to either pay for cars encumbered by pensions from GM or 
to buy from foreign companies like Toyota.517 A major reason for this is that 
pensions for Japanese automakers are paid by the state and they buy parts from 
outside suppliers and therefore do not pay pensions for the making of their parts or 
cars while GM is on the hook for both.518 
GM did make an attempt to cut costs with the creation of an auto parts spin-off 
Delphi in 1998.519 However, the UAW demanded that GM pay for Delphi’s pension 
and healthcare obligations and if Delphi failed to do so, hire back Delphi’s surplus 
workers and renew Delphi contracts on the same terms as GM for the next two 
                                                            
 508  Id. at 42-43.  
 509  Id.  
 510  Id. at 43.  
 511  Id. at 41-43 (the spouse and/or children could also be eligible for benefits for a longer 
period of time under the new plan). 
 512  Id. at 56.  
 513  Id. at 53.  
 514  Id. 
 515  Id. at 59-60.  
 516  ALEX TAYLOR, III, SIXTY TO ZERO: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE COLLAPSE OF GENERAL 
MOTORS – AND THE DETROIT AUTO INDUSTRY 221 (2010). 
 517  Id.  
 518  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 502, at 60 (the pensions for German auto workers are paid by 
the state as well). 
 519  Id. at 61-62. 
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rounds of negotiations (almost a decade).520 Unsurprisingly, Delphi filed for 
bankruptcy in 2005 as the company had $8 billion in unfunded healthcare liabilities 
and $4 billion in unfunded pension liabilities.521 The court filings stated, “Delphi 
needs a pension solution . . . it cannot afford to fund the pension . . . and no business 
can operate successfully if it cannot respond to market forces.”522 Other large 
corporations such as HP, Verizon, and IBM immediately began to permanently 
freeze their pensions around this time as well.523 Starbucks even announced it was 
spending more on healthcare than coffee beans, proof that the Social Security 
problem is not exclusive to Social Security insurance or pensions.524  
GM has been left with no choice but to keep its liabilities unfunded. Even if GM 
made its annual contribution and paid on its installment plan, each new deal makes 
the prior installment plan deficient.525 Additionally, pension increases affect more 
than current workers; they apply to retired workers as well. A GM employee who 
retired with a forty-five dollar pension per month in 1950 was collecting $435 a 
month by 1980.526 The result, a need for more and more employees to provide 
contributions to the already retired workers whose pensions continue to increase 
during each round of negotiations, a disincentive to fire unproductive workers, and 
an incentive to hire new workers even if their labor is not needed.  
Furthermore, GM has developed a habit of creating more vehicles than 
consumers want because its fixed costs (included legacy costs) are too high to let 
factories sit idle when demand wanes.527 According to CEO Wagoner, “[t]o the 
extent that we sell more products . . . we amortize those costs over more cars and 
trucks sold, and the impact (of retiree costs) isn’t so great.”528 As a result, GM’s 
brand and profits have taken a hit as resale value of GM cars drop due to market 
saturation.529 By 2008, GM’s two fundamental and closely related weaknesses—a 
huge legacy cost burden and an inability to adjust its structural costs—crippled the 
corporation’s profitability, forcing a bailout.530 
2. What to Do Now? 
Concerning GM’s 2012 deal with Prudential, Vice President of Finance and 
Treasurer Jim Davlin said, “[o]ur pension liability was so large . . . that each time 
funding went down the ratings agencies and others doing financial evaluations 
considered this a substantial debt-like obligation,” and, “[a]s our funding status 
                                                            
 520  Id.  
 521  Id. at 72. 
 522  Id.  
 523  Id. at 78.  
 524  Id. at 39.  
 525  Id. at 47-48.  
 526  Id. at 48.  
 527  Id. at 53-54.  
 528  TAYLOR, supra note 516, at 176.  
 529  LOWENSTEIN, supra note 502, at 53-54.  
 530  Id. at 78.  
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changed we’d go from no debt one year to dramatically high debt the next year.”531 
He also highlighted how the pensioners were safer in Prudential’s hands because 
“this is their core business.”532 Also, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changed the 
pension issue from one of investment to one of finance because GM’s finances are 
impacted more short-term with potential “shareholder repercussions.”533 
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (“Map 21”)534 was enacted 
in 2012 and changed the minimum and maximum obligations for pension funding.535 
The minimum percentage decreased 5% every year from 90% in 2012 to 70% in 
2015, while the maximum percentage increased 5% every year from 110% to 130%, 
giving companies more flexibility to underfund during tough times and overfund in 
times of growth.536 The relief further came in the form of adjusting the calculations 
for overall liabilities known as segment rates, which are used to calculate funding 
obligations.537  
On the other hand, Map 21 increased the annual premiums employers are 
required to pay the PBGC per plan from $30 in 2012, to $42 in 2013, and $49 in 
2014, with inflation adjustments thereafter.538 The additional variable rate premium 
for underfunded companies was also increased from nine dollars per $1,000 worth of 
underfunding as of 2013 to fourteen dollars in 2014.539 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2013540 then raised premiums to fifty-seven dollars and sixty-four dollars in 2015 
and 2016 respectively541 while raising the variable rate premium to twenty-four 
dollars and twenty-nine dollars in 2015 and 2016 respectively.542  
The relief undoubtedly helps, but overall liabilities do not change while the 
payments to the PBGC continue to rise increasing the short-term impact on 
employers and, potentially, shareholders. Also, if and when the current Map 21 
extension phases out,543 “the impact to operations (could) be substantial.”544 
                                                            
 531  Russ Banham, The Great Pension De-Risking; Stung by funding shortfalls time and 
again, companies are using a variety of tactics to lighten their pension burdens for good. CFO 
MAG., Apr. 2013, at 42, 43. 
 532  Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  
 533  Id. at 42.  
 534  Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, H.R. 4348, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 535  Id. at 845. 
 536  Id. at 847.  
 537  Id.  
 538  Id. at 850.  
 539  Id.  
 540  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, H.R.J. Res. 59, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 541  Id. at 26.  
 542  Id. at 27.  
 543  Surface Transportation and Veterans Health Care Choice Improvement Act, H.R. 3236, 
114th Cong. (2015) (3rd Extension of Map 21; extension up to Oct. 29, 2013). 
 544  Barry B. Burr, Corporations Face Looming Pension Bills: End of Federal Relief and 
Increasing Longevity To Strain Balance Sheets, PENSIONS & INV. (June 29, 2015), 
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In GM’s 2014 annual report, the automaker described how their unamortized pre-
tax actuarial gain went from a $1 billion dollar gain in 2013 to a $4.6 billion dollar 
loss in 2014545 by saying “[t]he change is due primarily to the decrease in discount 
rates546 and the change in mortality assumptions partially offset by actual asset 
returns in excess of assumed returns.”547 Liabilities for pension obligations are 
discounted at the market rate for corporate bonds and, for the past fifteen years, the 
average annual rate of return for corporate bonds has been 4.57%. GM’s corporate 
bond rates have been below average at 3.59% in 2012, 4.46% in 2013, and 3.73% in 
2014.548  
Pension “contributions [should] rise very substantially, double if not triple” due 
to the possibility the stock market “turn[s] around, which it mostly will now that the 
fed [could] raise [interest] rates.”549 However, as of June 2015, GM’s spokesman 
Tom Henderson said, “[w]e don’t expect [to make] a significant mandatory 
contribution for the next five years.”550  
IV. LEG THREE: PRIVATE SAVINGS PLANS  
A. The Rise of the 401(k) Plan 
Leg three of the retirement stool is the private savings leg. Leg three has 
traditionally involved life insurance, bank accounts, individual stock purchases, and 
similar investments. However, as employer defined benefit plans have been 
discontinued, they have been replaced with Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 
401(k) plans, and other similarly tax motivated plans.  
Defined benefit plans are perhaps the ultimate paternalistic oversight of an 
employee’s well being. The participant often pays nothing into the plan, but upon 
retirement receives a lifetime benefit that is often inflation protected without casting 
any investment responsibility on the participant.551 The main disadvantage for the 
participant is if the participant leaves the employment covered by the plan the 
accrual of benefits usually stops far short of the ultimate goal of providing an 
annuity based on a percentage of the participant’s final years’ earnings.552 On the 
employer or sponsor’s side the defined benefit plan creates tremendous burdens that 
                                                            
http://www.pionline.com/article/20150629/PRINT/306299972/corporations-face-looming-
pension-bills. 
 545  GEN. MOTORS CO., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 55, 56 (2015) [hereinafter GM 2014 
REPORT]. 
 546  Id. at 103 (noting that the discount rate for United States pension benefit plans 
decreased from 4.46% to 3.73%). 
 547  Id. at 55-56. 
 548  Id. at 103. 
 549  Burr, supra note 544. 
 550  Id. 
 551  MARIN, supra note 2, at 81-82. 
 552  Id. at 82. 
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must be administered over an undetermined period dependent upon the longevity of 
the participants.553 
Sponsors’ concerns over defined benefit plans and participants’ desire for some 
control over their investment future led to the introduction of defined contribution 
plans, typically individual retirement accounts and 401(k) employer sponsored 
retirement plans.554 Defined contribution plans provide tax advantages to participants 
by allowing for a deduction of amounts contributed into the plan and then allowing 
the contributions to grow tax-deferred until such time as the participant withdraws 
the funds years later in retirement.555 A variation of this scheme, which is 
economically equivalent if tax rates remain constant, is the ROTH 401(k), which 
denies the deduction for contributions but allows later withdrawals to be tax-free.556 
Under either variation, this method of saving is far superior to a bank savings 
account, which is taxed on an annual basis.557 These plans encourage savings,558 but 
unless contributions are made early in one’s career, the plans are unlikely to provide 
sufficient funds at retirement and all investment risk is borne by the participant who 
is often an unsophisticated investor.559 
The growth of 401(k) plans closely followed the fall of defined benefit plans 
such that the contributions to defined contribution plans exceeded the contributions 
                                                            
 553  Id. at 82, 85. Government regulation under ERISA, financial reporting of pension plan 
performance, and payments to the PBGC all combine to make defined benefit plans 
unattractive to sponsors. Id. at 86-91.  
 554  Tax legislation in 1978 and through the 1980s introduced the concept of the 401(k), 
which proved to be more popular than anyone at the Treasury Department anticipated. 
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 160-62. 
 555  MARIN, supra note 2, at 83. 
 556  Id. 
 557  To perform a calculation on the lifetime impact of the 401(k), the medium earner is 
assumed to save 10% of lifetime income in which case the medium earner would accumulate 
$359,015 by age sixty-five based on assumed tax rates of 15%. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 
286. At that tax rate, the tax would be $53,852, leaving an after tax amount of $305,163. Id. 
However, if instead of using the 401(k) plan, the medium earner had put his money into a 
regular savings account and been taxed currently he would accumulate and after-tax amount 
of $241,521 at age sixty-five. Id. The tax advantaged account would have resulted in $63,642 
more than a regular savings account. Id. Thus, the medium earner would receive a tax benefit 
in this amount. Id. Each earner category would benefit from the tax benefitted savings, but the 
higher earner would receive higher benefits. Id. at 286 tbl.24.4 (identifying the net tax benefits 
for low, medium, high, and maximum earners as $17,185, $63,642, $152,014, and $433,604 
respectively).  
 558  Results of studies are conflicting on the question whether IRA or 401(k) savings 
contribute to the overall savings by contributors or are merely a change in the form of the 
savings. One study suggested that 45% to 60% of the contributions are new savings while 
another study suggested it was only 2%. Id. at 175 (citing William G. Gale & John Karl 
Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving, 84 AM. ECON. REV., Dec. 1994, at 1233–60).  
 559  MARIN, supra note 2, at 83-84 (noting that “individuals habitually underperform 
professional money managers by as much as 10 percent, and the most ‘gentle’ surveys show 
that there is a at least a 2% disadvantage to individuals investing on their own”).  
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to defined benefit plans in all but one year between 1984 and 2008.560 As self-
directed plans grew, concerns were raised about the effect of such changes on 
workers’ retirement security since participants seemed to be older, higher-paid, male 
workers and not those most in need of retirement security.561 During the 1980s, 
401(k) plans shifted investment decisions to the beneficiary and retirement security 
become a “do-it-yourself” project supported by employer sponsorship with 
increasing investment options being provided.562 
Initial enrollment restrictions such as the one-year waiting period were 
eliminated and enrollment was encouraged which helped companies to meet anti-
discrimination rules.563 Behavioral economists’ suggestions about how to increase 
plan participation were included in The Pension Protection Act of 2006, which 
allowed for automatic enrollment and other automatic features such as increasing the 
contribution rate annually by 1% until the 10% level is reached or the employee says 
stop.564 The Act also encouraged the use of default investments in various types of 
stock and bond funds. In 2007, the Department of Labor issued guidelines providing 
that automatic enrollees’ contributions are to be invested in various stock funds.565 
The guidelines were in response to studies showing that professionally managed 
defined benefit plans outperformed self-managed defined contribution plans and that 
                                                            
 560  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 205. Notwithstanding the increasing popularity of 401(k) 
plans in some circles, a number of states have experienced adverse results for workers from 
defined contribution plans and have opted to replace them with defined benefit plans after up 
to thirty-five years experience with defined contribution plans. Ron Snell, Pension Reform: 
Not Easy, But Worth It, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-
and-employmentpenson-reform-not-easy-but.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
 561  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 203 n.7. Schieber describes a study using 1993 census data 
and concludes: 
[P]articipants tended to be older, have longer tenures, earn higher pay and work for 
larger companies than nonparticipants. Women were less likely to participate than 
men. Workers tended to contribute more to their plans as their pay levels climbed. The 
results suggested that those who needed help the most in acquiring retirement security 
were being left out. 
Id. 
 562  Id. at 201-03. The 22.6% drop in the stock market on Black Monday, October 19, 1987, 
reduced the value of assets in defined contribution plans and raised questions of fiduciary 
responsibility for market losses. Id. The result was regulations governing “self-directed” 
accounts that allowed participants to select the investments, which included equities, bonds or 
fixed income, or money market investments and relieved the fiduciary of any fiduciary 
obligation for investment losses. Id. Large mutual funds became the investments of choice and 
participants could move investments on a daily basis based on the end of day valuation. Id. 
 563  Id. at 206. 
 564  Id. at 208-09. Tony Robbins calls this a “save more tomorrow” plan and recommends 
this in his book, TONY ROBBINS, MONEY MASTER THE GAME: 7 SIMPLE STEPS TO FINANCIAL 
FREEDOM 67 (2014). 
 565  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 201-10. 
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automatic enrollees were mostly contributing the minimum amounts (usually 3%) 
while leaving the money in the most conservative investments.566 
The defined contribution plan also presented a problem with “leakage.”567 There 
was a tendency for participants, particularly younger participants with relatively 
small amounts in their plans, to cash out the plan when they changed jobs. This 
deprived them of early-career retirement savings compounding, which could work 
over a forty or fifty year period with maximum benefit. The “cashing-out” 
phenomena with defined contribution plans which reduces future retirement security 
may not be significantly different than when individuals change jobs in mid-career 
and the defined benefit plan accrual is terminated at one company and started fresh 
at a second company.568 
Nevertheless, 401(k) wealth has been on the rise. A 2007 study compared the 
Social Security and 401(k) wealth of persons turning sixty-five in 2000 with the 
projected wealth that would be accumulated in 401(k) plans by persons turning 
sixty-five in 2010, 2020, 2030, and 2040.569 In 2000, a time when defined-benefit-
plan wealth was swiftly declining, the Social Security wealth of persons sixty-three 
to sixty-seven exceeded the combined wealth of their defined benefit plans and 
401(k) plans.570 Making the same comparison for persons turning sixty-five in 2010, 
2020, 2030, and 2040 the study broke the age cohort into ten groups based on 
projected lifetime earnings and found that, by 2030, 401(k) wealth will exceed 
Social Security wealth in the six highest of the ten earnings groups, and, by 2040, 
                                                            
 566  Id. Return differences of 1% to 2% would be significant over a forty-to fifty-year 
career. Id. Permissible investment options included a life-cycle fund reflecting an enrollee’s 
age, target retirement date, or life expectancy; a balanced fund reflecting the characteristics of 
the plan participants as a whole; or an allocation between various funds reflecting the 
enrollee’s age, target retirement date, or life expectancy. Id. 
 567  Id. at 210-11. 
 568  Id. at 211-12 (describing results from Andrew A. Samwick & Jonathan Skinner, How 
Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement Income?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 329 (2004)). The 
research found that distributions associated with job changes decreased in number and value 
from 2001 to 2007, while another researcher emphasized the need at least 25% of distributions 
early in one’s career and 50% later in the career were necessary to approximate the values 
achieved in defined benefit plans, and that, for the most part, defined contribution plans would 
provide higher benefits. Id. 
 569  Id. at 212-13. 
 570  Id. at 213-14 (citing James M. Poterba et al., Rise of 401(k) Plans, Lifetime Earnings, 
and Wealth at Retirement, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 13091, 2007), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13091. The comparison here does not include IRA or Keogh 
wealth in the calculation of 401(k) wealth in this calculation which, had it been included, 
would have found the highest lifetime earning decile’s wealth to exceed the value of Social 
Security wealth. Poterba et al., supra, at 5. Social Security wealth was calculated as the 
present value of projected benefits and the results were categorized by the deciles based on 
lifetime earnings. The calculations were based on 2000 dollars using standard Social Security 
estimated wage growth of 3.9% and inflation of 2.8%. Lifetime earnings ranged from $70,993 
in the first decile, to $1,336,716 in the fifth decile, to $1,722,307 in the sixth decile, to 
$3,565,347 in the tenth decile. Id. As with any study, the underlying assumptions of the study 
could be challenged, but the general thrust of the study that growing 401(k) wealth will 
outstrip Social Security wealth as the 401(k) plans mature. Id. at 6 tbl.1-2. 
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will exceed Social Security wealth in all but the two lowest earnings groups.571 Thus, 
by 2030, 401(k) projected accumulations over a fifty-year period will exceed Social 
Security’s accumulated wealth over a ninety-five-year period. 572 
Despite the projected success of the 401(k) phenomenon and the soaring stock 
market, the question remains whether and to what extent individuals are able to bear 
such responsibility. A recent op-ed piece by a renowned pension expert railed 
against privately managed plans referring to them as a ridiculous approach to 
retirement: 
Not yet convinced that failure is baked into the voluntary, self-directed, 
commercially run retirement plans system? Consider what would have to 
happen for it to work for you. First, figure out when you and your spouse 
will be laid off or be too sick to work. Second, figure out when you will 
die. Third, understand that you need to save 7% of every dollar you earn. 
(Didn’t start doing that when you were 25 and you are 55 now? Just save 
30% of every dollar.) Fourth, earn at least 3% above inflation on your 
investments every year. (Easy. Just find the best funds for the lowest price 
and have them optimally allocated.) Fifth, do not withdraw any funds 
when you lose your job, have a health problem, get divorced, buy a house 
or send a kid to college. Sixth, time your retirement account withdrawals 
so that so the last cent is spent the day you die.573 
Although questioning the ability of individuals to manage private accounts, 
Ghilarducci recognizes the need for savings beyond Social Security, suggesting that 
someone earning $100,000 at retirement would need $2 million (twenty times annual 
income in financial wealth) beyond Social Security to maintain their living standard 
in retirement.574 Ghilarducci may be overstating the case by suggesting saving $2 
million for a person earning $100,000. Using a simplified mathematical model and 
assuming someone works for fifty years, retires at age seventy, and lives to age 100, 
                                                            
 571  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 213-14. 
 572  Id. at 212-13 n.30 (citing Poterba et al, supra note 570, at 28, 32 referring to Tables 4-1 
& 4-4 respectively). Calculations for the comparison for 401(k) assets included assets in IRAs 
because it is likely that some retirees will have rolled over their assets in connection with a 
change of employment or at retirement. Poterba et al., supra note 570, at 4-5. The growth of 
401(k) assets will be modest for the lowest earners although with automatic enrollment and 
other practices designed to increase enrollment may have a positive effect on these earners. 
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 213-14. One study found that workers covered by defined benefit 
plans would retire one to two years earlier than those with only defined contribution plans. Id. 
at 257. 
 573  Teresa Ghilarducci, Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/opinion/sunday/our-ridiculous-approach-to-
retirement.html. The article also suggests it is a myth that people can plan to work more years 
to boost their retirement. Id. Conditions such as layoffs, finding work after fifty, or spousal or 
personal illness, among other reasons, make it difficult to work as one ages. See generally 
TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO 
SAVE THEM (1964). 
 574  Ghilarducci, supra note 573. There is some inconsistency in her statements since 
saving $7,000 a year for fifty years and earning an annual 3% only accrues $789,578, not the 
$2 million suggested as needed for the person making $100,000. 
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that person would need to save $17,400 every year and earn 3% per year to 
accumulate $1,962,665 by age seventy. At that point, the person could withdraw 
$100,000 per year until the fund was exhausted at age 100. If the same person 
invested in a broad based stock fund earning 7% per annum that person could 
accumulate the $2 million simply by contributing $4,900 per year. If the 7% return 
continued into the retirement years, the person could provide $100,000 for thirty 
years simply by accumulating $1.25 million by age seventy. Obviously, all sorts of 
combinations can be made, but the important point is that investing over long 
periods of time and utilizing the benefits of compounding can provide a relatively 
attractive retirement.  
Ghilarducci does not think the population can be educated to voluntarily make 
the sacrifice to save for retirement and proposes a plan for guaranteed retirement 
accounts (GRAs) with a forced savings component as the way to proceed.575 Her 
plan which addresses the need for additional retirement savings along with other 
plans, such as the one in Chile, which replaced its social security type plan, are 
discussed below. 
B. Guaranteed Retirement Account 
Ghilarducci’s concern is real; and allowing individuals to micromanage their 
investments may need to be limited in any solution to the retirement dilemma. For 
Ghilarducci, expecting individuals to shoulder the responsibility to save in a private 
pension plan for forty years is to defy human behavior. She proposes a guaranteed 
retirement account model to supplement Social Security by a forced contribution of 
5% of payroll, which may be split between employee and employer, into an 
investment account in which the government invests the monies in the financial 
markets but guarantees a minimum real return of 3%, reflecting the historic long-
term growth of the economy with the possibility of an inflation adjusted lifetime 
annuity at retirement.576 Covered payroll would be the same as current Social 
Security and everyone would receive a $600 tax credit against their contributions 
paid for through the reduction of tax expenditures for 401(k) plans.577 At retirement, 
participants can elect how they will receive their account distributions. 
The GRA supports retirement because it requires people to save, provides 
participants with flexibility on choosing a retirement date, provides lifetime benefits 
without the risk of not having the best investment advice, has predictable outcomes, 
is available to small businesses, is compatible with defined benefit plans, and is 
national in scope.578 There is a lot of merit in Ghilarducci’s approach and many of 
the features are reflected in the One-Fund Solution. 
C. President Bush’s Plan for Private Accounts 
Numerous proposals have been made for private accounts as part of Social 
Security. New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan added voluntary individual 
                                                            
 575  Id. at 15. 
 576  See Butler, American Paternalism, supra note 11, at 515-17 and citations therein 
(describing the guaranteed retirement account model); see also GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573, 
at 260-93. 
 577  GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573, at 277. 
 578  Id. at 263-74 (explaining each parameter in detail). 
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accounts to a proposal which Robert Ball, Commissioner of Social Security; thought 
was “antithetical to the social elements of the existing system.” In Ball’s view, 
individual accounts, if successful, would make workers want to make them larger, 
undermining commitment to the existing program.579 
In the late 1990s President Clinton was ready to move forward with a reform 
proposal that included diverting 2% of the Social Security tax to private accounts.580 
The proposal was never formalized and unrelated events focused President Clinton’s 
attention in other directions.581 
Using private accounts to solve Social Security problems is seen by many as 
diverting revenues away from current payment obligations.582 However, with or 
without private accounts the country will face the same choices only with private 
accounts they face them sooner.583 One knowledgeable Democrat is reported to have 
summed up the current stalemate as follows: 
The unsaid but implicit conclusion in her statement was that we can’t 
increase our contributions now and save them in a way that gives us 
meaningful financing relief later—added revenues put into the trust funds 
cannot be saved. All that is left is benefit cuts if we do anything now. She 
could not understand why any elected Democrats would ever want to put 
themselves in that no-win position. The implications of Kennelly’s 
observation, as I see it, is that some policymakers will avoid taking up 
Social Security reform until the trusts funds are nearly depleted and we 
again face the prospect of coming up short on the monthly payroll.584 
In 2005, President Bush proposed a system of voluntary accounts needed to be 
put into place on a phased in basis as part of a reformed Social Security system 
recognizing the long-term fiscal problem facing OASDI.585 He stressed how the ratio 
of workers supporting each retiree had dropped from forty to one to 3.3 to one in 
2005 and will drop to two to one by the time the youngest workers reached 
                                                            
 579  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 90. 
 580  Id. at 106. 
 581  Id. at 112. 
 582  Id. at 115. 
 583  Id. (referencing a statement from Andrew Biggs, an advocate of private accounts and 
member of President Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security). 
 584  Id. at 117 (reflecting on a conversation with Barbara Kennelly, a former Member of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and former president of the National Committee to Save 
Social Security and Medicare). 
 585  Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/social-security/text/ (last visited Apr. 24, 
2016). President Bush’s plan was only outlined in general terms which were evaluated in 
LAURA HALTZEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32879, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: PRESIDENT 
BUSH’S INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PROPOSAL (2005). A subsequent report evaluated the status of 
various proposals for reform including President Bush’s proposal. DAWN NUSCHLER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33544, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: CURRENT ISSUES AND LEGISLATION 
(2006). That the idea of private accounts gained in popularity in the 1990s was surprising. 
SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 107 n.16 (citing Douglas Elmendorf et al., Fiscal Policy during the 
1990s 30 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8488, Sept. 2001)). 
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retirement.586 Further, the problem would be aggravated by the Baby Boomer 
retirees scheduled to begin reaching sixty-two, the age for early retirement, in 2008 
and continue thereafter until 2031 at which time the number of retirees would have 
doubled.587 Also, because the wage index that determines initial benefits is growing 
faster than inflation, future retirees will be receiving higher benefits in real terms 
further jeopardizing Social Security. 588 
In making his proposal President Bush said a variety of proposals had previously 
been made to solve the fiscal short fall in Social Security including, “limiting 
benefits for wealthy retirees, indexing benefits to prices rather than wages, 
increasing the retirement age, discouraging early collection of retirement benefits 
and changing the way benefits are calculated.”589 These were all on the table for 
discussion as ways to make Social Security sound, but he emphatically stated that 
increasing payroll taxes was not a permanent solution.590 
There were three other parameters that were cornerstones of the proposal. First, 
the system’s progressivity must be maintained; second, there should be no change 
for persons fifty-five years and older; and third, any change should be gradual.591 A 
fourth caveat that Social Security should be a better deal for younger workers 
through voluntary accounts continues to be controversial.592 
Under President Bush’s proposal for individual accounts (IAs), workers under 
age fifty-five would be given an option to divert 4% of the 12.4% Social Security 
contribution to a private investment account in which the worker could invest into a 
group of broadly diversified index funds similar to the funds offered government 
employees in their Thrift Savings Plan.593 The maximum amount that could be 
diverted to IA would be $1,000 annually which would increase by $100 per year 
over a series of years.594  
Worker’s retirement benefit would be reduced to the extent that a worker 
diverted a portion of their Social Security tax to an IA. To determine the amount of 
the reduction, the administrator would create a hypothetical “shadow” account for 
the worker in which the worker’s IA contribution would be credited on paper. That 
shadow account would accrue interest at a real (inflation adjusted) rate of return of 
3%. At such time as the worker retired, the hypothetical amount in the shadow 
account would be used as the amount the worker could receive if he purchased a 
                                                            
 586  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 53 (referring to the ratio of the number of beneficiaries 
receiving benefits to the number of workers paying into the system as the “dependency ratio” 
and the ratio of the average benefits paid to the average wage of workers contributing to the 
system as the “earnings replacement rate”). 
 587  Strengthening Social Security for the 21st Century, supra note 585, at 1-2. 
 588  Id. at 2 (estimating for twenty-year olds in 2005 the benefit was estimated to be 40% 
higher in real terms when they retired). 
 589  Id. at 3. 
 590  Id. 
 591  Id. 
 592  Id. at 3-4. 
 593  Id. 
 594  Id. at 4. 
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lifetime annuity with an appropriate cost of living adjustment. That monthly amount 
would be used to reduce the worker’s Social Security benefit.595 
President Bush’s proposal was subject to considerable debate as he travelled 
seeking to build support for the change. Unfortunately, the IAs would not help the 
long-term deficit, and President Bush did not address that issue, which made the plan 
incomplete. Further, the Democrats thought the present system was just fine and that 
the solvency problem was thirty-five years away. President Bush’s plan never gained 
traction in the country or in Congress. 
Advocates of reform see Social Security as an out-of-date depression-era plan in 
need of modernization. The economic, social, and demographic changes of the past 
seventy years force the need for change, which has been accomplished in other 
countries. The present pay-as-you-go system is unsustainable and a system that 
allows workers to acquire ownership in an account is preferable and would give 
workers a larger retirement income. Also, reform may have the effect of curbing 
entitlement spending. Finally, current workers are paying for over-generous 
payments to former retirees who will get a much better return than they will.596 
Those advocating for a more restrained approach believe minor changes to the 
taxes or benefits would be sufficient and that advocates of private accounts want to 
undermine public support of the system and erode the social insurance nature of the 
system. They see considerable problems in transitioning to a system of private 
accounts and, even if it could be done, think it would put workers at excessive risk to 
the market. In any event, people already have the right to invest outside the Social 
Security system. 597  
D. Chile’s Private Pension System 
On November 4, 1980, Chile transitioned from a pay-as-you-go system598 into an 
“Individual Capitalization” pension system, providing for individual member 
accounts.599 The reform gave every individual the option of opting out fully from 
government run pension systems.600 Under this new plan, employers were required 
                                                            
 595  HALTZEL, supra note 585, at 4. 
 596  NUSCHLER, supra note 585, at 3-4. 
 597  It is also suggested that the demographic problem is overblown since people who live 
longer will likely work longer. Id. at 4-5. 
 598  Pay-as-you-go (“PAYGO”) is the practice of using funds currently collected for future 
obligation to pay amounts due under already accrued obligations rather than setting the funds 
aside for the future obligations. Pensions in Chile, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pensions_in_Chile. 
 599  Id.; see also SUPERINTDENCIA DE PENSIONES, THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, A 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 53 (2008), 
http://www.spensiones.cl/portal/informes/581/articles-3523_chapter4.pdf [hereinafter THE 
CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM] (stating each member has an individual account with an APF in 
which his/her social security contributions are deposited for investment in appropriate mutual 
funds). When the member retires or passes away, the amount in the account is returned to the 
member or his/her surviving beneficiaries in the form of a pension based directly on the 
amount in the account. Id. 
 600  Empowering Workers in Chile, JOSEPINERA.ORG, http://www.josepinera.org/articles/ 
articles_empoweringworkers.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).  
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to pay a stated percentage of a worker’s wages in the worker’s pension fund.601 
Workers already in the system were not required to switch over to the new plan, new 
workers were automatically placed in the new plan, and older workers were given, as 
an incentive to convert, a statutory minimum contribution of 11% lower than their 
contributions under the old pension system.602 As a result, over 95% of Chile’s 
workers converted to privately managed personal retirement accounts (PRA).603 
1. An Overview of Chile’s Private Pension System 
The pension system is managed by private institutions called Pension Fund 
Administrators (AFPs) each of which operate five mutual funds with different 
proportions of debt and equity securities purchased with funds accumulated by 
workers in their PRA accounts.604 AFPs are highly regulated to protect the interests 
of the workers and to insure the workers are fully informed of their PRA accounts, 
which are the source of their pension.605 
                                                            
 601  Employees are obligated to pay a total of 10% per pay period. THE CHILEAN PENSION 
SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 60; see also ALISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL42449, CHILE’S PENSION SYSTEM: BACKGROUND IN BRIEF 2 (2012), www.crs.gov, R42449; 
On the way to responsible citizens: Pension reform on the example of Chile, JOSEPINERA.ORG, 
www.josepinera.com/josepinera/Jp_ABC_Revolucion_pension_ger.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014) (indicating that the 10% rate was determined on the assumption of a 4% average real 
return on a PRA during a whole working life for the typical worker would be sufficient money 
in his account to fund a retirement benefit equal to approximately 70% of his final salary). 
 602  THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599. 
 603  The PRA is also referred to as an “individual capitalization account.” Id. at 60. This 
same reform introduced two important changes to the health system: (a) the disability and 
survivor insurance system became an integral part of the so-called “AFP system” (the AFPs 
are highly regulated private companies which can be 100% foreign owned that manage the 
PRAs on workers’ behalf); and, (b) it allowed workers to opt out from the monopolistic 
government health insurance system with all their mandatory contribution (another 7% of 
wages), as long as they were willing and able to buy with that money a minimum health 
insurance plan in what became the “ISAPRE system” (the ISAPREs are the private companies 
that offer diverse health insurance plans). Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. This 
comprehensive reform has changed dramatically Chile’s economy and society. Six million 
workers (95% of the labor force) have a PRA and 1.5 million (almost 25% of labor force and 
gradually increasing as higher wages allow their 7% of wages to buy the minimum health 
plan) have an ISAPRE plan. Id. 
 604  Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. The exclusive purpose of the AFP is to 
carry on activities related to the social security system. In the Chilean system, people can 
choose between five types of savings funds, denoted A to E, defined by their ratio of fixed-
interest to variable-interest assets. Kristian Niemietz, Chile’s private pension system has 
weathered the crisis, INST. ECON. AFF. (Jul. 27, 2010), http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/ 
chile%E2%80%99s-private-pension-system-has-weathered-the-crisis. Fondo A is the most 
risky one, with up to 80% of its assets invested in equities. Id. Fondo E is the most 
conservative one, consisting of fixed interest bearing bonds only. Id. The other ones are 
intermediate solutions. Id. 
 605  The AFPs are regulated by a government body, appointed by the President of the 
Republic, that guarantees the financing of benefits, which is represented within the system 
itself by the “Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators” (SAFP). The SAFP is broken 
down into six separate divisions: Legal Department, Institutional Control Division, Finance 
Division, Benefits and Insurance Division, Research Division, and Internal Administration, 
and IT Division. In addition, the SAFP has two units – the Medical Commissions Unit, 
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Workers choose which AFP(s) to join as well as the individual funds within the 
AFP, although older members and pensioners are limited to funds with a high 
percentage of debt securities and younger members can have up to 80% in 
equities.606 Employees are obligated and self-employed workers have the right to 
make regular deposits at 10% of taxable monthly wages and income subject to an 
upper limit.607 An additional 3% voluntary payment can be made to cover disability 
and term life insurance.608 These deposits are made into the employee’s individual 
capitalization account and invested by the AFP. Workers not making timely 
payments are subject to collection procedures609 and money put into the account 
remains tax-free.  
In 2002, a voluntary contribution system was added to the current system to 
encourage voluntary contributions to the individual capitalization account. These 
extra savings could mean early retirement for an individual or a higher pension on 
retirement. Alternatively, the extra savings could be used to compensate the 
individual for periods when no contributions were made due to some misfortune, 
such as unemployment. Under the voluntary system, workers can contribute an 
additional 10% of his wage subject to limits.610 
                                                            
ensuring compliance with disability legislation, and Unemployment Insurance Unit, ensuring 
that unemployment insurance functions correctly. THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 
599, at 55-58. 
 606  Investment decisions are made by the AFP but percentage limits are set for specific 
types of instruments and for the overall mix of the portfolio. Empowering Workers in Chile, 
supra note 600. The spirit of the reform is that those regulations should be reduced 
progressively as the AFP companies gain experience and capital markets work better. There is 
no obligation whatsoever to invest in government bonds or any other security. Id. Legally, the 
AFP companies and the mutual funds are separate entities. Id. Thus, should an AFP go under, 
the assets of the mutual funds-that is, the workers’ investments-are not affected at all and only 
the AFP’s shareholders lose their capital. Id. 
 607  The contribution limit is approximately $2,427 USD (sixty UF in Chile’s currency, the 
“Unidades de Fomento”). Barbra Kritzer, Chile’s Next Generation Pension Reform, 68 SOC. 
SECURITY BULL. 69, 81 (2008), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v68n2/v68n2p69.pdf. 
Unidades de Fomento is a real, inflation-adjusted unit that is used for special purposes in 
Chile including pension contributions and guaranteed benefits under the pension system. 
SHELTON, supra note 601, at 2 n.5. 
 608  Generally, it is advisable to pay the 3% and avoid the possibility of paying for their 
own disability costs. See Steve Idemoto, Social Security Privatization in Chile: A Case for 
Caution, ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST. (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.eoionline.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/social-security/SSPrivatizationChileCaseCaution-Sep00.pdf. 
 609  See THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599. 
 610 The voluntary contribution is limited to fifty UF per month (approximately $2,022 
USD). Id. at 61; see also Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. As a compliment to 
the individual capitalization account, an independent voluntary savings account was 
authorized in 1987, which can be used to create extra savings for retirement. Unlike the 
individual capitalization account, the voluntary savings account allows the individual to 
withdraw money from the account four times per year. THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra 
note 599, at 62-63. Withdrawals from the account are taxable income pursuant to a formula 
that determines the proportion of any withdrawal that constitutes gain or loss in the account. 
Id.  
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2. Obtaining Benefits  
The individual capitalization system offers three different types of pensions. 
First, the normal pension offered at the time of an individual’s retirement–—for men 
at or after age sixty-five and for women at or after age sixty.611 Second, a person can 
retire early provided the member qualifies for a pension equal to or greater than 50% 
of his or her average taxable income for the last ten working years, but which is not 
less than 110% of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State.612 Third, the 
members, through the plan’s administrators, finance a disability and survivorship 
benefit, but if the member is not covered by such insurance then the benefit is 
financed through that member’s individual capitalization account alone.613 
The pension is paid at the option of the member, either as a programmed 
withdrawal, a life annuity, or temporary income with a deferred life annuity. The 
programmed withdrawal must meet certain requirements to insure that the member 
does not exhaust their account.614 The member is able to withdraw the excess funds 
in his account to the extent the account balance is sufficient to meet 110% of the 
minimum pension guaranteed by the State and higher than 70% of the member’s 
average monthly taxable wage over the last ten years. 615 
Chile also provides a minimum pension for those that contributed to the account 
for twenty years but have an amount in their fund below the minimum. In 2002, the 
value of the minimum pension was approximately $72,000 for members under 
seventy years of age and $79,000 for members over seventy years of age.616 From 
1992 to 2002, the minimum pension grew at an annual rate of 4.6% in real terms.617 
                                                            
 611  THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 65. 
 612  Id. 
 
 613  Id. at 65-66. To qualify for a disability pension, a person must be under the age of 
retirement and must have lost at least two-thirds of their ability to work. Id. If the worker loses 
only one-half to below two-thirds of their ability, the individual may still be able to receive a 
partial disability pension. Id. 
 614  Niemietz, supra note 604. The Programmed Withdrawal option allows a retiree to leave 
his funds in the PRA and make programmed withdrawals, subject to limits based on the life 
expectancy of the retiree and his dependents; with this option, if he dies, the remaining funds 
in his account form a part of his estate and can be given to his heirs basically tax-free. 
Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. The Life Annuity option allows members to 
sign an irrevocable contract, losing ownership of their resources, allowing their pension 
benefits to be paid by a life insurance company (of their choice). Id. “This company promises 
to pay them a constant monthly income, in real terms, as long as they live, and to pay a 
survivorship pension to their beneficiaries. In this way, the member’s resources are transferred 
to the Life Insurance Company which assumes both the financial risk and the risk of longevity 
on the part of the pensioner and his/her family group.” THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra 
note 599, at 68-69. Lastly, the Temporary Income with Deferred Life Annuity option in 
essence allows a member to receive a loan on their benefits from the insurance company. Id. 
At the time of retirement, the individual retains ownership and therefore risk of loss on their 
annuity until such time as the loan is repaid. Id. 
 615  THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 68-69. 
 616  Id.  
 617  Id. at 69-71 (finding other criteria are in place to determine minimum pensions for the 
disabled and survivors). 
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3. The Transition Financing Pensions and Pension Options 
The transition from a pay-as-you-go system to a system of private accounts is a 
difficult and expensive process, but was accomplished without raising taxes.618 At 
the time Chile was in the hands of a dictator, essentially bankrupt, and had just 
started a modern pension system modeled on the United States system.619 
Chile took three important steps to facilitate the transition. First, it guaranteed the 
benefits of those in the former system.620 Second, workers who opted out of the 
former system were given a “recognition bond” in an amount equal in value to their 
interest under the former system.621 The bond would be a zero coupon bond bearing 
real interest of 4% per annum payable on the date of the individuals retirement. The 
bond could be traded in secondary markets and would be deposited in the worker’s 
PRA account. Third, all new entrants into the labor force were required to enter the 
PRA system.622 An element of transparency in the system is the following: 
We also ended the illusion-artificially maintained by lawmakers around 
the world-that both the employer and the worker contribute to social 
security. As economists know well, all the contributions are ultimately 
paid from the worker’s marginal productivity, and employers take into 
account all labor costs-whether termed salary or social security 
contribution-in making their hiring and pay decisions. So, by renaming 
the employer’s contribution as additional gross wage, our reform made it 
clear, without reducing workers’ take-home pay, that all contributions are 
paid ultimately by the worker and that he can control his own money. Of 
course, at the end of the day, wage levels will be determined by the 
interplay of market forces.623 
At the time of transition in 1980, the Chilean pay-as-you-go system short fall was 
estimated to be equivalent to 80% of GDP.624 Chile used five “sources” to finance 
the transition. First, Chile issued bonds at market rates of interest, some of which 
were purchased by the AFPs.625 Second, since the savings rate needed to fund the 
                                                            
 618  Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. Addressing transition costs is difficult 
but a key insight is that: “[C]ontrary to the widely held belief, there is no ‘economic’ 
transition cost, because there is no cost to GNP due to this reform . . . . A completely different, 
and relevant, issue is how to confront the ‘cash-flow’ transition cost to the government of 
recognizing, and ultimately eliminating, the unfunded liability created by the pay-as-you-go 
system.” Id. 
 619  MARIN, supra note 2, at 180. 
 620  Empowering Workers in Chile, supra note 600. 
 621  Id. 
 622  Id. 
 623  Id. 
 624  From 1981 to 1999, transition costs averaged about 3.25% of GDP. SHELTON, supra 
note 601, at 6.  
 625  Using debt, the transition cost was shared by future generations. In Chile, roughly 40% 
of the cost has been financed by issuing government bonds at market rates of interest. See 
Idemoto, supra note 608. Prior to changing the system, “the government deliberately created a 
budget surplus, and for many years afterwards the treasury minister was able to use . . . .” Jose 
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PRAs was lower than the payroll tax under the old system, a fraction of the 
difference was used as a temporary “transition tax.”626 Third, Chile sold government 
owned assets to raise funds.627 Fourth, Chile reduced and held down government 
spending.628 And, fifth, the value-added tax resulting from economic growth fueled 
by the PRA system increased tax revenues.629 These actions led one commentator to 
point to two lessons: (1) pension plans and their critical role in providing retirement 
income and support are perhaps the single most important variable in the fiscal 
stability of the world economies, so understanding their status—country-by-country 
or entity-by-entity—is the key to assessing and/or running those economies; (2) 
pension plans are the most important source of long-term capital in almost all 
economies and, as such, are the true engines of growth and must be tended to 
accordingly.630 
4. Criticism of the Chilean Model  
The full impact of Chile’s privatization remains unknown until the system 
matures. Critics point to its negative impact on public spending, exorbitant 
management fees, the income disparity between men and women and low-income 
individuals, and the susceptibility of the accounts to market down turns.631 Some of 
these criticisms were addressed in a 2008 reform that limited commissions paid to 
the AFPs and enhanced the minimum pension (often referred to as a “poverty 
prevention tier”) and benefits for women.632 
Critics question whether Chile’s model is applicable to other countries although a 
number of countries have already adopted it.633 For example, the Social Security in 
                                                            
Pinera, Empowering Workers: The Privatization of Social Security in Chile, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE (Michael D. Tanner ed., 2004). 
 
 626  Id. 
 627  Id. 
 628  Id. 
 629  Id. 
 630  MARIN, supra note 2, at 181. Regarding the sale of government assets, Marin points to 
the sale of Chile’s largest pension fund company, Provida, and insurance company, 
Consorcio. Id. at 180. 
 631  See Idemoto, supra note 608, at 3 (reporting, in 1990, high management fees and 
unfairness to lower, middle, and women workers); Niemietz, supra note 604 (observing that 
the value of Chilean pension assets crashed “spectacularly” in 2008 but rebounded in 2009, 
that 30% of Chilean pension assets are invested abroad making them less dependent on 
Chile’s economy, and that pensioners have more security than under the prior PAYGO 
system); see also THE CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599, at 88 (explaining that, since 
administrators fix set commissions within a legally established structure and members have 
freedom to choose between AFPs, commissions should reflect competitive levels between 
AFPs). 
 632  SHELTON, supra note 601, at 8-9. The poverty prevention tier provides a means-tested 
minimum benefit (the “Basic Solidarity Pension”) to everyone as well as a Pension Solidarity 
Complement for those who’s PRA does not provide a pension equal to a threshold amount. Id. 
at 1-2. Furthermore, the enhanced provision for women who, among other things, provides a 
bonus at age sixty-five for every live birth or adopted child. Id. at 9. 
 633 “Since 1990, ten other countries in the region have adopted some form of what has 
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the United States was more efficient than Chile’s system in 1981 when they 
converted to a private system.634 Further, the high administrative costs incurred by 
Chile, a lack of a public mandate for change, the large cash flow requirements for 
transition, and the lack of a current budget surplus all make adoption of the Chile 
system in the United States unlikely.635 
Chile’s new system has performed well. Reports are, from 1981 through 2014, 
Fund C, a balanced fund, averaged real returns of 8.6% with annual real returns 
between minus 3% and plus 30%. While the rate of contribution is almost half the 
former payroll tax rate, the benefits have been many times higher. Further, capital 
has experienced significant productivity gains, poverty has been reduced, and 
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP declined from 34.3% in 1984 to 
21.9% in 1990. Finally, pension funds and investment funds have accumulated funds 
equal to 70% of GDP.636 
E. Australia’s Model 
The retirement income security system in place in Australia consists of three 
pillars.637 The first pillar is a government provided, means-tested aged pension while 
the second and third pillars are mandatory and voluntary savings retirement funds 
together called the “superannuation fund.”638 The superannuation fund—employer 
sponsored mandatory retirement payments and private voluntary payments—was 
instituted by the government to alleviate some of the public burden and reduce 
                                                            
become known as the Chilean model: Argentina (1994), Bolivia (1997), Colombia (1993), 
Costa Rica (1995), Dominican Republic (2003), El Salvador (1998), Mexico (1997), Panama 
(2008), Peru (1993), and Uruguay (1996).” Kritzer, supra note 607, at 69; see also THE 
CHILEAN PENSION SYSTEM, supra note 599. 
 634  Idemoto, supra note 608. 
 
 635  SHELTON, supra note 601, at 9. 
 636  For information regarding the success of the Chilean plan, see Empowering Workers in 
Chile, supra note 600. The success of the system will ultimately be evaluated of a full 
working life plus any period of retirement. Id. 
 637  Australia’s national health care (often a fourth pillar of retirement) provides world-class 
medical treatment for medical emergencies, but, for treatments that can be delayed such, as a 
non-emergency hip replacement, retired Australians purchase private insurance. See 
Australia’s Health System—An Overview, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEPT. HEALTH, 
http://www.doctorconnect.gov.au/internet/otd/publishing.nsf/Content/australiasHealthSystem 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2016). Australia’s medical system consists of two parts: a universal 
health care that is funded by the government and pays for about 70% of medical costs, and a 
private individualized insurance system that covers the other 30% of costs. Id. Similar to the 
health care system in the United States, their public system is referred to as “Medicare” and is 
only available to qualified citizens based on eligibility requirements that vary based on age, 
income, disability, and more. Id. Home ownership has also been described as a fourth pillar. 
See David Ingles & Miranda Stewart, Superannuation Tax Concessions and the Age Pension: 
A Principled Approach to Savings Taxation 1 (Tr. Territory of the Pacific Islands, Working 
Paper 7/2015, 2015). 
 638  Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497. 
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government expenditures.639 The Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) requires 
employers to contribute 9.25% of the salary paid to employees640 and employees can 
contribute an extra amount up to, in 2014, $30,000 ($35,000 if aged over forty-nine), 
as well as contribute to a voluntary savings account.641 
Under the first pillar, all citizens are provided a basic means-tested benefit with a 
level of income deemed sufficient to provide a minimum standard of living.642 Most 
retirees in Australia are entitled to a pension benefit from a government-sponsored 
and administered system.643 Unlike the United States Social Security system, it is 
neither contributory nor meant to be a “safety net.”644 The amount of age pension an 
individual is eligible to receive “is determined by two factors: (1) the base amount, 
which is the same for every Australian, and (2) the means tests.”645 Coverage is not 
necessarily universal, but is based on eligibility criteria,646 and is meant to be a 
                                                            
 639  Id. (finding currently over 25% of government expenditures is on health, age-related 
pensions, and aged-care and will grow to over 50% by 2049-2050). John Hewson, The Politics 
of Tax Reform in Australia, ASIA & PACIFIC POL’Y STUDIES 590, 595 (2014) (stating that, 
while Australia’s overall tax burden is low, the simpler superannuation introduced in 2006 is 
both inequitable and inefficient, and finding that: “the [tax] system encourages wealth 
accumulation by borrowing and speculation, while . . . impos[ing] the highest rates of tax on 
wage and salary income and savings in deposits, while imposing substantially lower rates on 
the same amount of income from other investments and particularly if those investments are 
funded by debt.”). 
 640  Nick Summers, In Australia, Retirement Savings Done Right, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. 
MKTS. & PERS. FIN. (May 30, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-30/in-
australia-retirement-saving-done-right (explaining, when it began in 1992, the law required 
employers to divert 3% of most workers’ salaries into retirement accounts). As of July 1, 
2014, the rate was 9.5% and will remain flat for six years and increase to 10% on July 1, 2020, 
and to 12% on July 1, 2025. Ingles & Stewart, supra note 637, at 3; see also Superannuation 
in Australia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superannuation_in_AUSTRALIA (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2016) (stating “[e]mployers are not required to make employer contributions 
for employees earning less than $450 per month not working more than 30 hours per week, or 
for employees aged under 18 or over 70. If however they are earning $450 per month before 
tax and working more than 30 hours per week full-time, part-time or casual, the employer is 
required to pay superannuation regardless of being under 18.”).  
 641  Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497 n.15; Summers, supra note 640 (“One in 
five employees saves even more with voluntary contributions known as ‘salary sacrifice.’ 
Some companies match workers’ contributions.”). 
 642  Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497 and citation contained therein.  
 643  This system is known as “Age Pension.” The age pension redistributes income both on 
the basis of wealth and between the stages of the life cycle and is paid by current tax, which is 
largely paid by younger workers. Dana M. Muir, Building Value in the Australian Defined 
Contribution System: A Values Perspective, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 93, 104-08 (2011).  
 644  Id. at 104. 
 645  Id. at 106-08 (finding the Age Pension uses both an income test and an asset test to 
determine the amount an individual may be eligible for).  
 646  The eligibility requirements are that the individual reaches the age of sixty-seven, if 
born after January 1, 1957, and either have a been a resident for a continuous period of ten 
years at the time of filing, or the individual must have been a resident for five continuous 
years prior to filing with other years of residency that would total ten years. Id. Ingles & 
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“social assistance program to prevent poverty among the elderly.”647 Furthermore, 
benefits are foregone if not received during the time period in which they are 
available.648 Take for example, a sixty-seven year old beneficiary who is a resident 
and has worked for the past fifteen years but still working, he could not receive an 
age pension for the length of time in which he was still working and those benefits 
would not be later given to him upon his retirement; the benefits that accrued after 
age sixty-seven would have been. 
For most individuals, private wealth is tied to owner-occupied housing and 
values in the superannuation fund.649 Contributions, both mandatory and voluntary 
(pillars two and three), to the superannuation fund are taxed at a reduced rate of 
15%.650 At such time as the individual reaches retirement age, if the private account 
is above a certain amount, the individual will not be eligible for the social insurance 
retirement benefit.651 However, all moneys taken from the retirement account are 
tax-free.652 Over the past two decades, the retirement plan has increased in wealth, 
growing from just under 20% of GDP to roughly 90% of GDP, and with over 90% 
of employed Australians having savings in a superannuation account, the total assets 
in these accounts now exceed Australia’s GDP.653 
Australian marginal tax rates go up to 40% and the only deduction allowed is for 
charity.654 No deduction is permitted for mortgage interest on a primary residence. 
                                                            
Stewart, supra note 637, at 5-17 (describing in detail the age pension and the income and asset 
tests and pointing out that the eligibility age will increase to sixty-seven in 2023 and to 
seventy in 2035). 
 647  Muir, supra note 643, at 105. 
 648  Id. at 104-08. 
 649  Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 497. 
 650  Id. at 501 (noting the criticism that taxing contributions reduces the amount invested 
and the accumulation over the contributor’s working life). Income generated in the 
superannuation fund is taxed to the member as it accumulates, and taxed according to their 
proportion of tax-free and taxable benefits, although the fund receives dividend imputation 
credits, based on investment in Australian equities that can reduce the effective tax rate for 
investment income to 8%. Id. at 506; see also MERCER, TAX & SUPERANNUATION: 
BENCHMARKING AUSTRALIA AGAINST THE WORLD’S BEST RETIREMENT SAVINGS SYSTEM 7 
(2013), http://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/asia-
pacific/australia/News/130208_Global_Tax_Benchmarking_Final.pdf; Ron Bird & Jack Grey, 
A Brief Critical Review of Australia’s Retirement Savings System, 12 J. INV. CONSULTING 53, 
53 (2011). 
 651  Summers, supra note 640. 
 652  Id. 
 653  Daniel J. Mitchell, Unexpected Praise for Australia’s Pension Social Security System, 
CATO LIBERTY, http://www.cato.org/blog/unexpected-praise-australias-private-social-security-
system (last visited Apr. 21, 2016); see also Summers, supra note 640 (pointing out that assets 
in the superannuation fund grew to $1.52 trillion from 1992 to 2013 compared to $2.8 trillion 
in United States 401(k) plans with a population fourteen times larger than the Australian 
population). 
 654  If an individual has other investments income from such investments would be taxed at 
the regular rates. See Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 501; see also MERCER, supra note 
650. 
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Australia has a 10% goods and services tax (GST), but no local sales taxes.655 In 
Australia, taxes make up 22.2% of GDP656 and national debt is 20.48% of GDP.657 
The system, however, is far from perfect.658 Migratory labor law, for example, is an 
area where the law is limited, making it difficult for migratory workers to save for 
retirement the way national workers can.659 
F. Canadian Savings Account 
Canada has instituted a savings program attractive for middle class investors 
called the Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA). The TFSA is a flexible, registered, 
general-purpose savings vehicle that allows Canadians to earn tax-free investment 
income to more easily meet lifetime savings needs.660 The nearest United States 
equivalent is Roth Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA). With a Roth IRA, 
earnings are taxed before contributions are made into the account. The money then 
grows tax-protected, and people pay no tax when the funds are withdrawn. However, 
Roth accounts have numerous restrictions and, in some cases, can be subject to 
penalties.661 
While IRA accounts have been around for many years, only 38% of United 
States households own some type of IRA.662 Canada introduced TFSAs in 2009, but 
48% of Canadians have already signed up; and, as of 2013, TFSAs hold $109 billion 
                                                            
 655  See Exports & GST, AUSTRALIAN TAX’N OFFICE, 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/International-tax-for-business/Australians-doing-business-
overseas/Exports-and-GST/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
 656  Tax-to-GDP Ratio – Past and Prospective Developments, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications/2013/Economic-
Roundup-Issue-2/Economic-Roundup/Tax-to-GDP-ratio (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
 657  Australian Government Debt to GDP, TRADING ECON., 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/government-debt-to-gdp (last visited Sept. 14, 
2014). 
 658  See, e.g., Hewson, supra note 639 (“Australians are left with a system that still visibly 
fails three original, key objectives of tax policy, let alone to have adequately adjusted to the 
dramatic shifts in global and domestic economic and social environment and related policy 
challenges . . . .”) 
 659  See Cormick & McLaren, supra note 2, at 503–12 (discussing issues such as: the ability 
of sovereign nations to tax workers on their own authority, thus leading to the double taxation 
of some migratory workers; and the inability of migratory workers in many cases to transfer 
their earned retirement in a separate nation to Australia without significant ramifications). 
 660  Tax Free Savings Account, CAN. GOV’T. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.tfsa.gc.ca/. 
 661  Roth IRAs are subject to a number of restrictions based on income limits (cannot have 
AGI over $191,000 in 2014) and penalties if money is withdrawn within five years or before 
reaching age fifty-nine and six months. Id. 
 662  Amity Shlaes & Chris Edwards, A Simple Tax Reform Can Help Families Promote 
Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/amity-shlaes-
and-chris-edwards-a-simple-tax-reform-can-help-families-and-promote-economic-growth-
1408919408. 
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in assets.663 While the account is not completely without tax penalty, there are far 
fewer restrictions on these types of accounts than those placed on IRAs.664  
1. Key Features 
Some of the key features that set a TFSA apart from an IRA are, the lack of 
income limitations on contributions, lack of restrictions for using the account, and 
the tax benefits gained by having the account.665 Unlike the income, contribution, 
and withdrawal restrictions in an IRA, a TFSA allows any qualified Canadian 
resident666 to contribute up to $5,500 annually without tax penalty.667 Any unused 
contribution is saved and carried forward for use in future years.668 For example, if 
you contribute $3,500 this year, next year you could add the unused $2,000 and 
make a deposit of $7,500 that year. Any withdrawal made in the prior year can also 
be contributed without penalty.669 In addition, TFSA account owners can choose 
from a wide range of investment options.670 The investment income earned on the 
TFSA is tax free, as well as any withdrawals from the TFSA.671 
Although contributions to a TFSA are not tax deductible, “neither income earned 
within a TFSA nor withdrawals from it affect eligibility for federal income-tested 
benefits and credits, such as Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, 
and the Canada Child Tax Benefit.”672 Unlike an IRA, a TFSA does not have to be 
withdrawn at retirement. In the event of the taxpayer’s death, the assets within a 
                                                            
 663  Id. (“At the end of 2013 Canadians held $109 billion in assets in TFSAs. In an 
economy the size of the United States’ economy, that amount would be the equivalent of $1 
trillion.”). 
 664  Id. 
 665  About the tax-free savings account (TFSA), CAN. REV. AGENCY, http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/tfsa-celi/bt-eng.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2015). 
 666  Canadian residents must be eighteen years or older and have a valid social insurance 
number to be able to set money aside tax free. Id.  
 667  Id. see also Four Reasons to Open a TFSA, GETSMARTERABOUTMONEY.CA, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investor-education/investor-education-
fund/tfsas/four-reasons-to-open-a-tfsa/article16886502/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016) (“The 
money you put into a TFSA has already been taxed. So if your marginal tax rate is higher 
when you take the money out, you'll have paid less in taxes . . . . You can use the TFSA to 
shelter investments that would otherwise be taxed at the highest rate. That’s because you don’t 
pay tax on your TFSA’s earnings.”). 
 668  Tax Free Savings Account, supra note 660. 
 669  Tax-Free Savings Account, CAN. REV. AGENCY (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/tfsa/; see also Tax Free Savings Account, supra note 660 (“Re-contributing in the 
same year may result in an over-contribution amount which would be subject to a penalty 
tax.”). 
 670  This includes mutual funds, bonds, and Guaranteed Investment Certificates. Tax Free 
Savings Account, supra note 660. 
 671  Full amount of withdrawals can be put back into the TFSA in future years. However, 
re-contributing in the same year may result in an over-contribution amount, which would be 
subject to a penalty tax. Id. 
 672  Id. 
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TFSA can generally be transferred to the taxpayer’s legal or common-law spouse.673 
An account can be opened at any bank branch, or online, and can hold different types 
of assets, including bank deposits, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and more. 
The largest danger faced by TFSA owners is over contribution to their accounts 
annually.674 Canada’s Revenue Agency imposes a tax penalty of 1% per month on 
the excess contributions.675 Although the issue of penalties for excess contributions 
gained considerable attention in 2010, it eventually quieted down, but so far in 2012 
the government collected $22.5 million in penalties.676 In that year, nearly 80,000 
people were sent notices of over contribution but less than 20,000 received a waiver 
on the penalties they incurred.677 
The United States could adopt its own TFSA simply by expanding existing 
legislation. A TFSA is subject to simple and rather straightforward rules so that 
investors should be able to become adept at evaluating investment choices rather 
than the complex provisions of tax law. A United States TFSA would create an 
incentive for people to save for serious projects like the purchase of a home or 
saving for higher education or retirement. A TFSA would be equally available to 
both high-income persons as well as low-income persons. Even though there would 
be certain revenue losses, much revenue is already lost with Roth IRAs and 401(k)s 
and growth may be spurred with the additional savings created by a TFSA. 
G. Social Security Works All Generations Plan 
Those commentators who think private accounts are unacceptable, but realize the 
inadequacy of current arrangements in providing a secure retirement, propose 
expanding Social Security through the existing system and paying for it with 
increased taxes.678 They reach their conclusions because they believe America is the 
richest nation in the world, income has been inequitably captured by the top 1% of 
earners, and numerous groups have suffered under the economic recession and from 
general adverse economic conditions beyond their control.679 “The All Generations 
Plan” would expand the program to provide for millions of persons who give 
voluntary care to others in need and to those going through life changing events such 
                                                            
 673  Id. 
 674  Rod Carrick, Misunderstanding This Simple TFSA Rule Could Cost You A Lot, GLOBE 
& MAIL (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/personal-
finance/retirement-rrsps/dont-let-your-tfsa-land-you-in-tax-jail/article17123629/ (explaining 
that Canada’s Revenue Agency (CRA) figures show that approximately 74,000 people were 
sent notices for over contribution in 2012). “Also, the CRA has waived its penalties an 
average of 21,000 times in the past three years [but only] for people who were able to argue 
they made an honest mistake and remove the amount of their excess contribution as soon as 
they were told about it.” Id.  
 675  Id. 
 676  Id. 
 677  Id. 
 678  ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 88-104. 
 679  Id. The authors argue that legislation has shifted the redistribution curve upward toward 
the wealthiest 1% of the earners. Id. at 100-01. 
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as the birth of a child or the oldest of the old.680 The basic Social Security formulas 
and coverages are seen as offsetting these inequalities.681 The All Generations Plan is 
seen as: 
[A] solution to . . . the income insufficiency of today’s seniors; the 
retirement income crisis confronting today’s middle-aged and young 
workers; insufficient recognition of and public support for the caregiving 
functions of the family; and increased inequality, now hollowing out the 
middle class.682 
The first step in the All Generations Plan is to increase every benefit by 10% up 
to $1,500 per month.683 The second step is to recognize that the cost-of-living index 
does not adequately address the costs incurred by seniors by creating a more accurate 
COLA for seniors.684 This would prevent the erosion of benefits being received by 
seniors over time. Third, enhance the special minimum so that those working thirty 
years and retiring at full retirement age will receive a benefit equal to at least 1.25% 
of the federal poverty level.685 Other parts of the plan would enhance supplemental 
security income, provide benefits during caregiving for family members and others, 
restore benefits for students through age twenty-two, and expand benefits for adult 
disabled children.686 
The All Generations Plan contains proposals to pay for the enhancements.687 
Using GDP percentages, Social Security costs would be 4.94% of GDP as of 2015, 
will increase to 6.16% of GDP by 2035, and drop to 6.08% by 2085. This percentage 
is significantly lower than that incurred by other developed nations. The authors of 
the All Generations Plan consider this a minor and manageable increase since the 
United States is the wealthiest nation in history.688 The All Generations Plan 
proposes gradually increasing the Social Security tax divided between employer and 
employee from 12.7% to 14.4% and expanding the tax base to include all salary 
reduction plans such as flexible spending accounts as income for this purpose.689 In 
addition, it would eliminate the earnings ceiling on the tax and provide enhanced 
benefits affecting only 6% of the taxpayers.690 The plan would gradually direct that 
                                                            
 680  Id. at 73-86.  
 681  Id. at 103.  
 682  Id. at 107.  
 683  Id. at 110.  
 684  Id. at 110-11.  
 685  Id. at 113-14.  
 686  Id. at 117-22.  
 687  Id. at 123-40.  
 688  Id. at 125. The authors compare the allocations of GDP for other uses to that of Social 
Security and conclude that the increase for Social Security is modest and affordable. Id. at 
126. Further, the authors reason that if 0.93% of GDP can be allocated for 401(k) and related 
plans through tax expenditures that Social Security can be enhanced. Id. at 128.  
 689  Id. at 130-32.  
 690  Id.  
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40% of the trust fund assets be invested in equities to enhance fund’s income.691 
Finally, reasoning that high-income persons benefit most from services provided by 
the government, the plan proposes a 10% tax on income above $1 million dollars.692 
H. The Better Base Case 
Edward D. Kleinbard would focus on public investment, particularly on “hard” 
infrastructure, science, education, and providing more comprehensive social 
insurance believing that we can accomplish the goals without “radically changing 
our tax system.693 He advises greater spending in each area and, regarding education, 
thinks the focus should be on early childhood education in economically 
disadvantaged areas.694 He would also rethink the cost of post-secondary education 
since: 
Student loan programs make college affordable in a technical sense for 
some students, but they then graduate with tens of thousands of dollars of 
debt, which hangs over their future, dampening their appetite for 
entrepreneurial risk-taking at precisely the point in their lives when such 
risks should be least costly to them.695 
Kleinbard sees social insurance with mandatory participation, such as Social 
Security, employer provided health insurance, and unemployment insurance as a 
necessary characteristic of a modern growing state.696 Kleinbard notes: 
                                                            
 691  Id. at 133-34.  
 692  Id. at 134-38. The plan would also eliminate the distinction between the OASI and DI 
trust funds and summaries of the proposals. See id. at 138-39, 216-77 (appendix B provides 
Additional Information About the Social Security Works All Generations Plan and Other 
Proposals Including Cost and Revenue Estimates).  
 693  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 267. Kleinbard thinks public investment in infrastructure 
is justified because governments have lower financing costs, there is an absence of financial 
profit, and it results in positive externalities in that everyone likely benefits and there is a 
creation of good paying construction jobs. Id. at 277-78. 
 694  Id. at 289-98. Kleinbard sees religiously based private education as “tribal havens” with 
low academic standards. Id. at 297. 
 695  Id. at 296. Making loans to students always seems like government is helping students, 
but, by failing to police the practices of schools in taking student loan money or providing 
money only for programs with a history of providing jobs to students, the government is faced 
with large numbers of students who cannot pay those debts. Id. The result is that the 
government creates ways to forgive those debts either through payment plans or by favoring 
work for non-profit organizations with forgiveness. Id. Lately governments are considering 
forgiving loans if the school violated state law in enticing students to matriculate there. Josh 
Mitchell, Obama Administration opens Door for More Student-Debt Forgiveness, WALL ST. 
J., June 8, 2015. 
 696  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 305. Kleinbard states: 
The universal experience around the world is that as a country grows richer the basket 
of insurance that its government offers its citizens—more accurately, the mutual 
insurance its citizens provide for each other through the intermediation of 
government—also grows in size. This is not the sure sign of decadence, but of 
common sense. 
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Countries employ social insurance as a key component of the social 
compact because most people believe that to be a member of a society is 
to have an interest in the welfare of other members of that society. This 
impulse can be expressed in ethical terms, but it also is based on straight 
forward economic logic: healthy and adequately nourished citizens are 
more productive, and will contribute more to the prosperity of society, 
than will sick and emaciated ones. Finally, in many cases, such as health 
insurance or insurance against absolute inadequacy,” insurance most 
efficiently delivered as mandatory social insurance (that is, as a 
government program), because this effectively address problems of 
adverse selection.697 
Social insurance is seen as a fair price to pay for the “safety net” and encourages 
risk taking by the youth because they know the down side is protected if their 
adventure does not work out. This safety net is paid for by the progressive income 
tax, which is seen as a “known alternative” justifying taking the risk where any 
moral hazard is a mere side effect that can be addressed with program design.698 
Kleinbard finds it ironic that individuals who have their health insurance subsidized 
through the tax code as well, receive numerous other tax benefits, and exemptions 
under the income and Social Security taxes still fight to repeal the subsidies and 
other benefits received by individuals forced to obtain health insurance under the 
Affordable Care Act.699 Our current system spends more money per capital than 
other developed countries on healthcare and produces trillions of dollars in waste 
and poor overall outcomes, according to Kleinbard.700 The answer for healthcare is a 
“national single-payer” system, the obvious and logical system, and Kleinbard stands 
amazed that President Obama did not pursue this option.701 
Regarding Social Security, Kleinbard admits that it has a progressive benefit 
scheme funded by a regressive tax source. It is a form of social insurance that allows 
people to say, “I made contributions, and now I get benefits,” although strictly 
speaking the early retirees did not pay very much for their benefits, which Kleinbard 
dismisses as an “accident of the start of the program” and a mere “generational 
                                                            
Id. at 298. 
 697  Id. at 303-04. 
 698  Id. at 305-06. 
 699  Id. at 307-08. 
 700  Id. at 316, 321. 
 701  Id. at 323. For Kleinbard, it is simple: 
At one stroke, the fundamental problem of adverse selection disappears, because all 
members of society participate. Premiums are easily collected through the existing tax 
administrative machinery. A patch work of largely monopolistic local sellers now 
faces a monopsonistic buyer. Operating administrative costs are reduced, as we see 
today in Medicare administration. There is more than enough value on the table here 
to compensate the medical community fairly and still reap hundreds of billions of 
dollars of savings every year. 
Id. 
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mismatch.”702 He does not classify the refundable portion of the earned income tax 
credit as insurance but as an “investment in our fellow citizens” or as a “special set 
of tax rate” applicable to individuals with incomes at certain levels.703 The 
refundable portion can be characterized as “primarily a rebate of payroll taxes borne 
by a low-wage worker” and he does not question how a low-wage worker can claim 
benefits of Social Security and later claim, “I paid for them.”704 
Kleinbard develops the history of how the income tax was adopted to move from 
a consumption tax (primarily tariffs) to an income tax based on ability to pay. The 
current tax scheme was an attempt to make wealthy Americans pay their “fair 
share.”705 Ability to pay builds on the “now-familiar language of the declining 
marginal utility of income,706 which is the most common justification to this day for 
our zero rate foundational bracket of income and increasing marginal rates 
thereafter.”707 For Kleinbard, the solution to the fiscal problem comes from a mildly 
progressive tax structure primarily focused on funding a government “big enough” 
to create the social insurance programs that will change lives.708 He finds the current 
focus on the progressivity of the income tax is misguided. Rather, the focus should 
be on what the spending side needs to achieve the goals of a good society and 
structuring the tax system as necessary to generate the needed revenues.709 
The attempt to use a “progressive” tax structure to reduce inequality is shown by 
Kleinbard to be a mistake. He proposes that it is the size of the revenue raised, rather 
than its progressivity, that is important because the “progressive” overall fiscal 
system that distributes revenue in a progressive fashion should be the real focus.710 
                                                            
 702  Id. at 326. 
 703  Id. 
 704  Id. at 326-27. 
 705  Id. at 338, 339. 
 706  Id. at 343. The concept of declining utility of income is the basis for asserting the need 
for an “equal sacrifice” in paying taxes by all citizens so that the wealthy must pay a greater 
rate than less well-off people so they feel the same pain. As Kleinbard acknowledges, 
referring to a book by Walter Blum and Harry Kalvern, the criticism of the concept is that: 
[U]tility cannot be measured in cardinal terms, which is just a fancy way of saying 
that no one knows the quantum of utility I derive from my next dollar of income, 
according to some objective scale (like “pounds” or “yards”). As a result, 
interpersonal comparisons are impossible, which means that one cannot answer the 
question, how many dollars must we tax the rich fellow to make him feel the same 
pain that the poor one does when we tax her, say, $100? 
Id. at 343 (citing WALTER BLUM & HARRY KALVERN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION (1953)). He would recast the concept as an aspirational one in which we could say 
that it represents how we would act if we all had good mothers. Id. Although determining the 
optimal degree of rate progressivity is difficult, the concept of the declining utility of income 
is the core theory of the utilitarian social welfare norms. Id. at 352-53. 
 707  Id. at 339. This combination meant that the income tax and progressive rate structure 
were “joined at the hip.” Id.  
 708  Id. at 341. 
 709  Id. at 344. 
 710  Id. at 366. 
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In this regard, he demonstrates that the elderly are the overwhelming winners when 
government spending per household is compared to the taxes paid by those 
households.711 
Kleinbard builds his argument on a foundation of a moral responsibility of every 
individual in society to give back to society in recognition of the fact that no one 
succeeds on his or her own but succeeds from the contribution of society and the 
“luck” of the draw. He asserts: 
[I]f you accept the fundamental premise of this book, that material 
outcomes are determined by an undifferentiated porridge of personal 
efforts and brute luck, by virtue of which we all have a bit less control 
over our material success than we like to pretend, then some tax rate 
progression functions as a broad social insurance program to address the 
brute luck component.712 
Here he argues for big government funded by a “mildly” progressive tax system 
focused on investment and social insurance that will complement the private market 
and make for a much “happier” society as a byproduct.713 To support his moral 
foundation, he builds on an early work by Adam Smith, Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.714 He chooses this book because it creates a perspective with which to 
review Smith’s better known book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations,715 which is cited by conservative writers to support their views of 
limited government and see the road to happiness in reliance on “unalloyed real-
world private market outcomes,” referring to these writers derogatively as “market-
triumphalists.716  
Kleinbard proposes a “Better Base Case” to address the problems he has 
identified. He would expand infrastructure spending to create an infrastructure bank 
and raise the level of social investment and insurance. To provide the revenues for 
his expanded government, he would revert to the pre-2001 tax rate structure with 
four modest changes which include: (1) permanently repealing the individual 
alternative minimum tax; (2) retaining the child tax credit at the 2012 levels, 
including the refundable portion as a “make work pay” incentive; (3) keep the tax 
rate on dividends equal to the capital gain rate (20% pre-2001 rate); and (4) reinstate 
the 2009 estate tax level.717 Revenue of up to $1.5 trillion over ten years lost by the 
tweaks would be made up by converting the personal itemized deductions and the 
                                                            
 711  Id. at 363. 
 712  Id. at 346. 
 713  Id. at 169-70. 
 714  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (A. Millar, 6th ed. 1790) (this book 
was originally published in 1759, seventeen years before Smiths better-known book on the 
Wealth of Nations). 
 715  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(1776).  
 716  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 30 (this term is used throughout the book). 
 717  Id. at 379. His illustrations could leave a 1% to 1.5% of GDP deficit, $235 billion to 
$355 billion in 2021. Id. at 377. 
106https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/5
2016] ONE FUND SOLUTION AND THE PENSION CRISIS 875 
 
standard deduction from deductions to a 15% credit.718 This, he believes, would be 
supported by “widespread bipartisan consensus.”719 He does not suggest curtailing 
tax expenditures for income support such as pensions and 401(k) plans. As 
mentioned earlier, making Social Security solvent over the next seventy years and 
increasing the progressivity of our tax system can be achieved easily by gradually 
phasing out the earning cap on the Social Security tax.720 
Kleinbard describes his Better Base Case as modest and, from the standpoint of 
taxation, simple and straightforward.721 He believes our national wealth is sufficient 
to service the debt and begin paying down the debt. However, his plan sees deficits 
for the next ten years. Kleinbard sees government as being good at infrastructure 
investments and social insurance such that these actions will not only produce 
positive returns but will also produce a well-designed social insurance program that 
will “increase our appetite for economic risk.”722 Notwithstanding Kleinbard’s 
confidence in government, the primary impediments to the future are the trillion 
dollars of waste in the health care program and the trillion dollars of tax expenditures 
put in place by government. 
V. ONE FUND SOLUTION 
The foregoing has demonstrated the inability of governments (whether federal, 
state, or local), unions, and employers to effectively administer retirement plans in a 
political environment where restraint is required. Whether individuals can manage 
the accumulation of retirement wealth is an open question, although Social 
Security’s lack of transparency has created a reliance and expectation with a 
retirement security that is likely to disappoint. 
The One Fund Solution has been described in two previous articles.723 The One 
Fund Solution proposes a government administered private account with 
characteristics similar to what is commonly thought of as a “whole-life” insurance 
policy in which post-tax contributions build up over a lifetime of mandatory 
contributions to be distributed and used tax-free upon retirement. Investment options 
within the plan are limited but gradually expand as balances in the fund grow and a 
secure retirement is established.724 For security, there is a government guaranteed 
                                                            
 718  Id. at 380-83. He proposes curtailing all the personal itemized deductions, including the 
charitable deduction, because he finds it impossible to choose among them. Id. at 382. Scaling 
them back would make the tax system more “progressive, more efficient, less distortive, and 
simpler.” Id. at 383.  
 719  Id. at 381. 
 720  Id. at 384. Kleinbard views Social Security revenues like any other revenues as far as 
deficit reduction is concerned. Id. Removing the wage cap on Social Security would also 
likely create pressure to increase the benefit levels for those impacted by the removal. 
 721  Id. at 401. 
 722  Id. at 404. 
 723  See generally Butler, American Paternalism, supra note 11; Butler, It’s My Money, 
supra note 11. 
 724  Because of the long period from beginning work until retirement, the individual should 
be allowed to invest early in the stock market to get the maximum benefits of compounding. 
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fund with a guaranteed inflation protected return of 3%, which is available for all 
amounts in the fund.725 By making the One Fund Solution the sole tax-advantaged 
retirement account funded with after tax dollars, every participant receives the same 
benefit.  
Mandatory contributions to the One Fund would be set between 15% and 20% of 
taxable payroll, and voluntary contributions would be permitted so long as annual 
contributions do not exceed $50,000. Mandatory contributions are required only 
until the assets in the fund are valued at $1 million or more. Thereafter, voluntary 
contributions can continue until the fund value reaches $2 million, at which time no 
further contributions will be permitted. Tax-free withdrawals are limited to taxable 
gain of $2 million. All other retirement savings would be done on a personal level 
but would not be tax advantaged. Money in the One Fund account would belong to 
the contributor and would be inheritable at death.  
The transition to the new system extends over a ten-year period and begins with a 
determination of the present value of the account held by each individual in the 
present system. Each person is then given the option of continuing in the present 
system or transferring to the new One Fund system with the value of the Social 
Security benefit being the initial deposit in the One Fund account. For a period of ten 
years, all deposits remain in the guaranteed account such that no funds would leave 
the system and move into stock, bond, or other available accounts. The gradual 
elimination of retirement tax expenditures during the ten-year period provides 
additional funds to cushion the transition. Likewise, additional revenues are 
transferred into the system by the increased taxation of the entire contribution, 
although tax rates may be adjusted to allocate the burden of the expansion of the tax 
base. 
Capitalizing Social Security benefits would not be difficult since the value of 
each individual’s contributions and expected benefit is calculated on an ongoing 
annual basis. Capitalizing the liability would not increase the amount of the liability, 
but would merely quantify it and allocate it in a fair and reasonable way, while 
income from the elimination of tax expenditures would increase over time thereby 
enabling the government to address the unfunded liability. The problem of using tax 
revenues to support Social Security payments is already upon us in the form of the 
need to pay interest on the trust fund. Furthermore, these payments are continuing to 
increase into the indefinite future. 
While the One Fund Solution may seem inconsistent with the current retirement 
plans in place, it is intended to be a simple and straightforward approach to 
retirement planning. It replaces the complicated and inadequate Social Security 
system as well as the highly complex system of tax-benefited plans that benefit 
                                                            
By adding a separate savings feature to the One Fund that would serve as an emergency fund 
which could be invested in the stock market so long as the individual was on a path to full 
retirement benefits. 
 725  The United States economy has a history of 3% real growth over an extended period of 
time, which was the justification for the guaranteed return in the GRA and the reason it was 
chosen for the One Fund Solution guaranteed return. GHILARDUCCI, supra note 573, at 15. 
Unfortunately, not since 2004 has the economy experienced 3% growth, a full nine years of 
below par growth. Editorial, Another Growth Dip, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2015, at A12. 
Interestingly, the State of Kentucky has an interesting plan that pays 4% on employee 
contributions. NJ STATUS REPORT, supra note 299, at 21. 
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various interests in different ways. Social Security was never intended to be the sole 
source of retirement funds; but, now that the full force of the mature system is upon 
us, we find that, except for certain categories of beneficiaries, it is not a good return 
on the 12% of a person’s lifetime income used to fund the benefit. 
The current system of federal tax expenditures has created a hodge podge of 
savings vehicles that favor high-income taxpayers, and a fairer and more transparent 
system could be put into place by combining the various systems of federal tax 
supported retirement programs. The time has come to acknowledge that the 
multitude of tax benefited federal, state, local, and private pension system made 
possible by the federal income tax code is, year after year, creating greater unfunded 
liabilities that future generations will be called upon to pay. The concept that such a 
system is contributory and an entitlement is an artificial creation that needs to be 
abandoned. Ultimately the risk will rest on the public, which has no control over the 
means to accept that risk. This artificial concept of an entitlement should be 
abandoned in favor of a system giving individuals control of their own destiny.  
A. Integrating Social Security with the Total Retirement Scheme 
President Roosevelt’s comment that payroll tax contributions were put into the 
system to prevent future politicians from scrapping Social Security discloses the 
nature of the program;726 a welfare program wrapped up in a retirement plan with 
limited insurance benefits added. Social Security advocates tout its benefits and 
necessity as noted in the following statement: 
To this day, public defenses of the program often start with a recitation of 
how many retirees have no other income and would fall into poverty 
without it. The pitch is made even more effective by the fact that much of 
the employer-sponsored pension income never shows up on surveys . . . 
so Social Security seems even more dominant in providing retirement 
income than it actually is. 727 
Social Security was implemented at a time when the Great Depression left 
millions of people who never expected to retire unemployed at an advanced age. 
Such poverty was devastating, but at that time there were few private pension plans 
and private savings were lost in the market crash. Social Security filled the gap, but 
times changed, and, during the 1940s, employers adopted defined benefit plans and 
in the 1970s defined contribution plans were created.728 The retirement world is also 
different because in 1940 single earner couples were the norm but today those able 
to afford single earner couple status are high-income taxpayers.729 These changes 
were not contemplated in the 1930s. 
Social Security wealth and private pension wealth have traditionally been 
considered two separate realms and not integrated on matters of policy. If the 
numbers previously provided as to the investment return on Social Security 
contributions are correct, everyone except the single earner couple should be calling 
for change and a better return on their investment. But high-income taxpayers, or at 
                                                            
 726  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 140. 
 727  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 280. 
 728  Id. 
 729  Id. 
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least those with incomes above the median who do not have their tax liability offset 
by credits, are beneficiaries of the rich tax expenditures available for 401(k) 
contributions and other types of retirement vehicles that make up tax expenditures 
totaling nearly $800 billion from 2014-2018 or $69.4 billion in 2014 alone.730 
Objecting to the poor return on Social Security could raise questions about massive 
subsidies for high-income taxpayers thereby giving them an incentive to accept the 
current system. 
Schieber suggests the loss most earners experience in Social Security would be 
offset by the tax benefits received from 401(k) contributions over a lifetime.731 He 
calculates that for a single male medium earner the net result over a lifetime would 
be a net loss of $17,109, reflecting a loss under Social Security of $80,751 but a gain 
of $63,642 from his 401(k).732 A similar analysis for a single female showed a net 
gain of $14,609; for a single-earner couple a net gain of $264,071; and for a two-
earner couple a net gain of $29,218.733 The gain for the two-earner couple is merely 
twice the gain for a single-female and far less than the gain for a single-earner 
couple. For medium earners, the maximum gain goes to the single-earner household 
because of the spousal benefit under Social Security.734 For maximum earners, only 
the single-earner couple has a net gain from the combined system.735 The “winner” 
of this lottery is the single-earner couple and, to some extent, a two-earner couple 
where the lower earner is less than half the higher earner.736 
This analysis suggests that in some broad context “government” programs for all 
income levels provide a rough equality to all participants. The advantage for single-
earner couples may no longer be justified since the number of female retirees grew 
from 11.6% in 1944, when the benefit was adopted, to 35% in 1960.737 In 2008, 44% 
of women drew benefits based solely on their own earnings, 28% had a benefit based 
partially on their own earnings and supplemented by their husband’s earnings, and 
28% based solely on their husband’s earnings.738  
                                                            
 730  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2014-2018, at 32 (2014) (identifying the five-year tax expenditure totals for items of 
income security). The figures in the text do not include the tax expenditure for the exclusion 
of untaxed Social Security and railroad retirement benefits which total $209.1 billion over five 
years or $37.4 billion in 2014. Id. at 33. For a breakdown of the $800 billion by type of plan 
see infra note 897. 
 731  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 287-88. 
 732  Id. at 287. 
 733  See id. at 288. 
 734  Id. 
 735  Id. at 287-89 tbl.24.5. Table 24.5 provides the analysis for the four household styles and 
for low, medium, high, and maximum earners. Id. For maximum earners, the net loss for the 
single male is $61,858, for the single female $15,060, and for the two-earner couple $30,119. 
Id. The net gain for the one-earner couple is $325,226. Id. 
 736  Id. at 288. 
 737  Id. 
 738  The spousal benefit could change and be made more equitable but there may be other 
anomalies such as differential mortality rates across the demographic profile. Id. at 290. 
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Studies show that any redistribution of income from higher earners to lower earners is 
undermined by “spousal benefits for married couples where one spouse earns 
significantly less than the other.”739 When tax-favored retirement plan participation is 
considered, the redistribution of income is even further undermined. The conclusion is 
that future policy discussions need to be conducted in the context of the complete 
retirement support system and not merely Social Security in isolation.740  
B. The True Cost of Retirement  
A significant problem with the current retirement system, that integrates the three 
legged stool analogy with government control and tax advantages, is that people fail 
to appreciate the true cost of the benefits they expect to receive. The three legs are 
not independent, but instead are all related and ultimately stand or fall directly or 
indirectly on the employee’s compensation package. Employers can allocate so 
much to compensation and that amount is divided between Social Security, 
supplemental retirement, healthcare, and other benefits with the remaining amount 
being take-home pay. When one cost increases, other benefits suffer or take-home 
pay is reduced affecting personal savings. These costs are “hidden” to the employee 
who only sees that his pay is flat and his health care deductibles are increasing.741 
Productivity increases, which should benefit the employee, are being absorbed by 
increases in the cost of payroll taxes, retirement plan funding, and health benefits. A 
study of the 1980 through 2009 period showed that the 1980s increases in total 
compensation were absorbed by payroll tax increases (30%) and by health benefit costs 
(50%) while retirement plan costs were reduced (by 45%) as a result of reduced ERISA 
funding requirements.742 Increases in the 1990s were absorbed by payroll tax increases 
(6%) and health benefit costs (22%), while retirement plan costs were reduced slightly 
(by 8%).743 Increases from 2000 to 2009 were absorbed by payroll tax increases (3.5%), 
                                                            
 739  Id. at 292 (citing Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, How Effective Is 
Redistribution under the Social Security Benefit Formula? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7597, 2000)). The working paper concludes:  
When families are arrayed according to the total lifetime earnings, and spouse and 
survivor benefits are taken into account, the extent of redistribution from families with 
high lifetime earnings to families with low lifetime earning is roughly halved. Much 
of the remaining redistribution is from families where both spouses spend much of 
their potential work lives in the labor market, to families where a spouse, often with 
high earning potential, chooses to spend a significant number of years outside of the 
labor force. . . . 
Id. Schieber also relies on Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Is Social Security Part of the Social Safety 
Net? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15070, 2009) (reaching similar 
conclusions as Gustman and Steinman). 
 740  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 292-93. 
 741  “[T]he American middle class has absorbed a step increase in the cost of health care 
and other necessities as income have stagnated over the past half-decade, a squeeze that has 
forced families to cut back spending on everything from clothing to restaurants.” Ryan 
Knutson & Theo Francis, Basic Costs Squeeze Families: Surging Price Taxes for health Care, 
Other Essentials Leave Less for spending Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2014, at A1.  
 742  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 248 tbl.21.3. 
 743  Id. 
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health benefit costs (28%), and retirement plan costs (28%) that grew dramatically as 
ERISA funding standards were reinstituted to make up of the lack of funding in the 
1980s and 1990s.744 Funding future benefits will exact a toll on productivity for some 
time in the future, although a few years of economic growth with exceptional returns on 
pension funds may alleviate some of the pressure.745 
Another way to look at the problem is through Schieber’s estimates on how these 
hidden costs in compensation have escalated over the past fifty-six years and have 
become an increasing weight on an employee’s take-home pay.746 Schieber analyzes 
the situation of persons retiring at age sixty-five in 1955, 1975, 1995, and 2011 and 
estimates the percentage of lifetime income a person would have allocated to Social 
Security returning approximately 40% to 45% of final pay, to the contribution 
required to produce an annuity for an additional 40% of final pay, and to the cost of 
healthcare.747 His estimates are in the following chart. 
Table 6 
Year reaching age 65 1955 1975 1995 2011 
Lifetime payroll tax as percentage of 
lifetime earnings 
2.1% 5.9% 9.9% 13.1% 
Supplemental retirement benefit 40% of 
final pay 
4.6% 5.9% 6.7% 7.5% 
Total retirement cost per year 6.7% 11.8% 16.6% 20.6% 
Annual health benefits cost748 1.0% 3.5% 8.0% 10.6% 
                                                            
 744  Id. (detailing percentages for three categories of non-cash compensation that absorbed 
workers’ compensation increases over three decades for ten wage groups. The percentages in 
the text are approximations of the percentages in the middle compensation deciles).  
 745 As women entered the workforce in the 1980s, the number of two-earner families 
increased significantly yet families did not feel as though they were getting ahead since “most 
of the rewards for all that extra work were diverted to benefit costs, especially among the 
bottom half of earners.” Id. at 250. During the 1990s, much of the increase was being paid out 
in additional wages, but during the 2000s benefit costs were again absorbing compensation 
increases although not as much was going to the lower income workers and the distribution 
was therefore more equitable. Id. at 250-51. 
 746  Id. at 241 tbl.21.1, 365. Schieber predicts that a worker retiring in 2020 will see an 
increase of 20% over that of the person retiring in 2011. Id. at 334. When the Social Security 
system in 1939 was being amended in a way to carry the program into the future, the issue of 
whether to fund it, or a move toward pay-as-you-go was discussed by the Advisory Council 
on Social Security. Id. When member, Edwin Witte, seeking to put the program on an 
insurance model with funding as desired by President Roosevelt, suggested that to put the 
system on pay-as-you-go would make future taxpayer have greater payroll tax obligations, 
another member, J. Douglas Brown, responded by telling Witte that by then “we will all be 
dead.” Id. at 366 n.5 (citing MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 235 
(1979)). 
 747  Id. at 240. 
 748  Id. at 242. The health care costs are those paid by the employer divided by the total 
payroll without reduction for persons not covered by the health care benefits. Further, the 
health care costs do not include amounts paid by the worker for the insurance or out-of-pocket 
expenses. It has been estimated that a sixty-five-year-old couple retiring in 2013 will, on 
average, spend $220,000 out-of-pocket for medical expenses not including the cost of long-
term care. ALTMAN & KINGSON, supra note 8, at 53. In 2015, Fidelity Investments suggests the 
couple will spend $245,000 over two decades including Medicare premiums and non-covered 
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Year reaching age 65 1955 1975 1995 2011 
Retirement plus health costs 7.7% 15.3% 24.6% 31.2% 
Cumulative Lifetime Employee plus Employer Payroll Taxes as a percentage of 
Cumulative Lifetime Earnings, Supplemental Retirement Savings Rate, Employer 
Average Contributions for Health Benefits, and Totals as a percentage of pay for 
Workers Retiring at Various Dates.749 (All amounts stated as a percentage of salary 
or wages) 
These estimates reflect assumptions regarding age of retirement, life expectancy, 
and quality of healthcare in each of the referenced years and do not represent the 
actual experience of any retiree.750 Nevertheless, the specific observations are 
striking. In 1955, the cost of providing a retirement benefit equal to 80% of final pay 
was roughly 6.7% of lifetime income (2.1% for Social Security and 4.6% for a 
supplemental annuity).751 By 2011, the combined cost grew to 20.6%. Adding in 
health care, the lifetime payroll commitment to retirement and healthcare would 
have been 7.7% in 1955 and 31.2% in 2011.752 
With the way these benefits are structured, their true cost is hidden from the 
employee, allowing most taxpayers to assume they are getting a “good” deal for their 
“contributions” or perhaps that some government subsidy will allow them to collect 
more than they paid for. Some may think, “My 6.2% payroll tax for Social Security 
and 1.45% for Medicare will make my retirement comfortable,” when they should 
actually be thinking, “I am already contributing 31.2% of my compensation, but, is it 
enough? Maybe a higher number is more realistic.”753 One possibility is to make 
employees aware of these hidden costs so they would choose less expensive plans, 
                                                            
portions of Medicare but not including dental and long-term care expenses, leading one 
commentator to suggest that a health savings account is preferable to a 401(k), after funding to 
receive the employer match, or individual retirement account because contributions are 
excluded from Social Security and Medicare taxes and withdrawals for medical expenses are 
free of income tax. Anne Tergesen, HSAs Offer Benefits Beyond 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 
2016, at B7.  
 749  Id. at 241 tbl.21.1. 
 750  For example, the comparison reflects certain assumptions for the supplemental 
retirement; namely, that a return of 7% per annum and a retirement date that has gradually 
become earlier and earlier determined the costs of an annuity to supplement retirement 
income. For this Article’s purposes, the numbers are sufficiently accurate.  
 751  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 240 tbl.21.1. 
 752 That we retire earlier, live longer, and have superior health care in 2011 can explain 
some of the difference but allocating income to these purposes has a dramatic impact on the 
employees’ ability to provide for life’s other needs or desires. Id. Schieber puts it somewhat 
differently, pointing out that, for retirement alone, the average worker would surrender 
roughly 3.5 to 4 more years for their lifetime earnings to finance their retirement benefits than 
the generation retiring in the mid-1950s. Id. Going a step further, he points out that, when 
health care is added into the equation, the difference between 1955’s contribution and 2011’s 
contribution is more than nine years worth of pay out of a forty-year career. Id. 
 753  Schieber suggests that “[i]f we simply sit on our hands until 2030, those workers would 
have to divert roughly 16% of their pay to make up Social Security’s financing shortfall. 
Under recent health cost growth rates, the tab for health benefits could be as much as 17% of 
workers’ pay. Given the need to save for their own retirement, these costs could consume 
more than 40% of workers’ earnings. What are we leaving the next generation.” Id. at 252. 
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thereby allowing for greater take home pay or increased retirement savings. For 
example, limiting the costly exclusion754 for employer provided healthcare would 
make employees aware of the cost of healthcare and broadens the income tax and 
Social Security tax base.755 
C. Market Failure  
The enthusiasm for private accounts dissipated when the stock market 
experienced dramatic declines during the bursting of the “tech-bubble” in 2000, and 
again when the “housing-bubble” collapsed and took the stock market with it in 
2008. People saw their 401(k) balances fall in half and their retirement security 
evaporate.756 Taxpayers close to retirement age decided to stay on the job and forego 
retirement.757 However, since that time, the market has largely recovered, although 
the recovery is attributed to actions of the Federal Reserve Bank’s quantitative 
easing and near zero interest rates.758 But reacting to individual market downturns 
does not form a basis or require staying away from the market and perhaps a better 
understanding of markets would change that attitude.  
The notion that an average earner in 2011 dedicated up to 31% of their lifetime 
earnings to healthcare and retirement together with the low rate of return on Social 
Security should raise serious questions about the system in place. Such knowledge 
should cause people to develop a serious savings habit at a young age. 
Unfortunately, unless someone has a business degree, they are unlikely to 
understand the basics of financial management. Many people are unable to 
understand their own paycheck. The basics of financial management should be 
included in every high school curriculum to create a culture of savers rather than a 
                                                            
 754  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 246-47 (noting the loss of tax revenues in 2014 as $143 
billion from the income tax and another $100 billion from the Social Security tax). 
 755  STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 145; see also KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 246-47 
(pointing out how the exclusion for employer provided health care has distorted the market for 
health care). Kleinbard states: 
The core story line of healthcare policy in the United States over the last fifty years is 
a meditation on how the tax exclusion for employer-provided healthcare has impeded 
sensible policy. Employees have every reason to prefer oversized healthcare plans 
over cash income and employers have every reason to accommodate them. The result 
has been the relative over consumption of healthcare insurance (that is, a relative 
insensitivity to its costs), the proliferation of employer-provided plans, and with the 
latter the collapse of the individual health insurance markets, because most people 
most of the time are covered through their employers. (The technical formulation here 
would be that the subsidy distorts “allocative” decisions—decisions about how and 
when we spend our money.). 
Id. 
 756  The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Worker’s Retirement Security: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Hon. George Miller, 
Chairman). 
 757  Id. 
 758  Quantitative easing in the United States is now over but is just getting started in Europe 
and Japan so that United States investors are anticipating a benefit from investments in those 
countries. 
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culture of spenders. By creating a single account that individuals can see and 
understand, the One Fund Solution seeks to provide that impetus needed to learn the 
basics of investing, which, when coupled with government oversight of the 
investment choices and disclosure, make responsible savers.  
A simple illustration may help understand how basic financial management 
concepts provide protection against stock market failure. A young person starting 
their first job at age twenty will likely have fifty years before needing retirement 
funds. Allowing compounding of interest to work over this period say at a rate of 3% 
per annum would increase a $1,000 to $4,384 by age seventy. Of course the investor 
may reach age seventy during a year in which the stock market crashed as it did in 
1929, 2000, and 2008. The risk of market failure should be minimal since in every 
twenty-year period since 1802 the stock market after-inflation return has been 
between 1% and 12.6%. Considering that our young investor will have lived through 
more than two such twenty-year periods, it is likely that he is still in a position to 
retire.759 If he invests every year he should be in a position to withdraw the increased 
funds every year for the remainder of his life. A further protection our investor 
would have against market failure is that as he begins to see retirement on the 
horizon, he would begin either converting a portion of his portfolio into bonds that 
would form a buffer against any unexpected down turn in the market. 
Respected Professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Jeremy Siegel, suggests that although the future might see lower 
realized returns than in the past, there is “overwhelming reason to believe stocks will 
remain the best investment for all those seeking steady, long-term gains.”760 
Commenting in Professor Siegel’s latest book, Peter Bernstein states: 
“[O]verwhelming reason” is an understatement. The risk premium earned 
by equities over the long run must remain intact if the system is going to 
survive. In the capitalist system, bonds cannot and should not outperform 
equities over the long run. Bonds are contracts enforceable in courts of 
law. Equities promise their owner nothing—stocks are risky investments, 
involving a high degree of faith in the future. Thus, equities are not 
inherently “better” than bonds, but we demand a higher return from 
equities to compensate for their greater risk. If the long-run expected 
return on bonds were to be higher than the long-run expected return on 
stocks, assets would be priced so that risk would earn no reward. That is 
an unsustainable condition. Stocks must remain “the best investment for 
all those seeking steady, long-term gains” or our system will come to an 
end, and with a bang, not a whimper.761 
A common fear is that, as America ages, it will be unable to afford the massive 
retirement of the Baby Boom generation and, accordingly, the retirement age should 
                                                            
 759  JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL 
MARKET RETURNS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 95 fig.6-1 (5th ed. 2014). Over 
thirty years, stocks averaged from a low of 2.6% and a high of 10.6%. The lowest return on 
stocks approximated the return on Social Security. Bond returns over thirty years averaged 
from negative 1.9% to a positive 7.7%. 
 760  Peter Bernstein, Foreword to SIEGEL, supra note 759, at xviii. 
 761  Id. 
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be lifted. Further, how will the aging population sell all their securities if the number 
of young people able to buy those securities is declining? Will the next generation be 
as well off as the present generation? Jeremy Siegel noted that from 1950 to 2010 
life expectancy rose from sixty-nine years to seventy-eight years while the age at 
which men retire from the workforce fell from age sixty-seven to sixty-two and the 
period of retirement grew from 1.6 years to 15.8 years. 762 This trend is not likely to 
continue demographically, and the question of increases in retirement age will 
become paramount as fewer people will be called upon to support a growing retiree 
population. 
Siegel suggests that, if the developed world depended on its own productive 
capacity to produce the goods and services needed by the retiree generation, the 
retirement age needs to increase to age seventy-seven by mid-twenty-first century.763 
However, when growth in the emerging markets is considered, he projects that the 
retirement age need only increase to age sixty-eight, but that depends on the 
continued growth of emerging markets at a rate of 4.5% over the next fifty years, the 
rate obtained since 1990.764 The United States retirement age could continue to fall 
to age fifty-eight if the growth rate meets the 9% that China experienced over the 
past twenty years.765 This reflects the scenario that emerging markets provide goods 
needed by the aging developed world that are paid for with the funds from the 
purchase of shares by the savers in the emerging markets.766 Siegel projects that by 
2060 the developed world’s percentage of the economy will drop from its current 
50% to 25% and to 14% by the end of the century.767 
This simple view of the future should make every twenty-year-old consider the 
wisdom of devoting 12% of their lifetime income to a system whose return was 
based on United States government bonds. Citizens need to be educated on the 
accumulation of wealth and the One Fund Solution would provide them with an 
incentive to do so. Those unwilling or unable to understand such information would 
be protected by the paternalism of the federal government that would guarantee a 
real rate of return of 3% protected from taxes, inflation, and actions of the federal 
government. 
The impact of inflation is a difficult concept to understand when considering 
long-term investing. Government policy is that a certain amount of inflation is 
                                                            
 762  SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 60. 
 763  Id. at 62, 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario A). 
 764  Id. at 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario B), 64-66. 
 765  Id. at 63 fig.4.2 (Scenario C), 67. 
 766  Id. at 63 fig.4.2. Siegel addresses the question whether people in the emerging markets 
are likely to purchase assets of Western firms and notes that the firms are becoming global 
and not dependent on the country of origin. Id. at 68. Responding to recent unrest in the 
Chinese market, Siegel’s research continues to confirm that emerging markets will provide the 
needed savings to absorb retirees’ asset sales. Jeremy J. Siegel, China Worries Are 
Overblown, KIPLINGERS PERS. FIN. 48 (Dec., 2015), 
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/T019-C019-S002-china-worries-are-
overblown.html. 
 767  SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 65 fig.4-3. 
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necessary for a growing economy.768 Today, interest rates are so low that the return 
on government bonds or certificates of deposit is virtually zero.769 Although inflation 
is also low, any return on such bonds is taxed, leaving an after tax return that is 
somewhat less than the inflation so that the investor would be losing money by 
investing.770 Remarkably, rates in Europe have been pushed into the negative 
territory, a concept few investors can comprehend.771 The One-Fund Solution’s 
guaranteed 3% real rate of return protects those taxpayers who are unable to grasp 
                                                            
 768  Deflation is a threat to the economy even to the point that negative interest rates may be 
needed just to avoid falling into the grips of deflation. A recent article in The Economist points 
out that: 
On March 25th Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank, suggested that the ECB 
might need to be more forceful in order to keep the euro-area economy out of the grips 
of deflation. Look again, however, and the path forward appears similar across the 
rich world. The outlook is clearest in Europe, where the ECB may toy with negative 
rates as a means to fend off deflation. But even in America and Britain ‘normal’ rates 
are a distant prospect. 
Inflation and Interest Rates: Up, up, and away: Higher inflation may be needed to leave extra-
low interest rates behind, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 75. Moving on to 2015, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) has announced its bond-buying program, but skeptics wonder if the ECB 
will be able to find enough bonds to purchase to carry out its objective, which is to achieve 
2% inflation target. Christopher Whitall, ECB’s Test Is to Find Enough Bonds, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 26, 2015, at C1. Takashi Nakamichi & Megumi Fujikawa, Japan Adopts Negative Rates, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2016, at A1 (reporting the Bank of Japan (BOJ) is instituting negative 
interest rates in a “desperate” attempt to avoid sliding back into stagnation that has plagued 
Japan for two decades). In this effort, the BOJ is following the lead of the ECB and various 
national central banks in instituting negative rates. Quantitative easing seems to have lost its 
effectiveness leading one editorial writer to conclude: “The failure of unconventional 
monetary policy in Japan and Europe is proof that central banks can’t conjure growth in 
economies that need major reforms to let resources find more effective uses.” Editorial, Japan 
Goes Negative, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2016, at A10. It has also been pointed out that the main 
effect of quantitative easing has been a run-up in prices of investment assets and that the 
ending of quantitative easing in late 2014 presented a good time for Congress to raise taxes on 
capital and puncture the asset price bubble. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: 
International changes the United States shouldn’t Have Made, 145 TAX NOTES 739 (2014). 
However, this is unlikely because of the dependence on the political class of money from 
corporate sources.  
 769  Central banks worldwide have been frustrated in their attempts to reach the targeted 
2%. The fall of oil prices and other commodities in 2015 may be temporarily suppressing core 
inflation at a stable 1.3% (which excludes food and energy prices) as well as the price index 
for personal-consumption on which the Federal Reserve bases its 2% target is currently at 
0.4%. Global inflation: Low for longer, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2016, at 53. 
 770  Emese Bartha & Ben Edwards, Germany Sells Five-Year Debt at Negative Yield for 
First Time on Record, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, at C2. 
 771  German bond yields fell to a negative 0.08% in anticipation of the European Central 
Bank’s sovereign-bond-buying program, which investors believe will push bond prices higher. 
In any event, negative yields mean the investor is paying the German government for holding 
its debt. Id. 
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inflation’s impact on their investments. Investing in a diversified portfolio of stocks 
is also a long-term inflation hedge.772 
There will be limited investment choices for funds and those choices will be 
monitored by the federal government to determine they are following sound business 
practices including accurate disclosure. Recently, index funds tend to outperform 
actively managed funds on a regular basis and may be a possible avenue for the One 
Fund investments.773 Low-cost index funds have put a considerable squeeze on fund 
managers, seeking to outperform the market as market analysis becomes ever more 
efficient making the market more efficient and harder to beat.774 Once a participant’s 
assets reach predetermined levels, the One Fund Solution would permit greater fund 
choice. Such flexibility is important since: 
[H]ow your money is invested is far more important than the amount you 
save (actually somewhere between 6 and 100 times more important). And, 
in addition, it only gets more important in the later periods once the 
retirement pool is accumulated. Thus, pensions must rely heavily on their 
investment schemes to succeed in providing retirement income 
security.775 
                                                            
 772  SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 221 (“In contrast to the returns on fixed income assets, the 
historical evidence is overwhelming that the returns on stocks over long time periods have 
kept pace with inflation. Since stocks are claims on the earnings of real assets—assets whose 
value is intrinsically related to the price of the goods and services they produce—one should 
expect that their long-term returns will not be harmed by inflation.”).  
 773  Cheap is cheerful, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, at 10 (discussing Fund management: Will 
invest for food, ECONOMIST, May 3, 2014, at 19). Individual hedge funds have not done well, 
so investor management firms now seek to allocate investors’ money among hedge funds but 
the management fee is “1 and 10” (1% on the assets managed plus 10% on the profits) on top 
of the hedge fund management fee of “2 and 20.” Funds of funds: Not yet dead, ECONOMIST, 
June 7, 2014, at 80. 
 774  Jason Zweig, The Decline and Fall of Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23-24, 2014, 
at B9. Competition continues to force mutual fund fees toward zero. Jason Zweig & Sarah 
Krouse, Mutual-Fund and ETF’s Tumble Toward Zero, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2016, at A1. 
 775  MARIN, supra note 2, at 63 (“What differentiates pension fund management is the long-
term nature of the retirement cycle and thus the impact . . . that the investment return has on 
the amount of money available to satisfy retirement income security.” Id. at 64. Although 
investment constraints often give rise to hedge fund manipulation, these options would likely 
not be available for One Fund accounts. Id. at 75. Marin notes: 
For alpha to exist, there must be mispricings or anomalies to exploit, inefficiencies or 
arbitrages to be exact. The secret to hedge funds being able to avail themselves of 
these anomalies lies in the highly constrained nature of most institutional investing. 
That same ERISA that protects pension funds from bad thing happening to them also 
serves to dramatically constrain them. Hedge funds do not, for the most part, live in 
these constraints . . . There are fewer risk controls, no restriction on using derivatives 
and other sophisticated structures, no foreign content or the use of foreign exchange 
contracts, generally no limits on leverage except what is stated in their own 
prospectuses, no limitation shorting or the borrowing and lending of securities to 
accommodate that activity, and historically much less regulatory constraint. 
Id. 
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D. Annuities  
Upon reaching retirement age, the One Fund participant will need to determine 
whether to keep and manage their own retirement fund or accept a lifetime annuity 
structured to meet the participant’s anticipated needs. Richard Marin offers an 
example of such a decision coming from General Motors’ transfer of pension 
liabilities to Prudential Insurance Company.776 The participant, a sixty-three-year-old 
man with a twenty-year life expectancy is given the option of taking a lump sum of 
$818,000 or an annuity of $4,854 per month for life.777 In its simplest terms, the man 
could put the lump sum in a mattress and remove $3,408 each month ($818,000/240) 
for 240 months or put $4,854 in the mattress for 240 months and accumulate 
$1,164,960 at age 83. On the other hand, if he invests the lump sum at 5% return per 
annum he could withdraw $4,854 per month for 240 months and have $214,575 left 
in his account at age 83. At 6%, he would have a final account balance of $451,529. 
Finally, if he received a 3% return, he would run out of money after 218 months; 
and, with a return of 2.5%, he would run out of money in 207 months.778 If he takes 
the annuity and dies before reaching eighty-three, he leaves nothing to his survivors; 
but, if he lives to age 100, his payments continue. 
Although retirees in defined contribution plans choosing to annuitize their 
savings are more sanguine about retirement than those who do not, the 
overwhelming majority of private retirement assets are not being annuitized.779 To 
                                                            
  Marin further states: 
Alpha is actually the risk-adjusted measure of excess return. That relates to beta in 
that it implies the value of the selection of a specific security versus the market return. 
That is what we define as excess return. Naturally since no return is generally had 
without risk, the issue of interest is the amount of excess return only after you have 
adjusted for the added risk you are taking. If the investing world was truly “perfect” . . 
. there would be no alpha because the amount of excess return available from any 
security would be offset by the risk being taken to achieve it. 
Id. at 65. 
 776  Id. at 158. 
 777  Id. 
 778  Id. (calculating the actual annuity a person would receive is a complicated matter based 
on mortality tables and bond rates not discussed here). 
 779  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 355. Between 1990 and 2004, 60% of retirees with a defined 
benefit plans took their benefit in the form of an annuity while only 5% of those retirees with 
a defined contribution plan did so. Id. at 263. Economists are confounded by people’s 
avoidance of annuities when on a simple expected return analysis they would be better off 
with an annuity. Several reasons are offered, including the observation that often people in ill 
health do not expect to live long and the opposite for those in good health, the desire to have 
some money remaining to give their heirs, and the perceived excessive fees associated with 
annuities. Id. at 266-67. Some variations of the survey suggested that, if the annuity were 
presented in the context of consumption rather than as an investment, the annuity option was 
selected. Id. One study supported the conclusion that, at every income level, having an annuity 
made retirees report greater satisfaction in retirement than those who did not have them. Id. at 
355, 355 n.14. (citing Constantijn W. A. Panis, Annuities and Retirement Satisfaction (Rand 
Labor & Population Program, Working Paper 03-17, 2003), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU3021.pdf. 
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be sure, there are numerous uncertainties including the longevity risk and the risk 
that the annuity provider becomes insolvent. The impact of interest rates on the 
amount necessary to provide an annuity can be significant, especially over the past 
six years in which the Federal Reserve has kept interest rates low. For example, the 
amount needed to fund an annual annuity of $1,000 at age sixty-five when interest 
rates are 8.5% is $8,900 but is $10,670 when interest rates are 6% and $12,580 when 
interest rates are 4%.780 
Providing annuity default protection might overcome this reluctance to annuitize 
retirement savings.781 Purchasing annuities by installment over the ten years prior to 
retirement rather than purchasing the annuity at age sixty-five in a lump sum may 
help also. Installment purchases smooth out two prime variables in the determination 
of annuity values—total savings accumulated at the time the annuity is purchased 
and the interest rate on the date of purchase. Purchasing annuities through a group 
market could reduce fees.782 Inconsistent government regulations discourage 
employers from changing automatic default settings because they have fiduciary 
obligations to employees. An independent clearinghouse accepting lump sums from 
retirees over the installment period and spreading the risk among insurance 
companies might help.783 
Concern about the financial literacy and sophistication among self-managing 
retirees will be increased with the One Fund solution, since, presumably, many will 
decide to self-manage their funds. A 2008 study testing the ability of participants 
fifty-five years and older to make investment decisions showed the majority of 
retirees did not know what a bond was and only about one-third understood risk 
diversification.784 Men generally have had more knowledge about investing than 
women, and men were more likely to take risks and diversify their investments.785 
Age related dementia showed that retirees’ ability to manage their own affairs 
diminished over time, but the real challenge is to plan for and cover both anticipated 
and unanticipated expenses over an undeterminable period of time.786 
                                                            
 780  Id. at 183. In 1991, corporate pensions were using 8.49% to calculate funding 
requirements, but by 2009 it was 5.97% causing a 20% increase in funding requirements if 
everything else remained the same. Id. But it did not, and by 2009 Baby Boomers were ready 
to retire, the stock market was no longer exuberant, and the pension bill was coming due. Id. 
Further the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) was experiencing greater claims from 
underfunded plans from bankrupt employers. Id. Much of the PBGC problem arises from 
charging the same rate for all plans regardless of risk. Id. This is a continual problem with 
government insurance. 
 781  Id. at 356. 
 782  Id. at 357-60 (describing the simulation to compare the installment method of 
purchasing the annuity with the spot market purchase for retirees reaching age sixty-five for 
each year from 1915 to 2010). 
 783  Id. 
 784  Id. 
 785  Georgette Jasen, Male Investors vs. Female Investors: Studies show men and women 
could learn from the other’s approach, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2015. 
 786  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 263-66. 
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One study posited a worker, who saved 6% of their income from age twenty-five 
to sixty-five, retired and purchased a lifetime annuity with their savings paying a 
15% purchase and longevity fee at the time.787 Depending on which calendar year 
the worker turned age sixty-five and retired, the replacement percent of pre-
retirement income covered by the annuity varied from 15% to 43% with an average 
replacement rate of 28.4%.788 The replacement rate has generally been above the 
average since 1965.789 The assumption here is that the worker saved religiously, 
worked forty years with no periods of unemployment, took no distributions, and had 
constant plan coverage.790  
It is possible to purchase annuities with contractual automatic increases in 
amounts up to 7% with 3% being the most popular. Contractual cost of living 
increases are also available, although such increases depend on a formula, which is 
not easily understood.791 Such features are protection against the possibility of 
inflation. Some people think the “best inflation adjusted annuity on the planet is 
Social Security.”792 A final warning on annuities: 
Annuities can help when planning for future inflation but it’s important to 
understand that you need to have realistic expectations levels and not fall 
for the current over-hyped annuity income sales message that’s flooding 
the airwaves. It’s always a mathematical trade off when adding any type 
of income increase to an annuity.793 
                                                            
 787  Id. 
 788  Id. at 266. 
 789  Id. at 265-67. 
 790  Id. at 270-71. The return is comparable to that under Social Security, but the initial 
annuity payment would be lower if the worker wanted inflation protection, spousal protection 
with a joint and survivor format, or wanted an amount for his or her heirs. Id. at 271. 
 791  Be warned to “just make sure to run the real contractual numbers so you can properly 
drink the annuity COLA, and not swallow annuity Kool-aid.” Stan Haithcock, Should you 
drink the annuity COLA?, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-you-drink-the-annuity-cola-2014-09-30.  
 792  Id. 
 793  Id. 
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E. Put No Confidence In princes . . . or Their Economists794  
For 2015, the federal government expects to have an expenditure of $3.750 
trillion through direct spending and another trillion dollars through tax expenditures 
leaving a deficit of $469 billion for the year.795 From 2015 to 2019, it expects a 
deficit of $2.777 trillion and from 2015 to 2024; the deficit is expected to be $7.196 
trillion.796 Direct expenditures and tax expenditures will impact and virtually control 
the individual’s housing, medical care, education, and retirement. Not only is 
spending controlled but the financial system is controlled, through the Federal 
Reserve System, which over the past eight years has kept short term interest rates 
near zero and, through a process known as “quantitative easing,” flooded the market 
with funds maintaining the liquidity of the financial system.797  
Elected officials at the national level have been able to avoid responsibility for 
the sluggish economy by relying on the Federal Reserve System to address the 
financial crisis.798 The action of the Federal Reserve System has, in large measure, 
given record profits to the owners of equities in the stock markets but a meager 
return on the savings of millions of retirees who were depending on their modest 
nest egg to supplement their Social Security payments. As inflation is kept low, the 
COLA on those Social Security Payments has been minimal, although that benefit 
cuts both ways depending on the items affected by the increases in price. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 is credited with undermining support for 
private accounts as a part of Social Security, since it convinced many people that 
they could not rely on the equity markets to produce an adequate return. It is 
inaccurate to think that the crisis simply resulted from overleveraging that took place 
prior to the financial crisis. The action of the government in encouraging expanded 
homeownership and the failure of oversight played a part as did failures of rating 
                                                            
 794  In Trillion Dollar Economists, Robert E. Litan extols the virtues of economists and 
suggests they got a bad rap for not accurately predicting the 2008 crash. One reviewer 
suggests that Mr. Litan paid little attention to guilds although the economics profession 
exhibits the classic characteristics of a guild which: “[I]nsists on adherence to a particular 
methodology and set of beliefs—in this case, the standard understanding of macroeconomics, 
with its emphasis on Keynesian categories and government-fueled aggregated. The guild 
operates with an unofficial but real license from the banks and the federal governments.” 
Amity Shlaes, The Wonks Can’t Save Us, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2014, at A17. Further, macro-
economists eschew the Austrian School, which focuses on the individuals, and Public Choice 
Theory, which “predicts that governments will take advantage of market crises to expand in 
nonmarket sectors.” Id. Ironically there were no Public Choice Theorists in the White House 
or powerful institutions to warn that there might be a housing bubble if government expanded 
its presence in the housing sector. Id. Economists who can demonstrate the inefficiency of 
guilds fail to focus their attention on their own guild of economists. Id. 
 795  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 
2015 TO 2025, at 2 (2015). 
 796  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 
2014 TO 2024, at 2 (2014).  
 797  Id. 
 798  Willis L. Krumholz, Blame The Next Economic Crisis On The Fed, FEDERALIST (Dec. 
15, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/12/15/blame-the-next-economic-crisis-on-the-fed/. 
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agencies in rating mortgage backed securities.799 But Jeremy Siegel concluded: “[I]t 
was the management of many of these financial firms who should be held most 
accountable. They were unable to grasp the threats that would befall their firms once 
the housing boom ended, and they abdicated responsibility for assessing risks to 
technicians running faulty statistical programs.”800 
But this conclusion should not negate the part played by the federal government 
and the Federal Reserve System. Indeed, other observers reject the assertion that 
financial firms were the primary cause and place that mantle on federal housing 
policies.801 Prior to the crisis, it was believed that the Federal Reserve could bring 
about a “soft” landing from the excessively low interest rates and a return to normal. 
Siegel’s analysis is mixed: 
The financial crisis also punctured the myth that grew during Greenspan’s 
tenure as Fed chairman that the Federal Reserve could fine tune the 
economy and eliminate the business cycle. Nevertheless, despite having 
failed to see the crisis brewing, the Federal Reserve acted quickly to 
assure liquidity and prevented the recession from becoming far more 
severe than it turned out to be. 802 
Whatever responsibility the federal government may have for the Great 
Recession, the One Fund Solution should have the effect of pressing the government 
toward financial stability by insisting on a fair rate of return on the government’s 
borrowing from its citizens. It will also create an incentive to keep inflation under 
control and, in the long run, reduce federal borrowing. In the developed world, 2% is 
                                                            
 799  See id. 
 800  SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 36. 
 801  Id.; see also Peter J. Wallison, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE 
WORLD’S WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2015). Wallison 
points out that:  
[T]here is compelling evidence that the financial crisis was caused by the 
government’s own housing policies. These policies . . . were based on an idea—still 
popular on the left—that underwriting standards in housing finance are excessively 
conservative, discriminatory, and unnecessary . . . Indeed, if we look back over the 
last hundred years, it is difficult to see instability in the financial system that was not 
caused by government’s own policies. 
Id. at 4. 
 802  SIEGEL, supra note 759, at 36. Siegel also states: 
The Federal Reserve was able to avoid deflation by stabilizing the money supply. In 
the Great Depression, the money supply . . . fell by 29%. . . . In contrast, the money 
supply actually rose during the 2008 financial crisis as the Federal Reserve increased 
the total reserves by over $1 trillion. This action provided sufficient reserves so that 
banks were not forced to call in loans as they were forced to in the 1930s. Although 
one can certainly question whether the later injections of reserves (called quantitative 
easing) aided the economy, there was little doubt that the initial provisions of liquidity 
were critical to stabilizing the financial markets and preventing the downturn from 
becoming substantially worse. 
Id. at 41. 
123Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
892 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:769 
 
the magic number for inflation.803 Anything less seems to be a problem for the 
developed economies. Inflation provides an incentive to invest money and to 
purchase goods today because prices will be higher tomorrow. It also supports rising 
wages in which employers can reward productive employees and borrowers can 
expect to lessen their debt load over time. Falling prices are seen as creating the 
opposite effect, slowing down an economy.804 But government induced inflation 
works against those on fixed incomes who see the purchasing power of their 
pensions and savings consumed by higher prices. The One Fund Solution offsets this 
government-induced effect. 
F. Markets Not as Free as People Think 
Accepting investment responsibility should reflect an appreciation of market 
principles, but over the last couple of decades investment return has been determined 
(or rather guaranteed) more by Federal Reserve policy than overall market 
conditions. This has been the case since the United States’ intervention in the 
Mexican Peso Crisis, the Long Term Capital Management Liquidation by the 
Federal Reserve in 1998, the bursting of the Dot-Com Bubble in 2000, and the Great 
Recession in 2007-2008, which saw the market plummet precipitously.805 In each 
case, the Federal Reserve intervened by supporting loans, dramatically reducing 
interest rates, or instituting bond purchases (called “quantitative easing”) thereby 
providing liquidity in the economy but also stimulating increases in stock prices.806  
Stock market commentary over the past few years has been dominated by 
speculation on when Federal Reserve policy would reduce bond purchases or return 
interest rates to more normal rates.807 The slightest murmur from the Chair of the 
Federal Reserve regarding future action causes dramatic instantaneous upward or 
downward swings in market prices, making market participants enormous returns.808 
                                                            
 803  Binyamin Appelbaum, 2% Inflation Rate Target Is Questioned as Fed Policy Panel 
Prepares to Meet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/business/economy/2-inflation-rate-target-is-questioned-
as-fed-policy-panel-prepares-to-meet.html?_r=0. 
 804  Deflation: The high cost of falling prices, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2015, at 69 (suggesting 
that most shoppers can ignore the slow ascent of prices).  
 805  The crisis followed the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the Russian Financial Crisis 
of 1998. An earlier crisis caused by the devaluation of the Mexican Peso in 1994 and 1995 
required intervention by the United States through loans recommended by the Federal 
Reserve. JOSEPH A. WHITT, JR., THE MEXICAN PESO CRISIS, ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
ATLANTA FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 16-17 (1996). The loans totaling $12.5 billion were issued 
through the Exchange Stabilization Fund controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. This 
fund is normally used for short-term foreign exchange intervention, not for medium-term 
loans such as those to Mexico, but was used by President Clinton since Congress was 
reluctant to act because of the moral hazard of bailing out creditors of foreign governments. 
Id. 
 806  Id. 
 807  See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Likely to Remove ‘Patient’ Barrier for Rate Increase as 
Soon as June, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2015, at A1. 
 808  Id. (noting that interest rates have been near zero since 2008 and that raising them 
requires the Federal Reserve Chair to be confident that inflation would move toward the 2% 
target). Volatility is expected in the market as investors speculate on the action of the Federal 
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At the same time, stock values soar from zero interest rates, retired persons, seeking 
modest returns from secure bonds and Treasury notes, have been devastated; the 
little interest they receive is subject to income tax and their initial investment has 
been subject to lost value due to inflation.809 Even Charles Schwab was forced to 
comment, “[b]ut is it fair that seniors subsidized cheaper credit for others?”810 Until 
the Federal Reserve’s inflation target of 2% is met, the Federal Reserve will likely 
keep the rates near zero.811 While seniors benefit from low inflation, they receive 
little or nothing from their “safe” investments as their Social Security payments 
remain stagnant and costs unique to seniors such as drugs and medical care 
increase.812 Government, not the market, has been determining winners and losers. 
A similar problem occurs because people have a strong incentive to save a large 
percent of their income for retirement while the economy depends on high levels of 
consumer spending to generate growth in the economy. The government therefore 
often finds it necessary to provide incentives for consumers to increase spending by 
lowering the Social Security or other taxes.813 Those efforts can be impeded if 
people use the extra income to pay off credit card or other debt; although, if they 
save for retirement then those savings will result in investments in the economy.814 
Here, the One Fund Solution allows individuals an avenue to invest in the economy 
directly. 
When the Bush tax cuts were extended in 2011 and 2012, the government sought 
to stimulate consumer spending with a 2% reduction in the payroll tax.815 The lost 
Social Security revenue was nevertheless reflected by an accounting increase in the 
amount owed to the trust fund.816 While the use of dedicated tax revenues was 
                                                            
Reserve. Id. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 0.25% in December 2015, but the 
market response caused the Federal Reserve to question whether to continue the anticipated 
increases in 2016. See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
 809  See Hilsenrath, supra note 807. 
 810  Charles Schwab, Raise Interest Rates, Make grandma Smile, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 
2014; see also Robert F. Stauffer, Letter to the Editor, The High Costs of the Fed’s War on 
Seniors and Savers: Is it fair that seniors subsidize cheaper credit for others? Not only is it 
unfair but it has been an ineffective policy in stimulating the economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 
2014, at A16; Paul Schoenbaum, Letter to the Editor, The High Costs of the Fed’s War on 
Seniors and Savers: Is it fair that seniors subsidize cheaper credit for others? Not only is it 
unfair but it has been an ineffective policy in stimulating the economy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 
2014, at A16. 
 811  Eric Morath, Inflation Well short of Fed’s 2% Target, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2015, at A2. 
The annual rate of inflation in November 2015 was 0.5%, well short of the target 2% but if 
energy and food are excluded from the calculation the rate was close to 2%. Greg Ip, Fear of 
Low inflation Getting Out of Hand, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2015, at A6. 
 812  Id. 
 813  Id. 
 814  Another Growth Dip, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2015, at A12; see also Consumers Lead 
Economy As Factories Falter, INV. BUS. DAILY, Mar. 2, 2015, at A1. 
 815  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: FIVE YEARS LATER, FINAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, 29 (2014) 
 816  See generally David Pattinson, 75 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1 (2015). 
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originally intended to remove Social Security from the scope of political oversight, 
failing to collect the tax can give people the impression that Social Security is little 
more than a welfare program. This impression was enhanced in 1976 when the 
earned income tax credit was introduced and the government began refunding many 
low-income people amounts exceeding their Social Security contributions.817 The 
earned income tax credit and, later, the refundable child tax credit have insured that 
low-income taxpayers bear none of the burden of the Social Security tax or the 
federal income tax for that matter.818 These policies are merely a “payroll tax rebate 
program operated through the income tax. Its operation obscures its effect.”819 
Having a high percentage of citizens contributing little or nothing to the federal 
government raises a serious question of tax policy. It is estimated 45.3% of 
households pay no federal income tax.820 Although, one 2016 presidential candidate 
suggested that, in a democracy, everyone should make some contribution to the 
common good while most others candidates propose tax plans that would 
significantly increase percentage of households not paying any federal income tax.821 
In February 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), a $787 billion stimulus package aimed at 
reinvigorating the nation's economy (the “Federal Stimulus Package”) for purposes 
of, inter alia, job creation822 and to “help states avoid slashing funding for education 
and other programs.”823 Upon signing the Bill, which was thought to be the greatest 
stimulus program in United States history,824 President Obama promised the money 
would “help those who were hardest hit by our economic crisis.”825 Years later, 
                                                            
 817  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 331. 
 818  Id. 
 819  Id. Other tax programs operate to offset the payroll tax such as the 6.2% Making Work 
Pay tax credit in 2009 and 2010. Id. President Obama in 2011 proposed further payroll tax 
deductions as a method of stimulating the economy in amounts far exceeding President Bush’s 
2004 proposal to fund private accounts. Id. President Bush was loudly condemned for creating 
a funding “hole” in the Social Security trust fund but Obama’s proposal was merely an 
extension of the 2010 agreement. Id. at 331. 
 820  Id. 
 821  Doug Bandow, Everyone Needs To Pay Taxes To Limit Gov’t, INV. BUS. DAILY, Dec. 
17, 2015 (describing a proposal by former presidential candidate, Governor Bobby Jindal, to 
impose a 2% rate with few or no deductions so that everyone would have “skin in the game” 
and an incentive to resist wasteful programs). 
 822  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(a)(1), 
123 Stat. 115, 116 (2009) (establishing the purpose for the stimulus funding). 
 823  Meghan Ashford-Grooms, President Obama says Gov. Perry used stimulus fund to 
help balance budget, then started ‘blaming’ federal lawmakers who voted for legislation, 
POLITIFACT TEX. (Apr. 24, 2011), 
http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2011/apr/24/barack-obama/president-obama-says-
gov-perry-used-stimulus-fund-/. 
 824  Yuval Rosenberg, Obama’s Stimulus Plan: What Worked, What Didn’t, FIS. TIMES 
(Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/02/21/Obamas-Stimulus-Plan-
What-Worked-What-Didn’t. 
 825  Ron Hart, Where did the stimulus money go?, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/stimulus-501352-money-obama.html.  
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however, critics disagree over the success of the stimulus plan.826 Of the billions of 
dollars allocated, “[a]bout $500 billion went to tax cuts, unemployment benefits, and 
“state fiscal relief” (shoring up insolvent state budgets)”827 with $105.7 billion given 
to the states for Medicaid and Medicare.828 States used their allocation for several 
purposes.829 Texas used it to reduce their budget deficit and put the majority of its 
funds towards Medicaid and education; while California, which accounted for about 
$31 billion of this initiative, spread the money over several programs, including 
education, health, labor and workforce development, social services, transportation, 
housing programs, resources and environmental protection, criminal justice, and 
other programs.830 Much of the money went to maintain jobs rather than create new 
ones.831 
Reliance on the government is preferable to reliance on the market. However, 
Congress adds new programs without paying for them, except to the extent that the 
new program eliminates waste in existing programs, giving the impression that the 
new program will not be expensive. With the adoption of the Affordable Care Act, 
the elimination of waste would be available to help pay for the expanded 
coverage.832 Later, when Congress imposed an across the board sequester of funds 
for federal programs, there was no talk about eliminating waste, but only talk of the 
dire consequences of cutting vital federal programs. No one seemed able to find any 
waste to eliminate: 
Economists are quick to speak of “market failure,” and rightly so, but a 
greater threat comes from “government failure.” Because it is a 
monopoly, government brings inefficiency and stagnation to most things 
it runs; government agencies pursue the inflation of their budgets rather 
                                                            
 826  Id. (discussing the disparity between President Obama’s promise and the allocation of 
stimulus money per capita); Tom Howell Jr., Obama’s stimulus package, 5 years later: Dems 
defend, Republicans ridicule, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/17/obama-stimulus-package-dem-defends-
gop-mocks/?page=all (providing political insight into the rate of unemployment five years 
after the stimulus). 
 827  Philip K. Howard, Howard’s Daily: Finding Infrastructure in the Stimulus Plan, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-k-howard/howards-
daily-finding-inf_b_4808898.html. 
 828  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www.ed.gov/open/plan/recovery-gov (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
 829  See Stimulus Spending by States, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-STIMULUS0903.html (illustrating 
each state’s allocation of the stimulus money it received); Jennifer LaFleur et al., How Much 
Stimulus Funding is Going to Your County, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2012), 
https://projects.propublica.org/recovery/; State oversight of Federal Stimulus Funds, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-economic-
stimulus-package-oversight-plans.aspx (last updated Aug. 4, 2009) (providing individual 
websites for each state to track their use of stimulus money). 
 830  Update from Washington, D.C., CAL. ST. ASS’N COUNTIES (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.counties.org/csac-bulletin-article/update-washington-dc-07082011. 
 831  See Hart, supra note 825. 
 832  MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST 182 (2011). 
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than the service of their customers; pressure groups form an unholy 
alliance with agencies to extract more money from taxpayers for their 
members. Yet despite all this, most clever people still call for government 
to run more things and assume that if it did so, it would somehow be more 
perfect, more selfless, next time.833 
The tremendous waste occurring in the United States health care system is a clear 
example of how inadequate oversight is costing taxpayers billions of dollars each 
year. It is reported: 
Health care is a tempting target for thieves. Medicaid doles out $415 
billion a year, Medicare (a federal scheme for the elderly) nearly $600 
billion. Total health spending in America is a massive $2.7 trillion, or 
17% of GDP. No one knows for sure how much of that is embezzled, but 
in 2012 Donald Berwick, a former head of the Centres for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), and Andrew Hackbarth of the Rand 
Corporation, estimated that fraud (and the extra rules and inspections 
required to fight it) added as much as $98 billion, or roughly 10%, to 
annual Medicare and Medicaid spending–and up to $22 billion across the 
entire health system.834 
G. The Great Recession and Lost Wealth 
Government works against itself when it lowers interest rates. Low interest rates 
hurt retirees and makes states use a lower discount rate in valuing their unfunded 
pension obligations. The low rates also push people into the stock market to get any 
decent return on their savings. 
The 2007 Great Recession is just now becoming part of the economic history of 
the twenty-first century as employment in the United States is reaching pre-recession 
levels and GDP in Europe, generally, is reaching the pre-recession levels.835 But 
reaching pre-recession levels seven years after the beginning of the recession is 
overlooking the lost GDP and productivity projected prior to the recession. 
Evaluating economic potential based on pre-recession conditions, as of last year, the 
United States was 4.7% below potential and Britain was 11% below. Other European 
Union countries fared even worse with Greece, the worst of the countries in the 
developed world, with 30% below. By 2015, the weighted average loss among rich 
countries as a whole was projected to reach 8.4%–as if the entire German economy 
had evaporated.836 
                                                            
 833  Id. 
 834  Health-care fraud: The $272 billion swindle, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 26; see also 
Health Care Fraud in America, That’s where the money is, How to hand over $272 billion a 
year to criminals, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 13. 
 835  The US Economy to 2024, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Dec. 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/the-us-economy-to-2024.pdf. 
 836  Wasted potential: Counting the long-term costs of the financial crisis, ECONOMIST, June 
14, 2014, at 71 (citing Laurence M. Ball, Long-term Damage from the Great Recession in 
OECD Countries (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 20185, 2014); Robert. E. 
Hall, Quantifying the Lasting Harm to the U.S. economy from the Financial Crisis (Nat’l 
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 20183, 2014)). 
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The primary causes of the loss of GDP were identified as loss of employment 
hours worked, labor-force participation, a capital investment shortfall, and 
disappointing productivity growth.837 China’s demographic clock is ticking against 
its economic growth. The fifteen to fifty-nine working age population fell by 3.45 
million last year to 937.27 million.838 This declining demographic may trim 3.25 
percentage points from its yearly growth rate between 2012 and 2030.839 
In addition, Central banks, while reducing interest rates to zero, are fighting to 
get inflation up to 2%, but are failing in that effort and economies are struggling: 
Europe is in dire economic straits. Growth in the euro zone is stuck below 
1%, unemployment is above 11% and inflation is hovering around 0.4% 
far from the European Central Bank’s 2% goal and dangerously near 
outright deflation. This week the Paris-based OECD rich-country club 
warned that the euro zone was mired in stagnation, and added that it was 
dragging down the world economy. Even the pope has joined in, calling 
the European Union “elderly and haggard.”840 
Deflation is destructive to the economy as explained: 
[T]he belief that money made tomorrow will be worth less than money 
today stymies investment; the belief that goods bought tomorrow will be 
cheaper than goods bought today chokes consumption. Central bankers 
can no longer set real (that is, inflation-adjusted) interest rates low enough 
to restore demand. Wages, incomes and tax revenues all stall, 
undermining the ability of households, businesses and governments to pay 
their debts-debts which, in real terms, will grow more burdensome under 
deflation.841 
The burden of Eurozone debt can cause turbulence in the market: 
Soldiering has been described as long periods of boredom punctuated 
by moments of sheer terror. Financial markets seem to be developing the 
same pattern. The boredom stems from a massive central-bank 
intervention in markets.  
As long as investors remain convinced that central banks are in control 
of events, and can adjust monetary policy to avoid recession and inflation, 
volatility will be low for most of the time. In these quiet periods, the 
dominant trend will be momentum-investors buying the assets that have 
most recently risen in price. By September, for example, investors were 
heavily exposed to peripheral European bonds (the debt of Greece and 
                                                            
 837  Id. 
 838  Id. 
 839  Id. 
 840  Fiddling while Europe burns, ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 2014, at 13. 
 841  The dangers of deflation: The pendulum swings to the pit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2014, at 
25 (containing a by-line that reads, “Politicians and central bankers are not providing the 
world with the inflation it needs; some economies face damaging deflation instead”). With an 
inflation rate of 0.3% Europe, which produces almost a fifth of world output, may be forced 
into recession next year. Id. at 15. 
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Spain, for example) and to cyclical stocks (those that perform best when 
the economy is dong well). 
But when the trend changes, prices may move very sharply, as the 
terrified herd stampedes out of what can be illiquid markets. In the last 
four weeks, defensive stocks have outperformed cyclicals by one of the 
greatest margins in history, according to BlackRock, a fund management 
group.842 
After six years of near zero interest rates, central banks are considering how to 
return to normal interest rates since there continues to be low rates of inflation.843 
The fear is that returning too quickly will undermine the recovery while deflation 
looms as a great concern. Many observers are calling for efforts to bring inflation up 
to the target of 2% or even somewhat higher than that.844 
H. Social Security: A Different Kind of Defined Benefit Plan 
Social Security is different than state or private pension plans because of the 
federal government’s taxing power, ability to borrow money, fiscal policy control, 
and ability to create demand deposits through the Federal Reserve’s quantitative 
easing. These powers in the hands of a solvent and stable government may provide 
the confidence desired by the public, but, in the hands of irresponsible politicians, 
can lead to a disaster affecting the entire nation with no one there to bail them out.  
The federal government has reached the point where the Social Security tax 
receipts by themselves are insufficient to pay the benefits and general budget funds 
are used to repay accruing interest on the Social Security trust fund. That condition 
will worsen as claims against the trust fund grow. Since the federal budget is not in 
balance, the Social Security deficit will be closed with borrowed funds. The federal 
government, like Illinois, New Jersey, and California, is borrowing to pay current 
Social Security benefits. 
Over its first four decades, Social Security provided much larger windfall 
benefits for high earners than for lower earners. This occurred early in the program 
when participants had little time to contribute. The costs for the windfalls were left 
for later generations to pay when, for many workers, the windfalls would disappear 
and Social Security would become a bad deal.845 That bad deal will likely become 
even worse as the system is reformed to save it.846 
Traditional methods of reducing government debt through inflation may not 
work with debt accumulated for Social Security since benefits are structured to 
                                                            
 842  Buttonwood, Liquid diet: Recent market turbulence may be only a foretaste, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2014, at 74. 
 843  See generally Neil Irwin, Why Very Low Interest Rates May Stick Around, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/upshot/why-very-low-interest-rates-
may-stick-around.html. 
 844  Monetary policy and asset prices, A narrow path, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2014, at 67 
(noting central banks around the world are struggling to promote growth without fomenting 
worrisome risk-taking.) 
 845  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 279. 
 846  Id. 
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account for inflation unlike many other pensions. The case is different in Europe 
where: 
Inflation indexation of pensions is a politically charged issue and is 
particularly so in European countries, where this has become the norm. 
This probably lines up with many other entitlement issues, which are 
likely to be thrown into serious challenge as the full extent of the pension 
crisis problems unfold.847 
Of course we may simply believe we will never have to pay off the national debt 
or that inflation will eliminate it altogether. But at some point, the reality of the 
flawed system will manifest itself and some people will bear the pain of that system. 
Social Security creates a complex set of incentives and disincentives for 
continuing to work. If you retire early at age sixty-two, you receive a reduced benefit 
that is further reduced if you continue to work and earn more than a minimum 
amount of money, creating a disincentive to work.848 At “full” retirement there is an 
incentive to continue working and delaying starting the benefit until age seventy 
when the benefit will be enhanced by 8% for each year worked after full retirement 
age until age seventy.849 A disincentive to continue working after age seventy is that 
a person continues to contribute to Social Security without any significant increase 
in benefit. 850  
When discussing the sustainability of Social Security, most focus on the 
increasing ratio of retired persons to working persons paying for the retirement and 
on the increased longevity of the retired population.851 Until recently, the retirement 
age has been moving earlier and earlier and the impact of the Social Security 
program on this decision has not been highlighted. Many people find that retirement 
is not what it is cracked up to be and prefer working. In fact, some perceive that the 
long-term trend is that people will be working well into their seventies.852 
In the Social Security system, each individual has no choice in the amount to 
contribute, the manner in which it is invested, or the form of payment in which the 
                                                            
 847  MARIN, supra note 2, at 18. 
 848  Retirement Planner: Benefits By Year Of Birth, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
 849  Id. 
 850  One commentator observes: 
What has not been widely appreciated is that the provisions of the social security 
programs themselves often provide strong incentives to leave the labor force. By 
penalizing work, social security systems magnify the increased financial burden 
caused by aging populations and thus contribute to their own insolvency. 
Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the 
World: the Relationship to Youth Employment 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 14647, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14647.pdf. 
 851  CHRIS FARRELL, UNRETIREMENT HOW BABY BOOMERS ARE CHANGING THE WAY WE 
THINK ABOUT WORK, COMMUNITY, AND THE GOOD LIFE 21 (2014). 
 852  Id. (“My own guess is that the average age at retirement over the next quarter century 
or so will rise to seventy.”). 
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benefit is to be received.853 Because changes advocated to the Social Security system 
all involve a form of forced savings with some limitation on investment choices, the 
assertion can be made that the differences are merely “haggling about the price.”854 
However, “no choice” is qualitatively different than having some choice in the future 
of one’s retirement assets, and, having choice and control, creates a sense of 
ownership and investment in a system in which one can see and understand the 
implications of saving for the future. 
With the One Fund Solution, a participant recognizes that at some point the 
required contributions may come to an end. The level projected herein is when the 
value of the account reaches $1 million. As time passes, many people will inherit a 
portion of the One Fund accounts of their parents and thus begin life with a legacy of 
inter-generational inherited wealth to build their own future. One can make 
additional contributions in an effort to get to a given level and qualify for alternative 
investments earlier in life. Of course, making additional contributions would work 
against many economic policies, which depend on consumer spending. Further, and 
more importantly, the One Fund Solution encourages the participant to investigate 
and learn about the system rather than merely being a passive participant.  
Today, in exchange for a base amount in retirement and certain disability and 
survivor benefits every person is required to give approximately 12.4% of their 
lifetime earnings into the Social Security system.855 This 12.4% commitment begins 
with one’s first job and ends only when one stops working, but the restrictions end 
only at death. The capturing of over 12% of our lifetime earnings is like an 
indentured servant of colonial times who gave three years labor for passage to the 
new world.856 But an indentured servant could look forward to a day in the near 
future when he would be free to make his own decisions and perhaps improve his 
lot.  
With Social Security, unless the individual is in the lowest earning groups, the 
“deal” is not a good deal, nor a fair deal, but a deal that is sure to get worse; and a 
time will come when the legacy costs will demand payment and benefits will have to 
shrink. Thus far, Congress’s sole objective has been to avoid pain for anyone and 
pass the problem on to the next generation. The choices suggested herein are not 
politically attractive. Even when solutions are suggested in other broad reform 
proposals, they receive stinging rebukes. No one will be happy to pay for benefits, 
but at some point, hard choices will need to be made and the choice will come down 
                                                            
 853  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 91-92. 
 854  Id. at 113. 
 855  Id. at 106. 
 856  In 1738, Henry Meyer, in consideration of the payment of his passage from Rotterdam 
to Bucks County Pennsylvania by Abraham Heslant, agreed to work for Heslant as a servant 
for a period of three years and Abraham Heslant agreed to provide Meyer with food, clothing, 
and lodging during the three year period and thereafter Meyer was to be made free and given 
two suits of clothes, one of which to be new. The contract of indenture is available at the 
Wikipedia site for the definition of indentured servant. Contract of Indenture, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/86/Indenturecertificate.jpg (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2014). 
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to housing, health care, retirement, or education. States and cities are already making 
such choices.857 
The enormous growth of government into the control of housing, health care, and 
education has taken much of the freedom once experienced by individuals. The 
result has been a total dependence of government decisions in every major area of 
life. With dependence comes a loss of freedom, control, and human dignity, 
precisely the opposite of what the founders of the program intended.  
Social Security has become a mixture of retirement planning and welfare. The 
picture lacks transparency and is distorted. If welfare is necessary, it should be 
provided outside the retirement system or be a separate supplemental system distinct 
from the One Fund Solution.858 Such a separation will allow people to intelligently 
save for retirement and be responsible for their own future. 
I. Alleviating the Problem and Facilitating a Transition 
State and local governments, along with their elected officials, are great at 
promising benefits but abhorrent at setting the money aside to fund those promises. 
Although funding pensions and retiree health care will come at the expense of 
bridges, roads, schools, and other vital community needs. Further, cutting benefits 
requires political fortitude that few politicians are willing to muster. Private 
employer pensions have also proved problematic, as government-funding 
requirements have been subject to manipulation depending on the revenue needs at 
the time. Finding defined benefit plans impossible to manage employers have shifted 
the burden of investment decision and risk onto insurance companies and are in the 
process of eliminating defined benefit plans. 
Transitioning to a new system requires radical change and a source of revenue to 
fund the change as demonstrated by the Chilean system. Chile achieved the 
transition by transferring government assets into private hands.859 There are ways 
this could be accomplished in the United States and it could involve a gradual 
change. Removing the United States and its people out of the spiral of continuing 
debt should begin with a ten-year transition period as described in this and the 
following sections. The society and the world have grown up in a debt dependence 
that bankrupts nations and ruins individual lives and families. Insuring against 
catastrophes for individual disability and premature death is relatively inexpensive if 
planned for in advance through life and disability insurance.  
                                                            
 857  Mark Peters & Kris Maher, Schools in Detroit, Chicago Seek State Help, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 21, 2016, at A3. 
 858  This recommendation goes against the argument that a program for the poor is a poor 
program because the use of dedicated tax revenues and making the system universal has had 
the desired effect of preventing reductions in Social Security, but has also prevented any 
change that would make the system more efficient or financially sustainable. See supra notes 
195, 224 and accompanying text. Lack of transparency and system complexity has also 
allowed for the gaming of Social Security. Two strategies to maximize Social Security 
benefits, “file and suspend” and “restricted application,” are being eliminated by the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. Glenn Ruffenach, A Strategy to Maximize Social Security 
Benefits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2016, at R2.  
 859  Pensions in Chile, supra note 598. 
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1. Expand the Workforce  
Professor Samuelson’s comment that “[a] growing nation is the greatest Ponzi 
game ever contrived”860 could provide an answer to the dilemma faced by nations 
with large aging populations and younger populations desiring smaller families. In 
terms of Social Security, this dilemma prompts the perpetual discussions of the ratio 
of workers paying the taxes and the beneficiaries receiving the payments from the 
system. In such discussions, the questions focus on birth rates, women in the work 
force, and immigration.  
The United States is ahead of the many developed countries in that women 
started migrating into the workforce back in the 1960s and the United States birth 
rate has consistently been maintained at the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman 
age eighteen to forty-eight.861 With United States immigration and expanding female 
participation in the workforce, the imbalance between household types is changed 
and Social Security funding is enhanced. The United States has already reaped 
economic benefits from some of these changes: 
The increases in women’s labor force participation rates since the late 
1960s have more than offset the reduced labor force participation rates of 
older men. As a result, since 1970, the percentage of time in the 
workforce has increased for the prime-age adult population. This has been 
a major contributing factor in our economic growth and higher standards 
of living over the latter part of the century. The trends raise the question 
whether higher female workforce participation rates will change long-
term retirement patterns. The answer is, probably not.862 
Congress and the administration has been debating reform of the immigration 
system, but show little hope of reaching a solution before the 2016 elections.863 The 
flow of low-skilled workers seems to be continuing while higher skilled workers find 
immigration opportunities limited.864 
2. Return to the Fiscal Constitution  
A 2014 book by Bill White outlining the fiscal condition of the United States 
from the Revolutionary War to the present notes five periods in which the country 
has incurred high levels of debt it moved quickly to balance the budget, even 
                                                            
 860  Shaviro, supra note 170, at 95 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan 
Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467 
(1958)). 
 861  GLADYS MARTINEZ ET AL., FERTILITY OF MEN AND WOMEN AGED 15–44 YEARS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 2006–2010, at 1 (2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr051.pdf. 
 862  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 179. 
 863  See Joshua Briesblatt, What to Expect from Congress on Immigration in 2016, IMMIGR. 
IMPACT (Jan 5, 2016), http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/01/05/congress-immigration-2016/. 
 864  A recent article suggests that the Obama administration is looking to immigration 
reform as a vital element in improving the financial health of Social Security by adding 
millions of newly legalized workers to the workforce. Editorial, President Obama’s New 
Budget, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/opinion/president-
obamas-new-budget.html. 
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maintain surpluses, for up to a decade to bring the debt into controllable levels 
calling the tradition the “Fiscal Constitution.”865 That tradition collapsed in the 
twenty-first century when the author could assert: 
Never before had the federal government waged major wars without 
raising taxes. Never before had it so heavily relied on foreign creditors. 
Never before had the president and Congress financed a permanent new 
domestic program entirely with debt. Never before had progressives 
accepted, much less insisted on, the substitution of federal debt for payroll 
contributions supporting the Social Security trust fund. Never before had 
many conservatives organized the fight against a constitutional 
amendment requiring a balanced budget. Never before had so many 
leaders of each major political party claimed that balancing the budget—
even with national income at an all-time high—would impair sustainable 
economic growth. After 2000 the federal government borrowed increasing 
amounts to pay for routine operating expenses in addition to debt incurred 
to pay for wars and recession-related stimulus.866 
The Fiscal Constitution is comprised of four basic principles that stood for 200 
years until its collapse under President Bush. The first principle is clear budget 
accounting (i.e. transparency of the budget revenues and expenditures). The second 
principle is pay-as-you-go budget planning. The third principle is dedicating taxes to 
a fund for a specific purpose tightening the link between spending and taxing. The 
fourth principle is congressional approval of the amount and purpose of any new 
debt.867  
The following statement by President Lincoln’s last treasury secretary, former 
Indiana banker Hugh McCulloch, provided a clear example of the principle of 
paying down debt: 
As all true men desire to leave to their heirs unencumbered estates, so 
should it be the ambition of the people of the United States to relieve their 
descendants of this national mortgage . . . . since wars are not at an end, 
and posterity will have enough to do to take care of the debts of their own 
creation.”868 
Secretary McCulloch’s statement recognizes a flaw not only in Social Security, 
but a flaw in our own thinking as a country and society that we live to consume all 
that we produce and failing to leave an inheritance is somehow a virtue.869 Another 
story line is set out in a recent book, in which the author described telling his clients 
the “last check they write should be to their undertaker . . . and that it should 
                                                            
 865  TOM WHITE, AMERICA’S FISCAL CONSTITUTION: ITS TRIUMPH AND COLLAPSE 408 
(2014). 
 866  Id. at ix. 
 867  Id. at 43-44, 68. 
 868  Id. at 110 (citing HUGH M. MCCULLOCH, MEN AND MEASURES OF HALF A CENTURY 206 
(1888)). 
 869  MCCULLOCH, supra note 868, at 206. 
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bounce.870 To be fair, the author suggests living off “life-time” annuities and making 
judicious gifts to loved ones during life rather than at death so that you can conclude, 
“by striving to die broke you guarantee you live well.”871 
An honorable practice recognized early in our nation’s history was the 
understanding that the nation needed to conserve its credit capacity to be available in 
the event of an emergency. Thus early borrowings tended to be longer term even at a 
higher interest rate because “[l]ong maturities on the federal debt gave the United 
States more flexibility in dealing with the unknown.”872 Debt was a resource to be 
used sparingly and then paid off quickly. Debt was necessary to (1) preserve the 
union, (2) secure and extend the nation’s borders, (3) fight a war, or (4) fund deficits 
during a recession.873 Another lesson is that the federal government does not need to 
spend borrowed money in order for the economy to grow.874 
3. Breaking the Logjam of Tax Expenditures 
Another author finding confidence in America’s ability to handle its fiscal 
problems was C. Eugene Steuerle.875 Steuerle finds support for his confidence in the 
actions of Alexander Hamilton who handled the Revolutionary War debt through the 
institution of the “hidden” tariff tax and of Theodore Roosevelt who enacted the “not 
so hidden” income tax and the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank at the beginning 
of the Progressive Era.876 These actions took political courage, flexibility, and a 
determination to solve the problems facing the nation. The problem today, in 
Steuerle’s view, is that all government revenues are committed not just for today, but 
also for the twenty-first century and beyond, as a result of inconsistent spending and 
tax policies.877 The result is that the current discussion is about sustainability rather 
than how can government be opened so that future generations have the ability to 
make their own policy choices.878 Steuerle’s three-point plan is summarized as: 
                                                            
 870  STEPHEN POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE: A RADICAL FOUR PART FINANCIAL PLAN 
(1998). 
 871  Id. 
 872  WHITE, supra note 865, at 51. 
 873  Id. at 67. 
 874  Id. at 86, 393. The idea of America’s Fiscal Constitution was taken up again in Carl 
Lane’s book, A Nation Wholly Free, which describes in detail how, through the efforts and 
determination of President Andrew Jackson, America was able to experience two years, 1835-
1837, as a debt free country. Applying the lessons of Jackson to the current situation, Lane 
warns of the urgency, stating anything might trigger a loss of confidence in the United States 
creditworthiness which could cause “wide spread misery, civil disorder, and the possible 
collapse of our institutions.” CARL LANE, A NATION WHOLLY FREE (2015); see also Daniel 
Shuchman, When America Paid Its Debts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2015, at A1. 
 875  Steuerle recognizes that the nation’s long-standing aversion to debt, which seems to 
have ended with Vice President Dick Cheney’s comment to Treasury Secretary O’Neill that 
“[d]eficits don’t matter.” STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 35. 
 876  Id. at 22-29. 
 877  Id. at 29. 
 878  Id. 
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1. Remove the automatic and eternal built-in growth in programs that 
current policies will generate . . . . 
2. Pay our bills in normal economic times and stop pretending that 
deficit-financed tax cuts do anything more than shift burdens onto our 
children; and  
3. Start using some of the resources that we free up from steps (1) and 
(2), above, to invest wisely in our children, in programs devoted more 
to opportunity and mobility than ever-more consumptions . . . .879 
Seeing the federal government tax and spending policies as alternating between 
“giveaways” and “takebacks,” Steuerle sees the country entering the “takeback” 
phase after excessive spending and tax cuts dominated the Presidency’s of Bush and 
Obama, although both Republicans and Democrats will seek to keep their prior 
successes.880 Steuerle sees the rate of growth of spending exceeding the growth of 
revenue forever—or until the economy collapses—and points out that projections 
under current law are that United States federal debt as a percentage of GDP will 
approach 250% by mid-century.881 Such growth of debt will result in four economic 
consequences as follows: (1) rising and unsustainable levels of debt; (2) a shrinking 
ability to fight recession or meet other emergencies; (3) a budget for a declining 
nation that invests ever less in its future, particularly in children and youth; and (4) 
broken government, as reflected in antiquated tax and social welfare systems.882 
In discussing these consequences, Steuerle points out that no one knows when 
lenders will come to the point of refusing to fund the national debt, but it is sure to 
come at some point. But it is the broken system in which he points to outdated tax 
expenditures for housing and retirement that fail to achieve their purposes. Over 
$400 billion in tax relief is dedicated toward savings for retirement, higher 
education, and retirement, but personal savings remains low often hardly exceeding 
the amount of the subsidy.883 Numerous other tax subsidies likewise fail to achieve 
their purposes.884 He criticizes state and military pensions as not reflecting realistic 
budget constraints and notes many inconsistencies in the Social Security program 
including requirements to pay for benefits you will not receive such as the spousal 
benefit being paid for by single taxpayers, the benefit for divorced spouses requiring 
ten years of marriage, and certain benefits for children of healthy but retired 
parents.885 
Along with the four economic consequences, Steuerle posits three deadly 
political consequences: 
                                                            
 879  Id. at 31. 
 880  Id. at 66-70. 
 881  Id. at 82-83. 
 882  Id. at 82. 
 883  Id. at 98. 
 884  Id. at 97-99. 
 885  Id. at 99-101. 
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1. The decline of “fiscal democracy,” as previous decisions by dead and 
retired policymakers deprive today’s and future generations of the 
power to make their own decisions;  
2. A classic “prisoners’ dilemma,” in which liberals and conservatives 
alike assess correctly that they will “lose” politically by acquiescing 
to spending cuts or tax increases, respectively to reduce budget 
deficits or create budget flexibility; and  
3. Obstacles to “fixing” government because, to address new priorities 
or create new programs, elected officials must renege on old 
promises, telling people they are no longer entitled to the higher 
benefits or low taxes that they have come to expect. 886 
The third consequence is the greatest obstacle because, with all future revenues 
committed, politicians will be called upon to renege on old promises to get resources 
for new priorities. Restoring fiscal freedom requires more than merely reducing 
deficits under current policies to sustainable levels. Rather it requires broadly 
rescinding promises for ever-growing benefits or low taxes and moving government 
in new directions.887 For example, real reform of health care will force a realization 
that, “we cannot have it all, that we can no longer live with the illusion that we are 
entitled to all the health care we can get, no matter the price.”888 Overturning the 
status quo may take years or even decades, but Steuerle sees a bright future when 
fiscal freedom is restored and the young can again set their own priorities.889 
In summary, Steuerle is concerned about the loss of fiscal freedom brought about 
by current spending and tax priorities that has effectively committed the nation’s 
wealth through the end of the twentieth-first century. His solution is to limit or 
eliminate the automatic provisions that cause these items to grow faster than the 
economy. This is a return to a situation in which priorities are again set annually by 
the current generation of leaders. In particular, he sees the need to curtail the 
automatic growth in health and retirement spending (as protected by the Democrats) 
and the myriad of tax expenditures built into the system (as protected by the 
Republicans) in order to focus on making the twenty-first century the century of the 
child as the country focuses on promoting education of the young and investment 
that creates social mobility.890 
4. Excessive Tax Expenditures and Retirement Tax Complexity 
Improving the long-term outlook of the Social Security System inevitably 
focuses on curtailing benefits or increasing the earnings cap on the Social Security 
tax in a way that impacts higher earners.891 Such action would increase the inequality 
                                                            
 886  Id. at 104. 
 887  Id. at 113-14. 
 888  Id. at 127. 
 889  Id. at 132. 
 890  Id. at 150. 
 891  Schieber does not think the solution is as suggested by recent commissions to increase 
benefits for the low earners, decrease benefits for higher earners, increase taxes on higher 
earners, and then limit retirement tax expenditures which primarily help higher income 
individuals. SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 369. 
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of the system but would be viewed as maintaining or improving the progressivity of 
the system. Although it would make a “bad deal” for higher earners even worse, it 
may be palatable to them since they are the primary beneficiaries of the many tax 
expenditures already embedded in the Federal Income Tax Code.892 
The engine of retirement planning is the federal tax code. People wish to avoid 
paying tax on current income and want to have it accumulate tax-free over their 
working life. These plans originated during World War II when benefits provided to 
employees were not subject to the wage controls so unions could circumvent the 
limits on labor costs by demanding higher benefits.893 
Tax reform is constantly discussed in the pages of tax magazines but never 
happens. The allure of the revenue that could be generated by curtailing many tax 
expenditures is a prime target for reformers interested in lowering tax rates. 
However, tax reform seems to be only acceptable when it is “revenue neutral.” In 
other words, everyone will pay the same tax after tax reform as they paid before tax 
reform.894 It will just be lower rates and fewer deductions. 
Many of the so-called tax expenditures support pensions for middle and upper 
income individuals, many of which are in a position to fund their own retirement 
through other means.895 Furthermore, while the Social Security trust fund is credited 
for contributions from low-income individuals, the earned income tax credit and tax 
credit for children under seventeen are refundable in part to relieve low-income 
individuals of the burden of Social Security taxes.896 There is enormous revenue tied 
up in these tax expenditures. Currently, the tax expenditure associated with employer 
provided plans, IRAs, and Keoghs totals $800 billion over five years from 2014 to 
                                                            
 892  Id. at 337. Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1977 sought to tax approximately 
90% of covered wages but that percentage has since fallen to closer to 83% due to higher 
earnings growing faster than lower earnings. Id. at 336. 
 893  See id. at 13-15. 
 894  Significantly, tax reform requires bipartisanship to be successful. A recent report 
suggested that Republicans, who generally advocated major tax reductions, would like to 
repeal the deduction for state and local taxes because the benefit of the deduction favors states 
that have high state income taxes and are generally Democratic voting states (for example 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Illinois, Rhode 
Island, and Virginia are the top ten states impacted with estimated per household increases 
from $4,286 to $2,333, respectively). Richard Rubin, GOP Candidates Seek End to a Federal 
Tax Break That Benefits Blue States Most, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2016, at A5.  
 895  See id. 
 896  See Thomas Hungerford & Rebecca Theis, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Child Tax Credit History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-and-the-child-tax-
credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/. 
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2018.897 The earned income tax credit is $352.8 billion in tax expenditures over five 
years and the credit for children under seventeen is another $285.5 billion.898 
A proposal by recent commissions to limit the tax deduction for defined 
contribution plans to 20% or $20,000 was criticized as not providing an adequate 
retirement for persons earning between $100,000 and $200,000.899 Ghilarducci’s 
proposal for the Guaranteed Retirement Account (GRA) suggested curtailing the tax 
expenditures for 401(k) plans to fund the GRA.900 Another commentator suggests 
redirecting spending away from the automatic increases in retirement and healthcare 
spending on the elderly toward an investment in education for the young, increased 
infrastructure spending, and research.901 There will be many voices looking at the 
federal accumulation of power and wealth. 
The One Fund Solution would cut through the mass of tax expenditures and treat 
everyone equally. It is funded with after-tax dollars, which means that it has a 
progressive element built into the structure of the plan since low-income persons 
would contribute virtually untaxed dollars and high-income persons would be 
contributing funds taxed at the highest marginal rate. This feature alone creates an 
incentive for younger workers to make additional contributions early in their career 
when they are in low-tax brackets and able to create a retirement plan that is never 
taxed. Capping contributions to accounts at $2 million in assets and tax-free 
withdrawals up to $2 million over a lifetime would provide a $100,000 annual 
payment over thirty years of retirement even with the guaranteed real return of 3%. 
As one commentator concludes: 
I recognize that all of these items [e.g. tax expenditures for employer 
provided health care, housing and other personal itemized deductions] are 
frequently described as political “sacred cows,” but they simply are 
luxuries that we can no longer afford. Either we corral theses sacred cows, 
or they will stampede us.902 
                                                            
 897  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 730, at 32 (identifying the five-year tax 
expenditure totals as follows (in billions of dollars): Keogh plans: $52.1; Defined Benefit 
plans: $248.3; Defined Contribution plans: $399.0; Traditional IRAs: $69.5; and Roth IRAs: 
$30.2, all of which are listed under the heading “Income Security”). 
 898  Id. at 30, 32 (the earned income tax credit is listed under “Income Security” while the 
credit for children under seventeen is listed under “Education, Training, Employment, and 
Social Services”). 
 899  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 369 (referring to the Bowles-Simpson Commission and the 
Domenici-Rivlin Task Force). 
 900  Id. 
 901  STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 158 (as part of the author’s plan, the budget process needs 
to be reformed and “permanent” tax cuts need to be repealed). 
 902  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 259. Kleinbard believes that: 
All these social expenditures delivered through the tax system should be accounted for 
consistently as spending programs, whether they reduce tax liabilities or result in the 
receipt of a check. There again we see how tax expenditures occlude our 
understanding of size and function of government. 
Id. at 347. 
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Curtailing existing tax expenditures, providing income security, and dedicating 
the revenue generated thereby to funding the legacy costs of Social Security would 
be an important step toward addressing the nation’s long-term debt problem. Other 
tax expenditures directed toward middle and higher income individuals that could be 
curtailed for the same purpose are the deduction for mortgage interest on owner-
occupied residences ($405.2 billion over five years) and the deduction for property 
taxes on real property ($182.1 billion over five years).903 These two-tax expenditures 
have their advocates and their critics but whether they actually assist many middle 
income tax payers is questionable. The inability to assess the effectiveness of tax 
preferences was evident in a 1955 report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth 
and Stability: 
[If the government] decided to subsidize a certain activity, we should be 
hesitant about administering the subsidy by way of a tax preference. 
Subsidies in this form vary directly in amount with the tax brackets for the 
recipients; they are invariably hidden in the technicalities of the tax law; 
they do not show up in the budget; their cost frequently is difficult to 
calculate; and their accomplishments are even more difficult to assess.904 
A 1977 estimate was that tax expenditures for pension plans affected high end 
taxpayers more with the bottom 50% of taxpayers receiving only 5% of the benefits 
of the tax expenditures.905 While inequities in the present system of tax expenditures 
could be addressed,906 the difficulty of doing so has led some commentators to 
suggest adopting a value-added tax (VAT) to fund entitlement reform and reduce 
reliance on income taxes.907 Raising revenue is raising revenue and a VAT may well 
                                                            
 903  STEUERLE, supra note 4, at 25. Kleinbard sees “curbing tax expenditures as the most 
powerful single fiscal instrument by which we can right our fiscal ship.” KLEINBARD, supra 
note 21, at 259. In particular, Kleinbard would substitute a 15% tax credit for all personal 
itemized deductions including mortgage interest deduction, real estate tax deduction, and 
charitable deduction, among others. Id. at 258-60. 
 904  SCHIEBER, supra note 9, at 141 (citing The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income 
Tax on Taxpayer Morale, in Joint Econ. Comm. Fed. Tax Pol’y for Econ. Growth & Stability, 
84th Cong., 250-51 (1955) (statement of Walter J. Blum)). The concept of tax expenditures 
would later be taken up and formally instituted into the federal system by Stanley Surrey. Id. 
at 151. 
 905  Id. at 151. 
 906  Other inequities involve the misuse of individual retirement accounts to shelter millions 
of dollars in wealth associated with the funding of IRAs with assets where incredible wealth 
can be directed for tax deferred growth. 
 907  Martin A. Sullivan, Setting the Ground Rules for Tax Reform, 144 TAX NOTES 1352, 
1354 (2014) (citing MICHAEL GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR, 
AND COMPETITIVE PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010) (proposing a 13% VAT that would 
cut the corporate tax to 15% and include certain provisions to offset income taxes and the 
heavy burden on the poor)). Sullivan further notes that resistance to the VAT is from 
conservatives who believe it will be a “money machine” to fund new and expanded 
governmental entitlements and liberals who believe it is unfair in disproportionally burdening 
the poor. Id. at 152.  
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stunt economic growth.908 But, the real reason to avoid a VAT is that its adoption 
allows politicians to avoid the tough question of reforming the income tax code and 
eliminating special interest provisions.909 Indeed, one commentator, concerned that 
politicians would be unable to resist continual rate increases once a VAT is 
instituted, suggested expansion of tax-preferred accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs 
as a way to move toward a VAT without actually adopting one.910 The One Fund 
Solution proposed herein would offer such a move.911 
5. Technological Breakthrough 
The last few decades have seen enormous wealth developed through technical 
advances. It is possible that some such advance would produce sufficient wealth to 
make reform possible if that wealth were directed toward solving the entitlement 
problems. We see one possible advance in the oil and gas industry with the 
revolution in fracking. The fracking techniques have created a great deal of wealth 
for individuals as well as for states that have encouraged such practices.912 But states 
like California have resisted development of its energy resources and other practices 
on environmental grounds.913 The federal government has been slow to embrace the 
new technology most noticeably in the refusal to approve the Keystone XL 
pipeline.914 
                                                            
 908  Japan’s consumption tax, The Big Squeeze: A tax goes up while recovery remains 
fragile, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2014, at 42. Japan’s consumption tax goes from 5% to 8% April 
1, 2014 and to 10% in October 2015 as a way to shore up Japan’s stretched public finances. 
Id. Abe’s effort is to inflate the yen and has pushed for wage increases but not all have 
received the increased wage. Id. Exporters seem to profit most. Id. Prime Minister Abe 
delayed the scheduled October 2017 increase to 10% until April 2017 and he is still planning 
to implement the increase at that time. Mari Yamaguchi, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
says he has no plans to nix a consumption tax hike planned for next year, denying speculation 
that it will be postponed amid suggestions that Japan's economy won't be able to handle it, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 29, 2016, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-03-29/japans-abe-says-no-plans-to-
postpone-consumption-tax-hike. 
 909  KLEINBARD, supra note 21, at 375 (noting that there are not resources for a VAT or 
other consumption tax, at least for the next decade or more, and finding that a return to the 
income tax as it was prior to the Bush tax cuts in 2001 would be adequate for the foreseeable 
future). Kleinbard continues: 
I have shied away from new taxes deliberately, however. Old taxes have two great 
virtues. One is that they are well understood; the other is that they are baked into 
prices and behaviors. Moving to large-scale new taxes can later relative prices or 
change behaviors in ways that are profoundly unsettling. 
Id. at 385. 
 910  Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Resist the Seductive VAT, 150 TAX NOTES 355 (2016). 
 911  Id. 
 912  Editorial, Less Government Means More Water, INV. BUS. DAILY, Apr. 29, 2014, at A2. 
 913  Id. 
 914  Mark J. Perry, Holding Back America AS Energy Megapower, INV. BUS. DAILY, July 
28, 2014, at 2. 
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One prediction of a bright future is: 
The current deficit in retirement savings took a long time to develop, and 
the resulting problems will require an equally long time to solve. But the 
important point is that these are soluble problems. The United States is 
still a very rich country. Growth rates have slowed in recent years, but 
technology and growing prosperity in emerging markets promise renewed 
robust growth going forward. If we act quickly, intelligent financial 
planning can enable us to meet the current challenge.915 
The fall in the price of oil is a “once-in-a-generation opportunity.”916 Some 
observers see it as an opportunity to reform the energy policy and promote clean 
energy with the first step being the elimination of all forms of fossil fuel subsidies 
and tax breaks, the elimination of prohibitions on the export of oil and gas, and the 
imposition of a tax on carbon use.917 There is an opportunity to change policies but 
the priorities should include retirement, education, and healthcare, which is making 
ever-increasing demands on the economy. Federal government ownership of 52% of 
the lands in the west offers an opportunity for oil and gas exploration that could 
provide funds directed towards solving the long-term fiscal imbalance, but most of 
these lands are off limits to exploration.918 The boom in natural gas is already having 
an impact in supplying cheap natural gas worldwide and could also have profound 
geopolitical ramifications.919 
CONCLUSION 
Under Social Security, individuals receive a form of social insurance they barely 
understand or are able to evaluate for 12% of their lifetime income. Indeed 
projections are that the benefit to be received in the future may not be as attractive as 
it appears since the funding sources seem inadequate to provide the benefit.  
The One Fund Solution seeks to replace the Social Security system with an 
individual account for each individual having a guaranteed real rate of return of 3% 
along with the possibility of investing in broad based mutual funds after the account 
reaches a certain level. Amounts in the fund will be withdrawn for retirement and 
                                                            
 915  Frank, supra note 3, at x. 
 916  Seize the day, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2015, at 9 (containing a by-line that reads: “The fall 
in the price of oil and gas provides a once-in-a-generation to fix bad energy policies.”). 
 917  Id. (“A cheaper, greener and more reliable energy future could be within reach.”). 
United States bans on the export of oil and the 1920 Jones Act requiring domestically shipped 
oil to be shipped on United States owned ships are impeding the sale of oil abroad at a time 
when storage capacity is being filled threatening to force well closings and oil producer 
bankruptcies rather than lifting bans that could open world markets to United States 
producers. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How the Oil Export Ban Chokes the Fracking Boom, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2015, at A11. Congress lifted the 1975 ban on the export of United States 
oil on December 18, 2015. America lifts its ban on oil exports, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2015. 
 918  Thomas J. Pyle, Federal Lands Are A Potential Energy Bonanza, INV. BUS. DAILY, Feb. 
11, 2015, at A15 (citing studies indicating that the tax collectors would reap a $2.7 trillion 
reward for opening only a small portion of the federal lands to exploration). 
 919  Mark Perry, Natural Gas boom Is Win-Win-Win Policy, INV. BUS. DAILY, Feb. 18, 
2015, at A15. 
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other specified uses on a tax-free basis. The One Fund is sufficiently large to justify 
the idea that it will, after an appropriate phase in period, be the sole tax benefited 
plan for retirement savings. Other tax motivated plans will be phased out. Balances 
in the One Fund at the death of the owner can be passed on to the owner’s 
beneficiaries thereby creating a pattern of intergenerational wealth.  
The One Fund, since it is funded by participants with after-tax dollars, will create 
the same tax benefit for all persons. It is not a progressive plan but there is no reason 
that government cannot structure welfare plans that will dovetail with the One Fund. 
Indeed the One Fund should be expanded so that health care plans, education savings 
plans, and other savings needs can be structured through the One Fund over time. 
Individuals need to understand the true cost of retirement and health care to 
appreciate the need to accumulate significant savings over a lifetime. The One Fund 
provides that vehicle; and, should the education system provide adequate financial 
literacy to its graduates, then the One Fund would be understood throughout society. 
The One Fund Solution promotes freedom and human dignity as people take control 
of their lives and, to some extent, realize that their tax contributions will actually 
have a positive effect on the truly poor. 
In the long run, the One Fund Solution would replace the need to guarantee 
private pensions, which are likely to be terminated as people rely on the One Fund as 
their primary source of retirement income.920 The One Fund Solution is superior to 
other proposed solutions; it reduces complexity in the tax code, while promoting 
responsible independent citizens, and a more open, responsible political system. 
America’s fiscal problems are in the news on a daily basis, but rather than 
address the problem directly, Congress and President Obama choose to continue 
kicking the can down the street. This was seen in the temporary fix for the DI trust 
fund that was made in the 2015 budget deal. Congress and President Obama diverted 
additional funds from the Social Security tax for three years to avoid fixing the 
Social Security disability program before the 2016 presidential election.921 Perhaps a 
future Congress and the next President will address the problem. But the general 
federal budget has already begun repaying its OASI trust fund obligations and the 
repayment will continue to increase until the trust fund is exhausted sometime 
around 2030. Since the federal budget is in deficit, and deficits are projected for the 
indefinite future, repaying the “so-called” trust fund obligation will entail additional 
borrowing and increasing the national debt. In 2030, the trust fund is exhausted and 
the “legal” decision will be on Congress to raise taxes, decrease benefits, or simply 
recognize that funding Social Security is a general obligation of the federal budget. 
Nevertheless, the $2.8 trillion trust fund will likely have been converted to an equal 
amount of public debt.922 
A better solution is the One Fund Solution; and, the sooner it is adopted and the 
nation addresses the fact that government cannot successfully carry the burden of 
everyone’s housing, education, healthcare, and retirement and facilitates a return of 
those burdens to the individuals who are able to plan for themselves, the sooner we 
will find financial security. 
                                                            
 920  MARIN, supra note 2, at 149-50 (describing the restrictions placed on corporate actions 
by the need to have such actions approved by the PBGC). 
 921  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 922  Graham, supra note 57. 
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Everyone will feel this problem. The crisis is summarized as follows:  
As it turns out, you can outrun a food shortage problem . . . and even a 
population growth problem . . . but who can outrun the demographic 
monster created by an aging work force, slowing population growth, 
slowing economic growth, and the profligate spending that ignores 
retirement savings in favor of pretending that a pay-as-you-go approach 
will suffice? It turns out the very few can.923 
  
                                                            
 923  MARIN, supra note 2, at 61. 
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